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Judgement bias, which examines decision-making under ambiguity, is a promising
measure of affect in non-human animals. However, there are significant gaps in our
understanding of the cognitive processes underlying judgement bias and the adaptive
significance of affect-induced shifts in decision-making, which we aimed to resolve.
To this end, we investigated the relationship between reward and punisher experi-
ence, judgement bias, and affective state in rats and humans. Firstly, we conducted a
systematic review and meta-analysis of pharmacological manipulations of judgement
bias which demonstrated that pharmacological manipulations designed to alter affect
overall influenced judgement bias in the predicted direction, hence supporting the
validity of judgement bias as a measure of affect (Chapter 2). Then, we combined
behavioural experiments with computational modelling, which permitted a deeper
insight into the decision-making processes underlying behaviour. Specifically, we ex-
amined the influence of fluctuating primary (Chapter 3) and secondary (Chapter 4)
rewards and punishers on judgement bias and self-reported affect in humans. Addi-
tionally, we manipulated rats’ reward and punisher experience either prior to (Chapter
5) or within (Chapter 6) a judgement bias test session. Data from the rat and human
judgement bias studies using a within-test manipulation (Chapters 3, 4, and 6) were
analysed using a novel computational model in which we defined decision-making as
a partially observable Markov decision process. We found that reward and punisher
experience, particularly the predictability (in humans) and absolute favourability (in
rats) of these experiences, altered judgement bias primarily by influencing reward or
punisher sensitivity. Humans that reported more positively valenced affect exhibited
greater predictability-dependent modulation of judgement bias. Finally, we assessed
the extent to which the explore/exploit trade-off could provide a novel measure of
affect and found that inducing a putatively negative affective state increased the rats’
tendency to explore, rather than exploit a food source (Chapter 7).

“Wee, sleekit, cowrin, tim’rous beastie,
O, what a pannic’s in thy breastie!
Thou need na start awa sae hasty,
Wi’ bickering brattle!
I wad be laith to rin an’ chase thee,
Wi’ murd’ring pattle!”
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In this general introduction we provide the reader with an overview of both theoret-
ical and empirical research on affect, decision-making, and the relationship between
the two. We will start by defining affect, discussing its potential function and un-
derlying neural mechanisms, and describing the importance of measuring affect and
current methods available to do this. Then, we will focus on the specific relationship
between affect and decision-making, discussing the cognitive mechanisms underlying
decision-making and how these processes may be influenced by affect, before outlining
judgement bias (a concept central to this thesis) as a measure of affect. Subsequently,
we will introduce computational modelling, and discuss its value as a tool to better
understand the relationship between affect and decision-making. Finally, we will dis-
cuss the aims of this thesis in the context of outstanding questions. To aid the reader
and for clarity, a glossary of key terms used in this thesis can be found below (Table
1.1).
1.1 Affective states: an ethological perspective
1.1.1 What is affect?
Defining affect is imperative to its scientific investigation. We start by differentiating
between the terms ‘emotion’, ‘mood’, and ‘affect’. Dictionary definitions for these
terms are vague and barely discriminable. For example, according to the Oxford
English Dictionary (2019) emotion is ‘a strong feeling deriving from one’s circum-
stances, mood, or relationships with others’, mood is ‘the way you are feeling at a
particular time’, and affect is defined as ‘emotion or desire as influencing behaviour’.
Here, we define emotion as referring to transient states, mood as referring to longer
term states that persist in the absence of stimuli that would elicit an emotional re-
sponse, and affect being an umbrella term that encompasses both emotion and mood
(Mendl et al., 2010). Moreover, dictionary definitions are too anthropocentric for our
purposes. The word ‘feeling’ implies that affect comprises a subjective component
which we cannot say with certainty applies to non-human animals 1. It is clear from
1Although it should be noted that there is consensus in the scientific community that non-human
animals may subjectively experience affect; the Cambridge Declaration on consciousness signed by
a number of scientists states that ‘the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in
possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness’.
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Table 1.1: Glossary of key terms used in this thesis
Term Definition
Affect
A multicomponential state, comprising physiology, behaviour, cognition
and potentially subjective feelings that is valenced and also varies in terms
of arousal.
Affective arousal The extent to which an affective state promotes behavioural activation orinhibition.
Affective disorders A pathological condition characterised by abnormalities of affectivestate.
Affective valence The extent to which an affective state is pleasant or unpleasant.
Anxiety An affective disorder (in humans) characterised by a chronically negativelyvalenced and high arousal affective state.
Bayesian inference
Updating of a belief following new evidence following Bayes’ rule
(i.e. P (A|B) = P (B|A)P (A)P (B) ).
Depression An affective disorder (in humans) characterised by a chronically negativelyvalenced and low arousal affective state.
Emotion A short term affective state; typically elicited by rewards or punishers.
Feeling The subjective component of affect.
Judgement bias The tendency to opt for either a ‘risky’ or ‘safe’ option, particularlywhen there is ambiguity about the outcome of the ‘risky’ option.
Mood A longer term affective state that persists in the absence of rewards andpunishers.
Optimism
Opting for a ‘risky’ as opposed to ‘safe’ choice more often
(or do so with greater alacrity) than others individuals completing




A framework for defining a reinforcement learning problem where there
is uncertainty about the true state of the environment.
Pessimism Opting for a ‘risky’ as opposed to ‘safe’ choice less often (or withweaker alacrity) than others completing the same judgement bias test.
Prior belief The probability distibution of an outcome before evidence isconsidered.
Punisher An outcome that an individual will actively avoid.
Reinforcement learning
A framework for understanding how individuals act to maximise
reward/minimise punishment through learning from interactions with their
environment.
Reward An outcome that an individual will work to obtain.
Risk-averse A tendency to make ‘safe’ (outcome known) as opposed to ‘risky’ (outcomeunknown) choices.
Risk-seeking A tendency to make ‘risky’ (outcome unknown) as opposed to ‘safe’ (outcomeknown) choices.
Stress An acute state of negative valence and high arousal.
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the research literature, and indeed our experience as humans, that affect consists of
more than a subjective component. James (1884) and Lange (1885) considered the
physiological response to be at the core of emotion. They suggested that peripheral
feedback precedes feelings; that ‘we feel frightened because we are running away’.
Other researchers have acknowledged the behavioural component of affect, such as
facial expressions (Berridge, 1996; Berridge and Robinson, 2003; Sandem et al., 2002)
and vocalisations (Knutson et al., 2002; Watts and Stookey, 2000; Zimmerman and
Koene, 1998). Indeed, Darwin (1872) describes the bodily expressions associated with
discrete emotions in both human and non-human animals in his seminal book ‘The
Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals’. It has also been purported that
cognition is an integral part of affect (Paul et al., 2005), with affect suggested to
influence a number of cognitive processes including attention (Crump et al., 2018;
Mathews and MacLeod, 1994) and memory (Cahill and McGaugh, 1998; Christian-
son, 1992). According to Lazurus’ cognitive-mediational theory (Lazarus, 1991) and
appraisal theory (Scherer et al., 2001), emotion arises from our appraisal of a situa-
tion; if we see a snake we may not feel scared if we assess that the snake poses no
danger in a particular situation.
Dolan (2002) accounted for both the cognitive and physiological components when
defining affect as ‘psychological or physiological states that index occurrences of value’.
Anderson and Adolph’s (2014) definition of emotion as ‘an internal CNS (central ner-
vous system) state that gives rise to physiological, behaviour, cognitive, and (subjec-
tive) responses’, encapsulates the multicomponent nature of emotion. This is similar
to Roseman’s (2008) definition which states that emotion comprises phenomenology
(thought and feeling qualities), physiology (neural, chemical, and other physical re-
sponses in the brain and body), expressions (signs of emotion state), behaviours (ac-
tion tendencies or readiness), and emotivations (characteristic goals that people want
to attain when the emotion is experienced).
Yet, while these definitions outline the components of emotion, which is undeniably
valuable for considering affect in non-human animals, the above definitions cannot be
used to distinguish between different affective states. There are two main approaches
to characterising affective states: a discrete approach in which affect is described as
distinct categories, and a dimensional approach in which affect is defined along a few
(usually two or three) dimensions. Ekman (1984) proposed the following categories
of emotion: happiness, fear, anger, surprise, grief and sadness. These categories were
derived from the observation that these emotions are associated with distinct facial ex-
pressions which can be accurately categorised cross-culturally, thought to reflect that
distinct and innate biological processes underlie each emotion. Furthermore, Darwin
(1872) noted similarities between human and non-human animal expressions in re-
sponse to threat. Likewise, Panksepp advocated the existence of distinct underlying
neurosystems that mediated seeking, rage, fear, lust, care, panic, and play (Panksepp,
1982, 1998). However, meta-analyses of neuroimaging studies have highlighted in-
consistencies in the neurocircuitry associated with these discrete emotions (Hamann,
3
Chapter 1. General Introduction
2012; Lindquist et al., 2012).
Further challenges to a discrete approach to defining affect include the existence of
culture-specific emotions, such as ‘age-otari’ in Japan, referring to the feeling of having
a bad haircut (Mendl and Paul, 2017). Additionally, by definition, discrete emotions
should be entirely distinct. Yet, emotions can be grouped by elemental features; for
example, happiness and surprise are more alike than happiness and sadness.
Using factor analysis of subjective reports of emotional words, research has re-
vealed that self-reported affect forms a circumplex structure (Russell, 1980; Russell
et al., 1989a; Watson et al., 1999; see Fig. 1.1) supporting a dimensional approach to
classifying affect. Valence (the pleasantness or unpleasantness of the affective state),
which according to many researchers is the defining characteristic of affect, and arousal
(the level of activation) are the most frequently used dimensions (Barrett and Rus-
sell, 1999; Carver, 2001; Mendl et al., 2010; Russell, 2003; Watson et al., 1999). For
example, excitement is a positively valenced high arousal state, while depression is a
negatively valenced low arousal state. Neural substrates have also been proposed to
underlie these dimensions. In particular, the mesolimbic system has been associated
with affective valence, while the reticular formation has been associated with affective
arousal (Posner et al., 2005). Moreover, these dimensions have also been considered
in terms of the actions they likely promote and the neurobehavioural systems under-
lying these actions. Positively valenced high arousal states have been considered to
encourage reward acquisition when rewards are abundant, while negatively valenced
low arousal states have been considered to promote withdrawal in the absence of ob-
tainable rewards. In contrast, negatively valenced high arousal states been proposed
to aid punisher avoidance in high predation environments, while positively valenced
low arousal states have been considered to promote relaxation in the absence of pun-
ishers to avoid (Boureau and Dayan, 2011; Mendl et al., 2010; see Fig. 1.1). Thus,
these dimensions can also be considered in terms of rewards and punishers (relating
to valence), and behavioural inhibition and activation (relating to arousal); dopamine
been proposed to mediate invigoration in the face of reward and serotonin has been
proposed to mediate inhibition when faced with a punisher (Boureau and Dayan,
2011; Mendl et al., 2010). The theory of constructed emotion offers an explanation
for the perception of affect as discrete; it suggests that this results from interocep-
tion, perception of the situation, and past experience, rather than biologically distinct
processes (Barrett, 2014, 2017).
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Figure 1.1: A dimensional approach to defining affect; (A) a circum-
plex model of emotion (adapted from Posner et al., 2005) - discrete
emotions can be defined according to their position on an arousal axis
and a valence axis; (B) an individual’s location in this space may reflect
their cumulative reward and punisher experience in their environment.
We consider a dimensional approach to be most appropriate for the study of af-
fect in human and non-human animals as it allows the characterisation of affective
states without being dependent on human constructs of emotion, thereby obviating
the possibility of anthropomorphism. Additionally, it allows us to focus specifically
on affective valence and affective arousal, the former being highly relevant to animal
welfare, with good welfare being associated with positively valenced affective states
and absence of negatively valenced affected states.
To be explicit, we define affect as a multicomponential state, comprising physiol-
ogy, behaviour, cognitive and potentially subjective feelings that is valenced and also
varies in terms of arousal. Additionally, we find Roll’s (2013) definition of emotion
as ‘states elicited by rewards and punishers’ helpful as it allows operationalisation of
the concept of emotion in non-human animals. Indeed, reward and punisher experi-
ence has been proposed to be central to mood and allow adaptive behaviour towards
potential future rewards and punishers.
1.1.2 The adaptive significance of affect
It has been suggested that affect functions to allow adaptive behaviour towards fitness-
enhancing rewards (e.g. food, water, mates, shelter) and fitness-costly punishers (e.g.
predatory attack, thermal damage, poison; Mendl et al., 2010; Nettle and Bateson,
2012; Trimmer et al., 2013). More specifically, affect (particularly mood) might func-
tion to coordinate an appropriate response to potential rewards or punishers or a
lack thereof given past experience of rewards and punishers, allowing rewards to be
maximised and punishers to be minimised. The hypothesis that affect organises and
coordinates behaviour is pervasive in the literature, with affect having been suggested
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to prioritise goals (Clore et al., 1994; Oatley and Jenkins, 1992) and influence decision-
making (Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Dunning et al., 2017; Mendl et al., 2010; Nettle
and Bateson, 2012). Similarly, pleasure has been described as providing a common
currency for decision-making (Cabanac, 1992).
The somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) states that affect guides decision-making
(Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Damasio, 1994). Specifically, the SMH proposes that
physiological responses to potential rewarding and punishing outcomes (somatic mark-
ers) facilitate decision-making. This has most frequently been studied in the context of
risky decision-making, and the finding that individuals who show an impaired physio-
logical response due to brain damage perform more poorly than controls on risk-based
behavioural tasks (e.g. the Iowa gambling task) has provided support for the SMH
(Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Bechara et al., 1999). However, the SMH has been sub-
ject to considerable criticism (Dunn et al., 2006; Maia and McClelland, 2004, 2005),
and has been weakened by the finding that control participants have conscious knowl-
edge of the advantageous strategy, meaning that somatic markers may not necessarily
inform decision-making (Maia and McClelland, 2004).
Signal detection theory (Green et al., 1966) has also been used to explain the
adaptive significance of affective states. Sensory information can be noisy and there
may be some degree of overlap between cues that signal rewards or punishers and
background noise. To illustrate this, consider the example of a prey animal who
has just heard a rustling noise which could either signal an approaching predator
or could just be the sound of wind moving vegetation. The individual must decide
whether to flee, which would be energetically costly but avoid the risk of predation, or
ignore the noise and conserve energy but risk predation. An anxious mood resulting
from, for example, repeated encounters with predators or a weakened ability to evade
predators due to poor health might result in a reduced threshold for responding to
potentially threatening signals (Bateson et al., 2011). However, an individual who
is relaxed, reflecting their good health and few punishing experiences, might have
a higher response threshold for potential threats (Bateson et al., 2011; Nettle and
Bateson, 2012). Similarly, affective state might modulate an individual’s threshold
for responding to potential rewards. Additionally, high arousal affective states which
promote activity, such as anxiety or excitement, may be beneficial when there are
rewards to be approached, or punishers to be avoided, while low arousal affective
states might allow the conservation of energy when there are few punishers to evade
or rewards to be obtained. Thus, mood has been proposed as a system which encodes
and integrates information about the state of the individual and their environment
to optimise responses to signals indicating potential fitness-enhancing rewards and
potential fitness-costly punishers (Bateson et al., 2011; Mendl et al., 2010; Nettle and
Bateson, 2012; Trimmer et al., 2013). A core assumption of this hypothesis is that
affect is a state which is driven by experience of reward and punisher, and success at
acquiring or avoiding them, which will be investigated in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6.
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1.1.3 Measuring affect in non-human animals
Typically, human affect is measured through self-report (e.g. Anderson et al., 2012;
Iigaya et al., 2016; Paul et al., 2011). Numerous questionnaires have been developed
for this purpose, such as the affect grid (Russell et al., 1989b), the Positive and
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988), revised Life Orientation Test
(LOT-R; Scheier et al., 1994), and Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961).
However, the accuracy of these measures depends on the willingness of a person to
disclose their affective state; for example, an individual may conceal their mood to
avoid judgement or to appease the experimenter and it also depends on the individual’s
ability to accurately assess their own affective state. However, as these questionnaires
provide a means to gain insight into the subjective component of affect in humans,
they are an unparalleled tool in the translational study of affect.
Although describing positive animal welfare has been approached in numerous
ways, for example, considering biological fitness (Barnett and Hemsworth, 1990;
Hurnik and Lehman, 1988), physical condition (Broom, 1991; Veissier et al., 2008), or
whether individuals are able to express natural behaviours (Hughes and Duncan, 1988;
Veissier et al., 2008), ultimately, concerns about animal welfare stem from the belief
that non-human animals subjectively experience negative affective states. Therefore,
consideration of the psychological state of the animal should be of utmost importance
when measuring welfare (Dawkins, 2008; Duncan, 2004).
In the United Kingdom, 1.89 million protected animals2 were used for experimen-
tal procedures in 2016 (UK Home Office, 2017); these experimental procedures were
considered to induce moderate suffering in 26% of animals used, and severe suffering
in 5% of animals used (UK Home Office, 2017). Improving welfare is important for
the benefit to the individual animals but compromised welfare is also considered to
reduce the reliability and repeatability of scientific results (Poole, 1997; Prescott and
Lidster, 2017). Therefore, ensuring positive laboratory animal welfare is of paramount
importance. Accurate and reliable measures of animal affect would allow the impact
of refinements to experimental procedures and husbandry in terms of animal welfare
to be assessed. Moreover, improved measures of welfare could also help to progress
a number of fields in which affect research is conducted, such as neuroscience, pain
research, and psychopharmacology.
Physiology, behaviour and/or cognition are typically considered when measuring
affect in non-human animals. Several physiological measures have been proposed to
measure individual’s emotional response to a stimulus or situation (Carter, 2001).
These include measure of hormone levels (e.g. ACTH (Adrenocorticotropic hormone)
or glucocorticoid) reflecting HPA (hypothalamic pituitary adrenal) axis activity (Abel-
son et al., 2007; Carter, 2001; Goldstein and Kopin, 2008; Moberg and Mench, 2000;
Mormède et al., 2007), or heart rate variability or skin temperature reflecting au-
tonomic nervous system activity (Moberg and Mench, 2000; Stewart et al., 2005;
2Where a protected animal is defined as ‘any living vertebrate other than man and any living
cephalopod’.
7
Chapter 1. General Introduction
Von Borell et al., 2007), However, while heart rate and ACTH levels might rise in
response to anxiety-inducing situations such as being pursued by a predator, they
can also rise in positively valenced states of excitement (Ralph and Tilbrook, 2016).
Hence, these physiological measures might reflect affective arousal as opposed to af-
fective valence.
Methodological issues are also a major drawback of physiological measures of af-
fect. For example, blood sampling is likely to be stressful for an individual and so,
depending on the time course of the physiological response, the measure might largely
reflect the emotional response to the sampling (Broom and Johnson, 1993). Caution
must also be taken to account for diurnal and seasonal variation in hormonal mea-
sures (Mormède et al., 2007; Ralph and Tilbrook, 2016). Furthermore, there appears
to be a dissociation between verbal report and some physiological indicators of affect
in humans, which calls the reliability of physiological measure of affect into question
(Lane et al., 1997; Stone and Nielson, 2001).
Potential physiological measure of longer-term affect (mood) include telomere at-
trition and hippocampal volume. These biomarkers purport to measure an individual’s
cumulative positive and negative experiences (Bateson and Poirier, 2019; Poirier et al.,
2019). The use of such biomarkers is supported by research which has linked telomere
attrition to anxiety and depression (Darrow et al., 2016), and a healthy lifestyle to
reduced levels of telomere attrition (Puterman et al., 2015). Hippocampal atrophy has
also been associated with putatively negative mood states in both human and (Arnone
et al., 2016, 2013; McKinnon et al., 2009) and a range of non-human animals (Poirier
et al., 2019; Sierakowiak et al., 2015). Moreover, rats that were exposed to stressors
including bright light and loud sounds were found to have rostral expansion of sites in
the nucleus accumbens involved in mediating avoidant or defensive behaviour, at the
expense of sites that mediated approach or appetitive behaviour. The opposite was
found to be true for rats housed in consistently familiar, dark, and quiet environments
(Reynolds and Berridge, 2008).
Behavioural measures provide a less invasive measure of affect than physiological
measures. Vocalisations and facial expressions have been proposed as measures of
affective state in several species (Berridge, 1996; Darwin, 1872; Descovich et al., 2017;
Finlayson et al., 2016; Knutson et al., 2002; Sandem et al., 2002). In rats, for example,
50kHz ultrasonic vocalisations (USVs) and a wider ear angle have been associated with
positively valenced affect, while 22kHz USVs have been associated with negatively
valenced affect (Finlayson et al., 2016; Knutson et al., 2002). However, vocalisations
and facial expressions likely have a communicative function and so may be influenced
by the presence or absence of conspecifics (Marler and Evans, 1996; Paul et al., 2005;
Zimmerman et al., 2003) which would reduce their reliability as a of measure of affect.
Several behavioural tasks have been developed to measure longer-term affect. The
forced swim test, and its derivative the tail suspension test, are among the most com-
monly used behavioural assays for investigating depression-like states in mice and rats
(Cryan et al., 2002; Kato et al., 2007; Porsolt et al., 1977; Steru et al., 1985). In these
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tasks, rodents (typically mice or rats) are faced with an inescapable threat of drowning
or entrapment and the duration of immobility is measured. Immobility in the task
was considered to measure hopelessness or despair, common features of depression,
as the animal perceives escape attempts to be futile and because a broad range of
antidepressants resulted in reduced immobility times (Cryan et al., 2002; Cryan and
Mombereau, 2004; Kara et al., 2017). However, the interpretation of immobility as
a proxy for helplessness has been questioned and immobility is now considered to
reflect an adaptive and learnt response which allows the animal to conserve energy
and hence prolong survival (Bogdanova et al., 2013; Borsini and Meli, 1988; Molendijk
and de Kloet, 2015; Naudon and Jay, 2005; West, 1990). Although there is evidence
to suggest that learning is impaired in depression, this new perspective on immobility
weakens the validity of these tasks.
A less contentious alternative to measuring depression-like states is the sucrose
preference test which measures hedonic capacity. However, the validity of this test
has been challenged by the finding that humans with depression show no reduction
in their preference for sucrose over water (Berlin et al., 1998; Dichter et al., 2010).
Additionally, the extent to which non-human animals show a behavioural response,
such as change in latency to approach a reward or consumption of a food reward
following an increase or decrease in reward availability, deemed ‘contrast effects’, has
also been proposed as a measure of welfare. More specifically, a greater behavioural
change following a shift from smaller to a larger reward is associated with more a
positively valenced affective state, while a greater behavioural change following a
shift from a larger to a smaller reward is associated with a more negatively valenced
affective state (Burman et al., 2008b; Neville et al., 2017).
The most frequently used behavioural assay to assess anxiety-like states in non-
human animal models is the elevated plus maze (Montgomery, 1955; Pellow et al.,
1985). This task measures the propensity of mice and rats specifically (as they are
thigmotactic, Crozier and Pincus, 1928) to spend time in an open area relative to an
enclosed area, and thereby pits exploration against safety. Individuals in anxiety-like
states are expected to spend more time in the safe enclosed area. However, while
administration of traditional anxiolytics can result in rats spending more time in
closed areas, antidepressants that are used to treat generalised anxiety disorder in
humans do not consistently produce changes in exploratory behaviour (Borsini et al.,
2002; Carobrez and Bertoglio, 2005; Rodgers et al., 1997).
Other tasks developed to examine the relationship between affect and cognition
in humans have also been adapted for non-human animals. Arguably, the two most
extensively used affect-measuring cognitive tasks in humans are the visual dot probe
tasks (MacLeod et al., 1986) and modified Stroop colour naming tasks (Williams et al.,
1996). The former measures the extent to which presentation of threat words (e.g.
‘pain’) interferes with the detection of a dot probe, and the latter measures the extent
to which naming the colour in which a word is written is influenced by the valence of
the word itself (e.g. ‘death’ vs. ‘chair’). Performance on these tasks has been shown
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to be influenced by affect, with anxious individuals showing a greater decline in their
ability to detect dots or name colours when threat words are shown in comparison
to non-anxious individuals. While near-direct translations of these tasks exist for a
range of non-human animals (Allritz et al., 2016; Cussen and Mench, 2014), at their
core these tasks assess the extent to which affect biases attention, which has also
been investigated in the context of animal welfare (Crump et al., 2018). In particular,
the extent to which an individual attends to potential punishers appears to provide
a measure of affect, although specifically high arousal (e.g. anxiety-like states) as
opposed to low arousal (e.g. depression-like states; Bethell et al., 2012; Lee et al.,
2018, 2016). In addition to biases in attention, biases in decision-making have also
been used to investigate affect in both human and a range of non-human animals.
This will be discussed in greater detail in section 1.3.
1.1.4 Affective neuroscience
Ultimately, the behavioural, cognitive, physiological, and subjective components of af-
fect have a neural origin. In particular, the adrenergic, dopaminergic, GABA (gamma-
Aminobutyric acid), and serotoninergic systems have been implicated as determinants
of affect and also have a role in the processing of rewards and punishers (Kalia, 2005;
Lövheim, 2012; Price and Drevets, 2010; Ruhé et al., 2007). Variation in the sensi-
tivity of these systems resulting from either genetic or environmental factors may be
responsible for variation in affect between individuals and underlie susceptibility to
affective disorders in both human and non-human animals. Here, we will discuss each
of these systems and their relationship to affect.
Epinephrine and norepinephrine are hormones and neurotransmitters that bind
to adrenergic receptors. The adrenergic system is involved in the early stages of a
stress response; it prepares the body for action by increasing heart rate, triggering
the release of glucose, and increasing blood flow to skeletal muscles (Sapolsky et al.,
2000). Brains of depressed human patients have reduced levels of norepinephrine,
and antidepressant drugs such as reboxetine selectively-target the adrenergic system
(Klimek et al., 1997; Massana, 1998). Genetic studies in both humans and mice have
linked variation in norepinephrine transporter genes to susceptibility to depression-like
states (Haenisch et al., 2009; Lin and Madras, 2006).
Dopamine is a neurotransmitter that can have both inhibitory and excitatory ef-
fects on target dopamine neurons. Dopamine is involved in moderating reward and
punisher related behaviour (Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Ikemoto and Panksepp,
1999; Niv et al., 2007; Smith and Dickinson, 1998). In particular, dopamine activity
has been shown to encode reward prediction errors (Schultz et al., 1997) and medi-
ate the incentive salience (i.e. ‘wanting’) of rewards (Reynolds and Berridge, 2002).
Dopaminergic-system dysregulation is associated with depression (Papakostas, 2006)
and depletion of tyrosine (the precursor to dopamine) has been shown to alter re-
ported mood in humans, although only in individuals at risk of major depressive
disorder (Ruhé et al., 2007). Moreover, environmental enrichment, which is assumed
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to induce a relatively positive affective state, can lead to changes in the mesocorticol-
imbic dopamine system in a range of non-human animals (Bezard et al., 2003; Laviola
et al., 2008; Segovia et al., 2010; Zhu et al., 2005)
The neurotransmitter GABA is the major inhibitory neurotransmitter in the mam-
malian brain (Nemeroff, 2003). GABA is involved in eliciting appropriate responses to
both appetitive and aversive stimuli (Reynolds and Berridge, 2002). Reduced GABA
levels are associated with panic disorder (Goddard et al., 2001; Nemeroff, 2003). A
number of commercially available treatments for anxiety disorders such as barbitu-
rates, benzodiazepines, and gabapentins are thought to work by enhancing GABA
function.
Serotonin is a primarily inhibitory neurotransmitter that binds to serotonergic
receptors (Owens and Nemeroff, 1994). Serotonin is thought to guide behaviour in
the face of aversive stimuli; and has been implicated in the prediction of aversive
events, as well as freezing and withdrawal when presented with punishers (Boureau
and Dayan, 2011; Owens and Nemeroff, 1994). There is a wealth of evidence indicat-
ing a link between low levels of serotonin and depression (see Owens and Nemeroff,
1994). Antidepressant drugs that specifically target the serotonergic system, such as
citalopram and fluoxetine, are commonly prescribed to humans experiencing depres-
sion (Mars et al., 2017). Depletion of serotonin by dietary depletion of its precursor
tryptophan in human subjects can reduce mood in those predisposed to depression
(Ruhé et al., 2007) and post-mortem examination of brain tissue from depressed and
suicidal human patients revealed reduced concentrations of serotonin (Kambeitz and
Howes, 2015). Knockout mice lacking the serotonin 1a receptor exhibit enhanced
anxiety-related behaviour (Ramboz et al., 1998).
Importantly, these neurotransmitter receptor systems are highly conserved across
species (Jorgensen, 2014; Ottaviani and Franceschi, 1996; Venter et al., 1988). Conse-
quently, investigating whether pharmacologically altering levels of affect-modulating
hormones or neurotransmitters in non-human animals induces the predicted changes
in a measure of affective state, given its effect on human mood, has become the ‘gold’
standard for validating measures of affect in non-human animals. In Chapter 2, we
describe and discuss the results of a meta-analysis and systematic review of pharma-
cological manipulations on judgement bias, a potential measure of affect (see section
2.3).
1.2 Affect, cognition, and decision-making
1.2.1 Affect and cognition
Cognition has been defined as ‘the ways in which animals take in information through
the senses, process, retain and decide to act on it’ (Shettleworth, 2000). Beck’s Schema
theory suggests that distortions in cognition contribute to the development and main-
tenance of affective disorders (Beck and Alford, 1967; Beck, 2002). These distortions,
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such as overgeneralising, catastrophising, and magnification of the importance of neg-
ative outcomes, lead to negative views about the self, the world, and the future (Beck
and Alford, 1967; Beck, 2002). Similarly, it has been suggested that an individual’s
appraisal of a situation or event determines the resulting affective state; for example,
a snake might only induce fear if an individual considers the snake to pose a threat
(Lazarus, 1991).
Affect has also been proposed to influence various aspects of cognition including at-
tention, memory, and decision-making. The influence of emotion on attention is clear;
potentially fear-inducing stimuli, such as snakes or spiders, rapidly grab our atten-
tion (Eastwood et al., 2001; Öhman et al., 2001). Anderson (2005) also demonstrated
that humans have an enhanced ability to detect emotionally salient words relative
to neutral words. Furthermore, threatening words distract anxious humans and sad
words distract depressed humans to a greater extent than clinically healthy humans.
(Williams et al., 1996). Similarly, in humans, anxiety is associated with greater atten-
tion to threatening words in the dot probe task (MacLeod et al., 1986), while positive
mood is associated with greater attention to reward-related words (Tamir and Robin-
son, 2007). However, these results are complicated by the finding that humans will
gaze at happy faces for a longer duration following a negative mood induction, which
has been proposed as a form of mood repair (Sanchez et al., 2014).
Affect has also been proposed to bias memory recall. For example, mood-
congruent memory describes the finding that memories are more readily retrieved
when their emotional significance is consistent with the individual’s current affective
state (Blaney, 1986; Elliott et al., 2002). Likewise, affect is considered to influence
interpretation of ambiguous stimuli; when presented with homophones (e.g. die/dye)
anxious humans have a greater tendency to interpret the word negatively than non-
anxious individuals (Eysenck et al., 1991; Mathews et al., 1989) and when presented
with neutral faces, humans experiencing more negative mood states are more likely
to interpret the face as being sad (Hale III et al., 1998; Leppänen et al., 2004).
Several theories have sought to explain the influence of affect in decision-making,
such as the affect heuristic (Finucane et al., 2000) and somatic-marker hypothesis
(Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Damasio, 1994), both of which describe how affective
responses may guide decision-making. Most commonly, negative affective states have
been associated with more risk-averse decision-making. For instance, depressed hu-
mans score higher on self-reported measure of harm avoidance (Joffe et al., 1993) and
following a negative affect induction humans report lower tendencies for risk-taking
(Yuen and Lee, 2003). Additionally, Anderson et al. (2012) found that anxious hu-
mans were more likely to make decisions that allowed punisher avoidance as opposed
to reward gain. Paul et al. (2011) found a positive correlation between positive af-
fect scores (as measured by the PANAS questionnaire) and bias towards risk-seeking
decision-making, and likewise a negative correlation between negative affect scores
and bias towards risk-seeking decision-making in humans. However, negative affect
12
1.2. Affect, cognition, and decision-making
has also been associated with increased risk-taking behaviour, particularly with re-
gards to gambling (Koot et al., 2013; Porcelli and Delgado, 2009; Preston et al., 2007).
1.2.2 How are decisions made?
Historically, little consideration has been given to the influence of affect on decision-
making processes. However, the question of how an optimal decision-maker should
behave, and how individuals deviate from this, especially in the context of monetary
rewards and losses, has long been studied. Expected value, first considered in the 17th
century (Daston, 1980; Ore, 1960), quantifies the long-run average value of a choice as
the summed probability of each possible outcome resulting from that choice multiplied
by its value, hence providing a means for options to be compared and decisions to
be made. However, as Bernoulli (1738) recognised, expected value does not allow for
individual differences in the subjective value of the outcome (Bernoulli, 1954; Stearns,
2000). Expected utility theory considers that the subjective value of an outcome may
differ from the absolute value, providing an explanation as to why individuals do not
necessarily select options with the highest expected value (Bernoulli, 1954; Stearns,
2000; Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953). Prospect theory, derived from economic
experiments and observations of human behaviour, further accounts for deviations in
behaviour from the predictions of expected value theory. It considers that individuals
have a biased weighting of probabilities, such that the subjective probability of high
probability events is reduced and subjective probability of low probability events in
increased relative to the true probability. Prospect theory also allows for asymmetry
in the value of outcomes, such that losses are weighted more heavily than gains.
A commonality between these theories is that they posit that individuals inte-
grate information about the probability and value of the potential outcomes of a
specific decision, thereby yielding a single value which provides a common currency
for decision-making. Neurobiological evidence suggests that such a value is estimated
and used to inform decision-making (Breiter et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2005; Lau and
Glimcher, 2008; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006, 2008; Platt and Glimcher, 1999).
It has been demonstrated that the expected value of a choice modulates the activity of
intraparietal neurons in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), and that this activation
correlates with option selected by the macaque (Platt and Glimcher, 1999). Addition-
ally, human fMRI studies have revealed activation in mesolimbic brain regions that
correlate with the expected value of a choice (Breiter et al., 2001).
In addition to an integrated representation of reward value and probability, these
two components of expected value have independent neural representations (Knut-
son et al., 2005). The mesolimbic dopaminergic system has been implicated in the
valuation of reward-related stimuli, specifically determination of the incentive value
of rewarding stimuli (Berridge, 2012; Berridge and Aldridge, 2008; McClure et al.,
2003; Zhang et al., 2009). The incentive salience of a reward (the extent to which
it is desired) has been shown to depend on D2 receptor activity (Maldonado et al.,
1997; Trifilieff et al., 2013). It has been proposed that the hedonic value of a reward
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is encoded by the opioid system (Berridge et al., 2009; Peciña and Berridge, 2000).
Encoding of probability estimation appears to also involve modulation of dopamin-
ergic activity, with the phasic activation of dopamine neurons exhibiting variation
dependent on the probability with which a reward occurs (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Tobler
et al., 2007).
1.2.3 Affect and probability estimates
Numerous studies have demonstrated that affect can alter subjective probability as-
sessments in humans. In particular, positive affect appears to result in greater esti-
mates of the probability of rewarding events and lower estimates of the probability of
punishing events, while negative affect appears to have an opposite effect on proba-
bility estimation (Johnson and Tversky, 1983; Nygren et al., 1996; Wright and Bower,
1992). For example, reading a newspaper story about death, regardless of the type
of death reported (e.g. homicide, illness, or accident) both induced negative affect
and increased the individual’s estimate of the frequency of fatal accidents (Johnson
and Tversky, 1983). Conversely, a positive affect induction was shown to increase an
individual’s rating of their likelihood of winning a bet (Nygren et al., 1996).
Affective disorders are also associated with biased probability estimates. Depressed
and anxious humans rate the probability that they will experience punishing events
more highly than clinically healthy individuals (Andersen et al., 1992; Butler and
Mathews, 1983; MacLeod and Byrne, 1996; Muris and Van der Heiden, 2006. How-
ever, there is some evidence that greater estimation of punishing events is more closely
associated with anxiety than depression (Muris and Van der Heiden, 2006) and that
depression is instead linked to reduced estimation of the probability of rewarding
events (MacLeod and Byrne, 1996; Muris and Van der Heiden, 2006). Furthermore,
when given the task of generating scenarios of potential future events, humans with
anxiety generate a greater number of negative event scenarios in comparison to clini-
cally healthy humans (MacLeod and Byrne, 1996), while depressed humans generate
fewer positive events (Bjärehed et al., 2010; MacLeod and Byrne, 1996; MacLeod and
Salaminiou, 2001). An experiment was conducted in which individuals with varying
degrees of depression were asked to report both the probability of an event occurring
and at a later date were asked whether the event occurred (Strunk et al., 2006). It was
found that individuals with more severe depressive symptoms had more pessimistic
probability estimates and that their predictions about the future were imprecise. How-
ever, as discussed in section 1.1.2, a greater number of ‘false’ alarms may be adaptive
for depressed and anxious individuals, where such states arise from previous experi-
ence of rewards and punishers.
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1.2.4 Affect and reward and punisher valuation
There is contradictory evidence regarding the influence that affective valence might
exert on reward and punisher valuation. In a range of non-human animals, manipu-
lations that are anticipated to induce negatively valenced affect such as chronic stress
or early-life adversity have been associated with both an increased and a decreased
valuation of rewards (Kleen et al., 2006; Neville et al., 2017; Rüedi-Bettschen et al.,
2006; Shaham and Stewart, 1994). Environmental enrichment, assumed to induce
a relatively positive affective state, has been shown to reduce self-administration of
amphetamines (Bardo et al., 2001; Green et al., 2002) and reduce the hedonic value
of a number of drugs including cocaine, nicotine, and heroin (Green et al., 2003;
Solinas et al., 2008). Similarly, in humans, although anhedonia is a core symptom
of depression, hyperphagia can also be observed (American Psychiatric Association,
2013).
Research has shown that depression is associated with a preference for low-
magnitude rewards obtained with low-effort compared to high-magnitude rewards
obtained with high effort (Treadway et al., 2012, 2009). Thus, it has also been pro-
posed that affective disorders, specifically depression, modulate the value of the effort
required to obtain a reward, in addition to value of the reward itself. This has been
further supported by the finding that escitalopram, an antidepressant, modulates ef-
fort expenditure, as measured by force exerted on a handgrip (Meyniel et al., 2016).
With regards to punisher valuation, it has been demonstrated that anxiety-like
states increase the physiological response to potential punishers (Davis et al., 2010;
Grillon, 2008) which could reflect that anxiety increases the subjective value of the
punisher. However, despite anxiety and depression often being comorbid in humans,
a meta-analysis identified that major depressive disorder is associated with a reduced
reactivity to punishers (Bylsma et al., 2008).
The temporal dynamics of the affective state might also modulate reward and
punisher valuation; there is evidence for an increased reward valuation in shorter-term
negatively valenced affective states, but a decreased reward valuation in longer-term
negatively valenced affective states (Spruijt et al., 2001).
This uncertainty about how affect should influence reward and punisher valuation
also translates to hypotheses regarding the putative function of the relationship be-
tween affect, or reward and punisher experience, and subjective value. Reward utility
functions are considered to be concave (i.e. increasingly less steep), suggesting that
the additive subjective value of a reward should decrease with increasing gains; an
individual that is starving should value food more highly that an individual that is
sated (Hsee and Rottenstreich, 2004; Hsee et al., 2005). Yet, in reward-sparse environ-
ments a high reward value which could promote greater activity would be antithetic
to the conservation of energy in the face of limited resources. Trimmer et al. (2017)
proposed that punisher experience should determine the value of rewards, specifically
food rewards; food should be valued more highly in environments in which threats
are more frequent as maintaining the high energy reserves needed to evade predation
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becomes more important. Likewise, it has been suggested that an increased valuation
of rewards in more negative mood states could function to regulate mood by motivat-
ing the individual to seek mood-enhancing rewards (Morris and Reilly, 1987; Sanchez
et al., 2014).
1.3 Judgement bias: decision-making as a measure of wel-
fare?
The judgement bias task, first described in 2004 by Harding et al. and based on
discrimination learning, has been used to measure the cognitive component of af-
fect, specifically altered decision-making, in numerous species, including rats (Rattus
norvegicus; Brydges et al., 2011; Burman et al., 2008a; Harding et al., 2004), starlings
(Sturnus vulgaris; Brilot et al., 2010; Matheson et al., 2008), humans (Iigaya et al.,
2016; Paul et al., 2011), and bees (Apis mellifera; Perry et al., 2016). In a common
variant of this task, an individual is trained to make different actions in response to
sensory stimuli that differ detectably on a sensory continuum (e.g. high and low fre-
quency tones). There is a safe action which leads to no reward and no punishment,
and a risky action which leads to either a reward or a punisher3, the outcome of which
is determined by whether the predictive sensory stimulus is at one or the other end
of the trained sensory continuum. During testing, the individual is required to make
one of these two actions in response to intermediate ambiguous sensory stimuli (Fig.
??). More risk-seeking (often deemed ‘optimistic’) individuals, those who execute the
risky action or do so with greater alacrity, are considered to have a greater expecta-
tion of rewards, or reduced expectation or punishers, and thus are considered to be
experiencing a more positively valenced affective state in comparison with individuals
that are more risk-averse (often deemed ‘pessimistic’), those who execute the safe ac-
tion or execute the risky action more slowly (Bateson et al., 2011; Mendl et al., 2010;
Nettle and Bateson, 2012; see Fig. 1.3). The hypothesis that relatively risk-seeking
behaviour on the judgement bias task is associated with a relatively positive affec-
tive state has overall been supported by studies which have involved pharmacological
and environmental manipulations of affect, such as the provision of enrichment and
administration of antidepressant drugs, although opposite and null results have been
observed. In Chapter 2, we more formally examine this hypothesis by conducting a
meta-analysis and systematic review of pharmacological manipulations of judgement
bias in non-human animals.
3Here, following Kacelnik and Bateson (1996) and Niv et al. (2012), we are defining ‘risk’ as
outcome variability such that actions that have greater variability in their potential outcome are
considered to be more risky
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+ve tone
-ve tone
Go Stay Go Stay
Ambiguous 
tone
Figure 1.2: An example of judgement bias test, using the task de-
scribed by Jones et al. (2018): following trial initiation, the rat is
presented with a tone which is either +ve, -ve, or ambiguous. If they
execute the risky response (‘stay’) when the +ve tone is presented they
will be rewarded with food, but executing this response when the -ve
tone is presented will result in a punishing air-puff. The safe response
(‘go’) results in no reward or punisher. During testing, the rat is pre-
sented with an ambiguous tone and must decide whether to execute

































Figure 1.3: The theoretical framework underlying the judgement
bias task: (A) positive affective valence is associated with either a
high expectation of rewards or low expectation of punishers (depend-
ing on affective arousal), and likewise negative affective valence is as-
sociated with either a low expectation of rewards or high expectation
of punishers (depending on affective arousal); (B) this in turn leads
to affect-dependent predictions about an individual’s judgement bias
relative to other individuals completing the same task.
The judgement bias task has several strengths as a measure of affect; interpreta-
tion of judgement bias results does not require species-specific knowledge, it purports
to measure affective valence as opposed to affective arousal, and human-versions of
the task have found that judgement bias correlates with subjective reports of affect
(Anderson et al., 2012; Iigaya et al., 2016; Paul et al., 2011).
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However, one major drawback of the task is the typically lengthy period of train-
ing of non-human animal subjects required before testing can commence. While this
problem was recently addressed by Jones et al. (2018) who developed an automated
task which reduced the duration of training in rats, in Chapter 7 we propose and
examine the validity of a novel measure of affect with a reduced training period. Lim-
itations also exist in the interpretation of judgement bias results. Firstly, judgement
bias only provides a relative and not absolute measure of affect; an individual that is
overall risk-seeking is not necessarily in a positively valenced affective state. This is
because methodological differences, such as the rewards or punishers used and rein-
forcement schedule, can also influence judgement bias (Jones et al., 2018). Secondly,
there has been a paucity of research examining the cognitive mechanisms underly-
ing the relationship between affect and judgement bias. As outlined in section 1.2,
affect could influence decision-making via an altered probability estimation and/or
an altered subjective valuation of the outcomes, with the latter often receiving little
consideration in the context of judgement bias. This complicates interpretation of
judgement bias data as the absence of strong evidence on which to base predictions
about how an affect manipulation will alter reward or punisher valuation presents a
challenge when making conclusions about how affect relates to judgement bias. To
address this, in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 we use computational modelling to disentangle
the influence of an altered probability estimation and an altered subjective valuation
on decision-making in the judgement bias task.
Biases might also arise through other cognitive processes such as attention or per-
ception (Mendl et al., 2009). For example, given that negative affect is associated
with greater attention to threatening stimuli (MacLeod et al., 1986; Williams et al.,
1996), and positive affect with greater attention to positive stimuli (Tamir and Robin-
son, 2007), responses may be more rapid when the valence of the stimulus presented
is more congruent with the valence of the individual’s affective state (Mendl et al.,
2009). Attention-related biases in judgement may be most apparent where response
latency is the outcome measure (Mendl et al., 2009). As the focus of this thesis is
specifically on the decision-making process, we will solely examine choice and not re-
sponse latency. Affect might also alter an individual’s perception of the stimuli; there
is some evidence that affective valence can influence perception, for example, anxious
humans are more likely to perceive neutral facial expressions as negative (Blanchette
et al., 2007). Consequently, affect may cause the ambiguous stimuli to be perceived
as indicative of the negative or positive outcome, which may be most evident at the
ambiguous stimuli closest to the reference cues (Mendl et al., 2009). However, the
possibility that affect exerts a top-down influence on perception has been challenged




1.4.1 What is computational modelling?
Marr (1982) proposed three-levels at which the brain can be understood: the com-
putational, the algorithmic, and the implementational. In terms of cognition, at the
computational level the precise problem is specified, at the algorithmic level the com-
putational problem is solved, and at the implementational level the neurobiological
substrate involved in solving the algorithm is considered. Computational modelling
of behavioural data may involve all three levels.
The aim of computational modelling is to recreate data such as reaction time,
choice, or neural firing, using a formal and mathematical description of the processes
through which the data arose. A key feature of computational modelling is that
it is generative and not just descriptive; a computational model generates its own
data to be compared with experimental data. Computational models can be used for
identifying the parameter(s) which best account(s) for the data and/or for identifying
the model which best accounts for the data (Daw et al., 2011a; Wilson and Collins,
2019). Consequently, computational modelling can help to elucidate the cognitive
processes underlying behavioural data by providing a clear and specific description of
these processes (Daw et al., 2011a). In this thesis, we will use computational modelling
as a tool to better understand the processes underlying decision-making.
1.4.2 Reinforcement learning
Reinforcement learning characterises how an individual learns through interactions
with the environment and how they can make decisions which maximise reward intake
while minimising punisher exposure (Bellman, 1952; Sutton and Barto, 1998). Markov
decision processes (MDP) allow a formal description of problems to be solved through
reinforcement learning (Bellman, 1957; Sutton and Barto, 1998). In particular, a
MDP is defined as comprising states, actions, transition probabilities, and a reward
function.
To illustrate this, consider a rat in a maze searching for a sucrose pellet. We can
formalise this as a MDP; the states can be defined as all possible locations in the
maze, and the actions can be defined as the movements that rat make to traverse
through the maze (e.g. left, right, forward, backward) to transition to new states.
The transitions between the states could be deterministic where the action that the
rat makes dictates the rat’s new state (e.g. they execute action ‘left’ and subsequently
move left), but if the maze was unsteady, the transitions could be probabilistic where
the action and probability that the rat is thrown off course in any direction determine
the new state (e.g. they execute action ‘left’ and move left with a probability of 0.7,
and move right, forward, or backward each with a probability of 0.1). In this example,
the reward is zero in all states except for the location of the sucrose pellet. However,
we have assumed that the rat knows which state they occupy. A partially observable
Markov decision process (POMDP) is a generalisation of a MDP in which the true
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state is unknown but observations (e.g. of odours within a maze) allow a probability
distribution over the possible states to be maintained (Bellman, 1957; Sutton and
Barto, 1998). In Chapters 3, 4, and 6, we define decision-making in the judgement
bias task as a POMDP.
Reinforcement learning can be either model-free or model-based (Dayan and
Berridge, 2014; Doll et al., 2012; Gläscher et al., 2010). In model-free reinforcement
learning, an individual takes a trial-and-error approach to learn how to act optimally,
in which reward values are updated through experience and direct knowledge of the
action-outcome contingency is not required. Decision-making depends on the actions
which an individual has learnt results in the greatest expected value. Using the exam-
ple of a maze, a rat using a model-free strategy may navigate the maze using the learnt
value of each action, for example, turning left because experience has taught the rat
that turning left has the greatest value. Hence, model-free learning does not make use
of the transition probabilities and is retrospective. Prominent examples of model-free
learning include the Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla et al., 1972; Sutton and Barto,
1998) and temporal-difference (TD) learning which encompasses Q-learning (Sutton,
1988; Sutton and Barto, 1998). In these models, learning is driven by a reward pre-
diction error; the difference between an expected value estimate and the outcome
(Rescorla-Wagner model) or updated expected value estimate at each time-step (TD
learning). Hence, reward prediction error is central to both these (and other) model-
free methods (Dayan and Berridge, 2014; Dayan and Niv, 2008; Gläscher et al., 2010;
Sutton and Barto, 1998).
In model-based reinforcement learning, an individual maintains a model of the
environment which they use to evaluate all possible outcomes and guide behaviour
(Dayan and Berridge, 2014; Doll et al., 2012; Gläscher et al., 2010). A rat using
a model-based strategy may navigate a maze according to the long-term value of
future actions and transitions; considering the value of each action (e.g. ‘left’) accord-
ing to where the action could ultimately lead them. Model-based learning involves
prospective planning and is informed by transition probabilities. Value-iteration and
policy-iteration are both model-based algorithms which can be used to solve MDPs
(Bellman, 1952; Sutton and Barto, 1998).
Model-free and model-based approaches differ in their flexibility and computa-
tional demand; while model-free learning is less flexible than model-based learning
but computationally non-intensive, model-based learning is fast and flexible but com-
putationally intensive (Dayan and Berridge, 2014; Doll et al., 2012). There is evidence
for both model-free and model-based learning in both humans and rats (Daw et al.,
2011b; Doll et al., 2012; Gläscher et al., 2010; Hasz and Redish, 2018). In particu-
lar, goal-directed behaviour which is planned and purposeful such as pressing a lever
with the goal of obtaining a sucrose pellet is often attributed to model-based learn-
ing, while stimulus-response habits such as pressing a lever even when the sucrose
has been devalued (‘going into autopilot’) are attributed to model-free mechanisms
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(Dayan and Berridge, 2014; Doll et al., 2012; Gläscher et al., 2010). Dopaminergic ac-
tivity has been proposed to encode reward prediction errors; while there is no change
in dopamine neuron firing following predicted rewards, unpredicted rewards lead to
increased firing, and predicted but absent rewards lead to decreased firing (Glimcher,
2011; Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997). Dopamine has also been implicated
in model-based learning (Sharp et al., 2015). Experimental alterations of dopamine
in humans have demonstrated that reduced levels of dopamine are associated with a
greater tendency to use model-free as opposed to model-based learning (De Wit et al.,
2012; Wunderlich et al., 2012).
1.4.3 Bayesian inference
Bayesian inference has also been applied to learning problems (Adams et al., 2016;
Friston, 2008; Knill and Pouget, 2004; Parr et al., 2018). Bayes’ rule states that the
probability of an event occurring in the face of new evidence (posterior probability)
depends on both a prior probability, which is the probability of the event prior to new
evidence, and likelihood of the event, which is the probability of the new evidence
given that the event will occur. Consequently, Bayes’ rule can be used to determine
the probable outcome of an action or likelihood of a belief about the state of the
environment given sensory evidence from the environment. The mean and precision
provide sufficient statistics for encoding the prior and likelihood probability distribu-
tions, and hence approximating Bayesian inference (Adams et al., 2016; Friston, 2008;
Parr et al., 2018). More specifically, the posterior probability will lie between the
means of the prior and likelihood distributions, with the proximity to either distribu-
tion governed by the precision of the distributions (assuming a Gaussian distribution
for the prior and likelihood). The precision hence determines the extent to which new
evidence influences current beliefs.
The Bayesian brain hypothesis states that our nervous system constructs a proba-
bilistic model of the world that continuously updates as sensory information is received
in a Bayesian manner (Dayan et al., 1995; Knill and Pouget, 2004). Moreover, the
theory of predictive coding (Friston, 2008; Rao and Ballard, 1999), for which there is
some biological evidence (Bastos et al., 2012; Shipp et al., 2013), suggests that per-
ception is influenced by top-down predictions from a model of the environment to aid
the efficient filtering of irrelevant information.
1.5 Computational psychiatry
1.5.1 What is computational psychiatry?
Computational psychiatry uses computational techniques to characterise and under-
stand affective disorders. The essential premise of computational psychiatry is that
affective disorders arise from or induce a deviation from optimal behaviour, and that
by computationally defining optimality we can examine the specific suboptimalities
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associated with affective disorders (Huys et al., 2016; Montague et al., 2012; Stephan
and Mathys, 2014). It has been proposed that suboptimal decision-making can orig-
inate from: abnormalities in how the problem to be solved is defined, making wrong
inferences (e.g. about state or actions), and by solving the right problem correctly
but assuming an aversive environment (Huys et al., 2015). It must be noted that it is
unclear whether seemingly suboptimal decision-making in individuals with affective
disorders is truly suboptimal as such behaviour may serve an adaptive function, as
outlined in section 1.1.2.
1.5.2 A computational perspective on the function of affect
Affective valence has been suggested to function similar to a Bayesian prior, informing
an individual’s estimation of the probability that their actions will be rewarded or
punished to guide decision-making (Mendl et al., 2010; Trimmer et al., 2013). This
proxy Bayesian prior would update following reward and punisher experience and
hence reflect environmental conditions (Mendl et al., 2010; Mendl and Paul, 2017;
Trimmer et al., 2013). This would obviate tracking of multiple historical rewarding
and punishing experiences (i.e. encoding and recalling each individual rewarding and
punishing experience) and allow more efficient encoding of past experience (Eldar
et al., 2016).
Predictability is thought to be a central facet of affect (Clark et al., 2018; Huys
and Dayan, 2009). Rewards can be more efficiently exploited, and punishers more
efficiently avoided when they are predictable, and therefore more predictable environ-
ments should be associated with more positive affect (Huys and Dayan, 2009). More-
over, it has also been proposed that longer-term affect (mood) reflects a Bayesian
hyperprior over uncertainty about outcomes; a belief about the extent to which the
environment is predictable (Clark et al., 2018). In particular, the precision of this hy-
perdistribution is thought to underlie affective disorders. A greater precision around
the belief that the environment is unpredictable would lead to a more persistent be-
lief and rejection of any evidence that the world is stable, as observed in depressed
individuals (Clark et al., 2018; Huys and Dayan, 2009). Indeed, humans with major
depressive disorder that have higher Beck Helplessness Scores (BHS) perceive them-
selves to have a low level of control, as determined by a broader prior distribution
about the outcome of their actions (Huys et al., 2009). In contrast a weaker preci-
sion, associated with anxiety, leads to greater action to resolve uncertainty about the
predictability of the environment (Clark et al., 2018; Cornwell et al., 2017; Huys and
Dayan, 2009).
However, this theoretical framework for affect does not account for recent evidence
that reward prediction errors, and hence greater unpredictability, induce positive af-
fect. It has been demonstrated that humans report greater happiness when they
receive a reward that is greater than expected (Rutledge et al., 2014). Moreover,
weather and sports results that are greater than expected are associated with greater
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gambling suggesting a link between positive prediction errors and ‘optimistic’ decision-
making (Otto et al., 2016). Considering this evidence, Eldar et al. (2016) suggested
that affect reflects the cumulative impact of positive and negative prediction errors,
purported to allow quick adaptation to changing environmental conditions. According
to Eldar et al. (2016), affective disorders are thus considered to arise from subopti-
malities in the expectation of reward and punishers; failure to update expectations
in worsening conditions would lead to the continual generation of negative prediction
errors and hence induce a depressed mood.
Interestingly, depression has been associated with altered prediction error sig-
nalling, specifically attenuated signals in hippocampus, rostral anterior cingulate cor-
tex, striatum, and thalamus, and stronger signals in the amygdala (Gradin et al., 2011;
Kumar et al., 2008). Moreover, the magnitude of this attenuation and amplification
correlated with the severity of the depression (Kumar et al., 2008). Stress induction
in healthy subjects has also been observed to modulate the strength of the prediction
error signal (Robinson et al., 2013).
1.5.3 How does affect modulate the processes underlying decision-
making?
Computational approaches have proved highly effective and fruitful in examining the
cognitive processes underlying affect-induced changes in decision-making behaviour.
Studies have investigated the relationship between affect and probability estimation.
For example, it was demonstrated that more optimistic individuals, as determined
by the revised life orientation test, had a greater prior belief that they would be
rewarded in a probabilistic task (Stankevicius et al., 2014). Another study attributed
suboptimal behaviour related to stress to a reduced estimation of the quality of the
environment (Lenow et al., 2017).
Computational modelling has also been used to better understand the relation-
ship between affect and reward and punisher valuation. Using a reinforcement learning
model, a meta-analysis of human behavioural data from a probabilistic reward task
revealed that major depressive disorder was associated with a reduced reward sen-
sitivity (Huys et al., 2013). It was also found that apathy in human depression is
associated with an increased effort cost as opposed to a reduced reward valuation
(Bonnelle et al., 2015). In relation to anxiety and subjective valuation, Charpentier
et al. (2017) found that humans with an anxiety disorder did not differ from clinical
healthy individuals in their relative valuation of losses to gains but were more averse
to uncertainty about the outcome of their actions. Analysis of human judgement bias
data using a Bayesian decision-theoretic model found that a positive affect induction
both increased the participants’ value of a potential reward relative to the potential
loss and biased them towards the risky choice (Iigaya et al., 2016).
There is also evidence from computational analyses to suggest that affect alters
the extent to which individuals employ model-free and model-based reinforcement
learning to solve problems. For example, humans experiencing high levels of chronic
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stress had a reduced tendency for model-based learning when confronted with an acute
stressor (Radenbach et al., 2015). Similarly, model-free learning models were found to
better explain the behaviour of depressed humans than non-depressed humans on a
task which pitted exploration against exploitation (Blanco et al., 2013). Additionally,
Huys et al. (2012) found that humans that experienced greater levels of depression (as
determined by Beck’s depression inventory) had a greater tendency to dismiss further
evaluation of a potential strategy when presented with a large loss, even though this
was counterproductive, in a task which required them to construct a model-based
representation of the environment (Huys et al., 2012).
Affect has also been proposed to influence learning. The extent to which an indi-
vidual updates their belief about the environment when given new information should
depend on environmental volatility; faster learning should be required in unstable
environments compared with those with little fluctuation (Browning et al., 2015).
However, anxiety in humans has been associated with a reduced ability to modulate
the speed of learning in accordance with environmental volatility (Browning et al.,
2015). Although a number of studies have suggested that depression is associated
with reduced learning in humans (Chase et al., 2010; Dombrovski et al., 2013), a
number of studies have found no evidence for this (Dombrovski et al., 2010; Gradin
et al., 2011; Huys et al., 2013), and so the effects of affective state on learning are
unclear.
1.5.4 Computational psychiatry in non-human animals
Despite the importance of investigating affect in non-human animals, both for improv-
ing animal welfare and to better understand human affective disorders, there remains
a paucity of research that uses computational analyses to investigate affect-induced
behavioural changes in non-human animals. One example of where computational
modelling has been instructive in examining affect in non-human animals a study
which applied drift-diffusion modelling to rat judgement bias reaction time data (Hales
et al., 2016). The drift-diffusion model considers that evidence about the stimulus pre-
sented is accumulated until a decision threshold is reached, with the key parameters
being the speed at which evidence is accumulated, the starting point of the evidence
accumulation, and distance from the threshold. It was found that pharmacologically
induced negative affect in rats increased the threshold for making the risky-response
(Hales et al., 2016). Additionally, consistent with the human literature, chronic stress
in rats has been associated with a greater likelihood of employing model-free learning
(Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009).
1.6 Aims of the thesis
As outlined in this review, there is still much uncertainty about the adaptive signifi-
cance of affective states and the relationship between reward and punisher experience,
affect, and decision-making. The overarching aims of this thesis are to examine which
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(if any) specific components of reward and punisher experience inform decision-making
(e.g. their frequency and predictability), the cognitive processes underlying judgement
bias (e.g. reward and punisher valuation and expectation) and their relationship with
reward and punisher experience, and the extent to which the relationship between
reward and punisher experience and decision-making is consistent between rats (a
commonly used laboratory animal with whom the original judgement bias study was
conducted) and humans (with whom we can also investigate how reward and punisher
experience relates to subjectively experienced affect). It is hoped that this will in-
form our understanding of judgement bias as a measure of welfare and more generally
contribute to the fields of animal welfare science and computational psychiatry.
We started by conducting a systematic review and meta-analysis of pharmaco-
logical manipulations of affect to assess the validity of the judgement bias task as a
measure of affect in non-human animals (Chapter 2). Then, we developed human
versions of an automated rat judgement task (Jones et al., 2018) and examined how
human decision-making and self-reported affect are influenced by primary (i.e. food)
and secondary (i.e. monetary) reward and punisher experience (Chapters 3 and 4).
Next, we conducted rat judgement bias studies in which we manipulated reward and
punisher experience prior to and within testing (Chapters 5 and 6). Finally, we as-
sessed whether decision-making in a task which pits exploration against exploration
could provide a novel measure of affect in rats (Chapter 7).
Computational psychiatry has arguably been instrumental in furthering our un-
derstanding of human affective disorders. Hence, the experimental chapters of this
thesis describe a computational approach to data analysis to aid in the elucidation
of the cognitive processes underlying behaviour. In Chapters 3, 4 and 6 we report a






judgement bias: a systematic
review and meta-analysis
Chapter summary: Validated measures of animal affect are
crucial to research spanning a number of disciplines. Judge-
ment bias, which assesses decision-making under ambiguity, is
a promising measure of animal affect. One way of validating
this measure is to induce affective states using pharmacological
manipulations and determine whether the predicted judgement
biases are observed. Here, we conducted a systematic review and
meta-analysis using data from 20 published research articles that
use this approach, from which 557 effect sizes were extracted.
The results of the meta-analysis suggest that pharmacological
manipulations overall altered judgement bias at the probe cues
as predicted. However, there were several moderating factors in-
cluding the neurobiological target of the drug, whether the drug
was expected to induce a relatively positive or negative affective
state, dosage, and the presented cue. This may partially reflect
interference from adverse effects of the drug, such as sedation.
Thus, while judgement bias can be used to measure pharmaco-
logically induced affective states, potential adverse effects of the
drug should be considered when interpreting results.
2.1 Introduction
Measurement of affective state, which is defined as comprising both short-term emo-
tions and longer-term moods (Mendl et al., 2010), is important to a number of dis-
ciplines including psychopharmacology, neuroscience, and animal welfare science, as
well as being of societal interest. For example, mood disorders are a significant global
concern; it is estimated that 780,000 people died by suicide in 2015, with on average
one death every 40 seconds (World Health Organization, 2017). Major depressive
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disorder is ranked as the largest single contributor to global disability, and anxiety
disorders are ranked sixth (World Health Organization, 2017). The development of
pharmacological treatments for mood disorders has been largely dependent on empiri-
cal studies using non-human animals (Rupniak, 2003; Valvassori et al., 2013). Reliable
and validated measures of affective state in non-human animals are therefore crucial
to understanding the neurobiological aetiology of these disorders and to assist in the
development of novel treatments. In particular, measures should have both predictive
validity (i.e. the extent to which the measure is altered in the predicted direction by
drugs which alter human affect) and construct validity (i.e. the extent to which they
measure precisely what they claim to measure) (Nestler and Hyman, 2010). Predictive
validity is typically regarded as the ‘gold-standard’ for validating novel behavioural
measures of affective state (De Vry and Schreiber, 1997; McArthur and Borsini, 2006).
The outlined deficiencies in currently used assays (e.g. forced swim test, sucrose
consumption, elevated plus maze, see Chapter 1) means that there is a clear need for
improved methods to measure affective state in non-human animals that have both
construct and predictive validity. The judgement bias task (sometimes referred to as
the cognitive bias task or ambiguous cue interpretation task) provides an alternative
means to examine affect in non-human animals and has been used widely in the field
of animal welfare science since its conception by Harding et al. (2004) (Baciadonna
and McElligott, 2015; Bethell, 2015; Harding et al., 2004). Rather than specifically
measuring anxiety or depression, the task purports to measure affective valence; the
relative pleasantness or unpleasantness of the current affective state of the individual.
To achieve this, the judgement bias task examines decision-making under ambiguity.
Although there is some variation in methodology, the basic principles of the task
outlined here are applicable to all judgement bias studies. Individuals are first trained
to associate the presentation of one reference cue (e.g. a high frequency tone) with a
reward and presentation of another reference cue (e.g. a lower frequency tone) with a
lower reward or punisher. Once training is complete, individuals are presented with
one or a few untrained probe cues that are intermediate between the reference cues
(e.g. medium frequency tones). Whether an individual responds to these ambiguous
cues as though they signal the more positive or less positive outcome, which is either
measured as latency to approach the cue or choice to execute or not execute the riskier
action which could lead to either the favourable or less favourable outcome (i.e. not
the safe action which leads to a null outcome), is considered to be indicative of their
expectation of rewards or punishers, and hence affective state. Individuals that exhibit
a decreased latency to approach the cue, or more frequently execute the riskier action
(often deemed ‘more optimistic’ or ‘less pessimistic’), particularly at the ambiguous
cues given that affect is considered to exert the greatest effect on decision-making
when there is uncertainty about an outcome (Mendl et al., 2009), are considered to
be in a relatively more positive affective state.
The task is based on the empirical finding that humans experiencing anxiety and
depression have a greater expectation of punishing events or reduced expectation of
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rewarding events than clinically healthy humans (Johnson and Tversky, 1983; Nygren
et al., 1996; Wright and Bower, 1992). To assess the extent to which judgement
bias could measure subjective affective state in humans, the task has been back-
translated to human subjects. Studies using the back-translated judgement bias task
have demonstrated a correlation between judgement bias and measures of subjectively
experienced affect, such as the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI), Visual Analogue
Scale for Anxiety (VAS-A), and negative affect dimension of the Positive and Negative
Affect Schedule (PANAS) (Anderson et al., 2012; Iigaya et al., 2016; Paul et al., 2011).
The finding that judgement bias correlates with subjective reports of affective state
in humans supports judgement bias as measure of affect, and hence the task appears
to have strong construct validity.
Research has been conducted to assess how judgement bias is influenced by affect-
altering drugs in non-human animals (see Table 2.1). Synthesis of these studies would
allow conclusions to be drawn about the ability of the judgement bias task to measure
pharmacologically induced positive (relatively more pleasant) or negative (relatively
less pleasant) affective states, and hence elucidate the validity and reliability of judge-
ment bias as a measure of affect in non-human animals. To this end, we conducted
a systematic review and meta-analysis to assess whether pharmacological manipula-
tions alter judgement bias and hence assess the predictive validity of the task. In
addition to assessing whether there was an overall effect, we investigated whether the
relationship between affect-altering drugs and judgement bias was moderated by fac-
tors relating to the drug and administration of the drug, such as the duration and
timing of administration, dosage, and neurobiological target of the drug. The po-
tential moderating effects of several task-related factors, such as the presented cue,
species used, sex, reinforcement type, response type, and the outcome measure, were
also investigated. While we predicted that the effects of judgement bias would be
greatest at the ambiguous cues and would depend on dosage, we did not predict that




This study followed the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic reviews and Meta-
Analyses (PRISMA) statement (Moher et al., 2009; see Fig. 2.1). A literature search
was first conducted on the 2nd November 2016 to identify all judgement bias studies;
the research articles from this literature search were split into groups of those that
used pharmacological manipulations (to be analysed here) and those that did not
(to be analysed in a separate analysis by Nakagawa et al., in prep.). These meta-
analyses were conducted separately as they assessed different research questions; here
we specifically want to examine the ability of judgement bias to detect pharmaco-
logical manipulations proposed to alter affect and to better understand the factors
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moderating this, but also due to the complexity the use of different drug doses adds
the meta-analysis.
In addition to these articles, a literature search was conducted on the 13th Novem-
ber 2017 using Scopus and Web of Science to identify more recent research papers,
and a further literature search was conducted on the 12th July 2019 using Scopus and
Web of Science, as well as additional searches in other subject databases (including
PsycINFO, PsycARTICLES, PsycBOOKS, PsycEXTRA, PsycTESTS, EMBASE and
Medline), grey literature (using ProQuest Dissertation and Thesis Database, Google
Data Search and Dimensions platform), and snowballing from reviews on the topic
(cited and citing references collected) and from already included papers (citing refer-
ences collected). Further details on the literature search, including the search-terms
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Figure 2.1: PRISMA Flow Diagram illustrating the number (n) of
articles included at each stage of the literature review
2.2.2 Inclusion and exclusion criteria
Following removal of duplicates, the identified articles were first screened solely by
their abstract. During this abstract-based selection, articles were selected for tenta-
tive inclusion in the meta-analysis if they were deemed to be an empirical study which
compared judgement bias between at least one control group and at least one treat-
ment group to whom an affect-altering drug had been administered. Additionally, to
be included, these studies had to be conducted on vertebrate non-human animals. An
affect-altering drug was classified as any substance that was considered to have an-
tidepressant, depressant, anxiolytic, or anxiogenic effects. Twenty-eight articles met
these inclusion criteria.
In the full-text screening, articles were selected on the basis that they had used a
variant of Harding et al ’s (2014) cognitive judgement bias task to compare judgement
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bias between a group of individuals to whom a vehicle substance had been adminis-
tered and at least one treatment group who had been given a drug to induce a positive
or negative shift in their affective state (Harding et al., 2004). To be included, the
outcome measure had to be either latency to approach the cue (e.g. a location in a
test arena) on each trial, where approaching the presented cue had been associated
with reward and hence shorter latencies would be interpreted as greater ‘optimism’,
or the proportion of positive responses to each presented cue where a greater propor-
tion would be interpreted as greater ‘optimism’, or an outcome measure that could be
converted into either form. For example, if the article reported the proportion of neg-
ative responses to each presented cue or reported the percentage of positive responses
to each presented cue, the extracted data would be subtracted from one or divided
by 100 respectively. All included articles either reported the proportion or latency,
but not both, and hence only one of these measures was extracted for each article.
Two articles were excluded at the full-text selection stage following retraction by their
authors, two were excluded for not meeting the inclusion criteria, and a further two
were excluded as they were conference abstracts that duplicated data presented in a
journal article which was included in the analysis (Table 2.1). In addition to these
six exclusions, two authors did not provide the requested data and so data from their
articles could not be included in the meta-analysis (Table 2.1). A total of 20 articles
were included in the meta-analysis (Table 2.1).
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We extracted the mean and standard deviation of either the latency to approach
the presented cue, or proportion of positive responses to the presented cue, as well
as the sample size (number of subjects), for every pharmacological treatment and
control group for each cue from each article (JZ and VN extracted the data which
were checked by VN and SN). Data in a graphical format were extracted using
GraphClick 3.0.3 (http://www.arizona-software.ch/graphclick/) or WebPlotDigitizer
4.1 (http://automeris.io/WebPlotDigitizer). As we extracted mean values, we ac-
knowledge that there may have been variation in how the authors incorporated non-
responses into their calculation of latency mean values which we cannot control for.
If multiple drug doses had been used, these variables (i.e. mean, standard deviation,
and sample size) were extracted for each dosage, and similarly, if there were test ses-
sions that varied the duration between administration and testing or number of days
of chronic drug administration, these variables were extracted for each test session.
Data collected from both a vehicle and treatment group prior to drug administration
were not included as these data did not provide information about the effect of the
pharmacological manipulation on judgement bias.
The extracted treatment and control group data were categorised according to
whether the pharmacological manipulation was expected to induce either a more or
less positively valenced affective state, which the judgement bias test is predicted to
measure. If an anxiogenic or depressant substance had been administered, as deter-
mined by the hypotheses stated in the published article, the treatment group was
categorised as the less positive group, and the vehicle group was categorised as the
more positive group (i.e. a relatively negative judgement bias was predicted in the
treatment group relative to the control group). If an anxiolytic or antidepressant
drug had been administered, which was also determined by the hypotheses stated in
the article, the treatment group was categorised as the more positive group and the
vehicle group categorised as the less positive group (i.e. a relatively positive judge-
ment bias was predicted in the treatment group relative to the control group). If no
hypotheses were stated in the article, this categorisation was based on the descrip-
tion and pharmacodynamics of the substance as outlined on the DrugBank database
(Wishart et al., 2017). Where multiple doses had been administered, higher doses of
anxiolytic or anxiogenic drugs were categorised as more positive whereas higher doses
of anxiogenic or depressant drugs were categorised as less positive. This was based
on the widespread finding that drugs exert greater effects at higher doses (Shaheed
et al., 2016; Thase, 1998).
Information about the article and authors, drug and drug administration, and
methodology were also extracted (Table 2.1 and 2.2). These included; the article title,
institute or university at which the research was conducted (extracted but not shown
in Table 2.1 or 2.2), the name of the drug, the dosing duration (chronic - where drugs
were administered repeatedly, acute - where the drug was administered immediately
before testing, or chronic wash-out - the period after drug administration had stopped
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following chronic administration), the time between administration and testing (acute
studies only), the number of days since the first dose (chronic studies only), the dosage
(in mg/kg), the neurobiological target of the drug, the pharmacological manipulation
type (antidepressant/anxiolytic or depressant/anxiogenic), the species tested, and the
outcome variable used (latency or proportion), cue (positive reference cue, midpoint
probe cue, negative reference cue, and where included the near negative probe cue and
near positive probe cue; not shown in Table 2.1 or 2.2, although number of probe cues
given instead), sex of the experimental subjects (all male, all female, or both male and
female), reinforcement type used for the reference cue (reward-punisher - where the
positive reference cue was rewarded and negative reference cue punished; reward-null
- where the positive reference cue was rewarded and negative reference cue was not
rewarded; or reward-reward - where the positive reference cue was rewarded with a
high reward and negative reference cue was reward with a low reward), response type
which reflected whether both or only one of the reference cues required an approach
response (go/no-go - where the positive reference cue required an active response
and the negative reference cue required no response, or go/go - where both reference
cues required an active response), the proportion of probe trials in relation to the
total number of trials, and cue type (reference or probe). To ensure that dosage
was comparable between substances and species, each drug dose within a species was
standardized by dividing the dosage (in mg/kg) by the standard deviation of all doses
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2.2.4 Effect size and sampling variance calculation
As latency data are bounded at zero and proportion data are bounded between zero
and one data obtained from the judgement bias task do not follow a Gaussian or
normal distribution. The delta method (Taylor approximation) was used to adjust
the extracted mean (x̄) and (sampling) variance (sd2) prior to calculating the effect
size to account for the non-normality of the raw data (Nakagawa et al., 2017a). For
extracted latency data, which were assumed to follow a log-normal distribution, this
adjustment was calculated via the log transformation as:














In this case, the transformed sampling variance is exact and not an approximation.
For extracted proportion data, which were assumed to follow a binomial distribu-
tion, this adjustment was calculated via the logit transformation as (Nakagawa and
Schielzeth, 2010):




















Hedge’s g (Hedges, 1981), a measure of effect size based standardized differences
in means, was then calculated as the difference between the means of the relatively
positive treatment (in which a relatively more positive affective state was expected,
as outlined above) x̄+ve and means of the relatively negative treatment (in which a
relatively less positive affective state was expected, as outlined above) x̄−ve, divided
by the pooled standard deviation, sdpool, and then adjusted for biases arising from
small sample sizes by factor J which depended on the sample size of the relatively







(n+ve − 1)sd2+ve + (n−ve − 1)sd2−ve





4(n+ve + n−ve)− 9
)
(2.7)
For the latency data, Hedge’s g was multiplied by minus one to account for a
higher proportion being equivalent to a lower latency, in terms of judgement bias.
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To account for shared controls, if one vehicle treatment group was compared to
multiple drug treatment groups, an additional effect size and sampling variance was
calculated based on a sample size for the vehicle group that had been divided by the
number of treatment groups (Higgins and Green, 2011).
2.2.5 Meta-analysis and meta-regression models
The meta-analysis and meta-regression were conducted using the function, rma.mv
from the R (R Core Team, 2017) package metafor (Viechtbauer, 2010); this function
allowed us to fit multilevel meta-analytic and meta-regression models (Nakagawa et al.,
2017b). All models included drug, institution at which the research was conducted,
and effect ID (a unique ID given to each effect size) as random effects to account for
the non-independence of effect sizes from studies conducted at the same institute or
using the same drug (Van den Noortgate et al., 2013), and were fit using restricted
maximum likelihood. The Knapp and Hartung adjustment was applied to all analyses
(Knapp and Hartung, 2003). Initially, an intercept only model was fit to the effect
sizes. A p-value for this model was obtained using a Wald-type test based on a t-
distribution. Heterogeneity was assessed by calculating the I2 values for each random
effect in the model and an overall I2 value for the model, following (Nakagawa and
Santos, 2012), which is an extension of the original I2 (Higgins and Thompson, 2002).
The I2 describes the percentage of the variability in effect estimates that is due to
heterogeneity rather than sampling error, an I2 value greater than 75% is considered
to be high (Higgins and Thompson, 2002; Nakagawa and Santos, 2012).
Meta-regression was used to examine whether the following categorical and contin-
uous moderators significantly contributed to variation between effect sizes: the dosing
duration (chronic, acute, or chronic wash-out), the time between administration and
testing (acute studies only), the number of days since the first dose (chronic stud-
ies only), the dosage differences between treatments from which the effect size was
calculated, the neurobiological target of the drug, the manipulation type (positive
or negative affect induction), the species tested, and the outcome variable used (la-
tency or proportion), presented cue (positive reference cue, near-positive probe cue,
midpoint probe cue, near-negative probe cue, negative reference cue), sex of the ex-
perimental subjects (all male, all female, or both male and female), reinforcement
type (reward-punisher, reward-null, or reward-reward), response type (go/no-go, or
go/go), cue type (reference or probe), and proportion of probe cues to reference cues
in the test session. An omnibus test based on an F distribution, which examines the
degree of variance explained by a moderator, was used to assess the significance of
each moderator (Viechtbauer, 2010). To further investigate significant moderators,
pairwise comparisons were made between the mean effect size for each level of the
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moderator. A Wald-type test was used to assess the significance of these pairwise
comparisons. Moderators which were significant in the meta-regression were subse-
quently included together in a full model and their influence on the effect sizes was
re-assessed. To verify that the model of best fit included all moderators, Akaike’s
information criterion (AIC) was calculated for the full model and was compared to
models where a moderator had been removed.
2.2.6 Subset analyses
As affect is hypothesised to provide information about the probability of each poten-
tial outcome of a decision, particularly when there is greater uncertainty about the
potential outcomes, any treatment designed to influence affective state is expected
to have the greatest influence on judgement bias at the ambiguous probe cues (see
Fig. 2.2 for example of hypothesised data) (Mendl et al., 2009, 2010). There are also
methodological and theoretical reasons as to why an effect may be observed at one cue
and not others. For example, a cue may be too perceptually similar to either of the ref-
erence cues for there to be ambiguity about the outcome, or a potential punisher may
be much more aversive than the reward is rewarding, to the extent that all animals
will avoid probe cues that are similar to the negative reference cue. By considering all
cues equally (including reference cues), the effect of an affective manipulation might
be obscured, potentially leading to the false inference of no significant effect. To this
end, we conducted an additional analysis on a subset of data that included only the
effect sizes from the probe cue with the largest absolute effect size for each drug within
an article. Additionally, we analysed a second subset of data that included only the
effect sizes for the cue with the absolute largest effect size in the direction of the mean
effect size for each drug within an article to avoid including outlying effects that might
not necessarily reflect the influence of the affective manipulation. If only one probe





























Figure 2.2: Example of hypothesised data from the judgement bias
task with two treatments; one designed to induce a relatively positive
affective state (relatively favourable treatment) and another designed
to induce a relatively negative affective state (relatively unfavourable
treatment). While the mean proportion of positive responses is al-
most identical at the positive and negative reference cue, a treatment
difference is observed at the probe cues
2.2.7 Publication bias and sensitivity analysis
To assess the reliability of results across different analytical approaches and to check
for a publication bias, the intercept-only and full meta-regression model were re-fit
to the data under a Bayesian statistical framework using the R package MCMCglmm
(Hadfield, 2010). The non-independence of effect sizes can also be accounted for using
Bayesian methods. A parameter-expanded prior, allowing variance components to
have different prior distributions, was used for both the random effect of drug and
institution ID, while the prior variance for random effect of effect ID was fixed at one
(i.e specified using the following R code):
p r i o r=l i s t (R=l i s t (V=1, nu=0.002) ,
G=l i s t (G1=l i s t (V=1, nu=1, alpha .mu=0, alpha .V=1000) ,
G2=l i s t (V=1, nu=1, alpha .mu=0, alpha .V=1000) ,
G3=l i s t (V=1, f ix=1))
Model fitting had 110,000 iterations, 10,000 burn-in periods, and thinning by every
100, resulting in an effective sample size of 1000. The result of this intercept-only
model was compared to our initial intercept-only model. The ‘meta-analytic residuals’
(sensu Nakagawa and Santos, 2012) from the full meta-regression model conducted
in MCMCglmm were used to produce a funnel plot and run Egger’s regression, which
here regresses the meta-analytic residuals against precision where the precision is
defined here as the inverse sampling error (Egger et al., 1997; Nakagawa and Santos,
2012), and hence checks for a publication bias. The meta-analytic residuals were
calculated using the R function ‘predict’ in which a marginal effect of the sampling
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error was specified. A significant result (i.e. p<0.05) using Egger’s regression and an
asymmetrical funnel plot would be indicative of a publication bias.
Additionally, the intercept-only meta-analysis was repeated but with the effect
size and sampling variance that had been adjusted (via the sample size) for shared
controls, to assess whether this altered the results.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Data review
We extracted 557 effect sizes from 20 articles that had been published by authors based
at 10 different institutions (see Table 2.1 and 2.2). Twenty-seven different drugs were
used across these studies. The majority (328) of the effect sizes came from studies that
had used drugs expected to induce a relatively positive affective state (anxiolytics or
antidepressants, 12 articles), while the remainder used anxiogenic or depressant drugs
(112 effect sizes, 9 articles). There were 408 effect sizes (14 articles) that came from
studies using acute pharmacological manipulations, 97 effect sizes (6 articles) from
studies using chronic pharmacological manipulations, and 52 effect sizes (5 articles)
that came from the wash-out period of a chronic pharmacological manipulation. Most
effect sizes came from studies using drugs that targeted the serotonergic system (198
effect sizes, 7 articles) while a high proportion of studies also used drugs that targeted a
range of neurobiological systems (190 effect sizes, 9 articles) which included drugs such
as cocaine and d-amphetamine which target the dopaminergic, serotoninergic, and
adrenal systems. The remaining effect sizes were from experiments using drugs that
specifically targeted GABAergic system (46 effect sizes, 4 articles), adrenergic system
(43 effect sizes, 3 articles), dopaminergic system (36 effect sizes, 1 article), opioid
system (20 effect sizes, 1 article), glucocorticoid system (15 effect sizes, 1 article),
oxytocin system (9 effect sizes, 2 articles). Five different species were used across
the studies: the most frequently used species according to the number of effect sizes
was rat (418 effect sizes, 11 articles), followed by pig (60 effect sizes, 2 articles),
sheep (50 effect sizes, 4 articles), chicken (23 effect sizes, 2 articles), and dog (6 effect
sizes, 1 article). Proportion was more commonly used as the outcome measure (435
effect sizes, 12 articles) compared with latency (122 effect sizes, 8 articles). The
majority of effect sizes came from studies using only male subjects (421 effect sizes,
11 articles), followed by only female subjects (130 effect sizes, 8 articles), and six effect
sizes (1 articles) came from studies that used both male and female subjects. The
most common reinforcement type was reward-punisher (420 effect sizes, 16 articles),
followed by reward-reward reinforcement (131 effect sizes, 3 articles), and reward-null
(6 effect sizes, 1 article). There were more effect sizes from studies using a ‘go/go’
design (415 effect sizes, 10 articles) compared with a ‘go/no-go’ design (142 effect
sizes, 10 articles).
Across the articles from the acute studies, the average time between the adminis-
tration of the drug and testing was 32.903±5.530 (mean±SE) minutes. The average
40
2.3. Results
number of days between the start of the chronic drug treatment and testing was
9.000±1.074, and the average days the animal had been withdrawn from a drug when
tested in the wash-out period was 6.938±0.824. The mean proportion of probe cues to
reference cues used during a test session was 0.341±0.037. There were 11 articles that
used more than one probe cue and three of these articles examined the effect of more
than one drug. In total, there were 14 sets of effect sizes obtained from different ar-
ticles using different drugs which used more than one probe cue. The probe cue with
the greatest absolute effect size was the near-positive probe cue on nine occasions,
the near-negative probe cue on four occasions, and the midpoint probe cue on one
occasion. The probe cue with the greatest absolute effect size was also the presented
cue with the greatest absolute effect size in the direction of the mean effect for all
but one of the sets of effect sizes, where the near-positive probe cue had the greatest
absolute effect sizes and the near-negative probe cue had the greatest absolute effect
size in the direction of the mean effect.
2.3.2 Meta-analysis
Overall, considering all effect sizes equally, drugs expected to alter affective state did
not significantly induce a judgement bias, although a small effect size (sensu Cohen,
1988: small=0.20, moderate=0.5, large=0.8) was observed (mean=0.239, 95% con-
fidence interval or CI=-0.047-0.525, t556=1.639, p=0.102). However, this needs to
be interpreted in the context of the observed high total heterogeneity in the model,
with an I2 value of 89.535 (>75%=high, Higgins and Thompson, 2002), indicative of
wide variation in the extent to which pharmacological manipulations alter judgement
bias that warrants further examination. The between-effect-size effect (i.e., residuals;
42.378%) and the between-drug effect (i.e., which drug were used; 35.112%) explained
a large percentage of this heterogeneity, while a smaller percentage of variability was
due to institutional variation (12.044%). Heterogeneity between effect sizes was fur-
ther explored through the meta-regression.
2.3.3 Subset analyses
However, as aforementioned, given the theoretical framework for judgement bias, we
did not anticipate that effect sizes would be equal across all cues. Instead, we consid-
ered it likely that pharmacological manipulations would exert the greatest influence
at only one of the probe cues, with proximity of this cue to the reference cues differing
between studies as a result of different methodologies. Hence, subset analyses were
conducted to assess the extent to which the pharmacological manipulations of affect
altered judgement bias at, at least, one of the probe cues. Pharmacological manipula-
tions of affect were found to have a significant small to moderate effect on judgement
bias when the analysis was repeated on the subset data comprising only data from
the ambiguous cue with the largest absolute effect size (mean=0.394, CI=0.017-0.770,
t154=2.067, p=0.040), and a significant small to moderate effect on the subset data
41
Chapter 2. Pharmacological manipulations of judgement bias: a systematic review
and meta-analysis
comprising only data from the ambiguous cue with the largest absolute effect size in
the direction of the mean effect (mean=0.455, CI=0.061-0.849, t154=2.279, p=0.024).
2.3.4 Meta-regression
The meta-regression revealed that several moderators significantly explained the ob-
served heterogeneity among the extracted effect sizes, these moderators were: phar-
macological manipulation type (Fig. 2.3: F(1,555)=16.056, p<0.001), dosage (Fig. 2.3:
F(1,519) =6.614, p=0.010), the reinforcement type (Fig. 2.3: F(2,554)=3.653, p=0.027)
and the cue type (Fig. 2.3: F(1,555)=4.725, p=0.030). The presented cue (Fig. 2.3:
F(4,552)=2.002, p=0.093), and the neurobiological target of the drug were marginally
non-significant moderators (Fig. 2.3: F(8,548)=1.835, p=0.079). More specifically,
pharmacological manipulations expected to induce a relatively negative affective state
(either depressant or anxiogenic) had a greater effect on judgement bias than those
expected to induce a relatively positive affective state (Table 2.3). Greater differences
in dosage between the relatively positive and negative treatments were associated
with smaller effect sizes. The greatest effect size was found when the reinforcement
used for the reference cues was a high reward and low reward, compared with a re-
ward and punisher. The effect of the pharmacological manipulation was greater at
the probe cues compared with the reference cues (Table 2.3). The effect of the phar-
macological manipulation was weaker at the positive reference cue compared to the
midpoint probe cue, and near-positive probe cue, and tended to be weaker than the
negative reference cue (Table 2.3). There was no difference in effect size at the pos-
itive reference cue compared with the near-negative reference cue (Table 2.3). The
remaining moderators tested were not found to significantly explain variation in effect
size. The effect of drugs targeting the adrenergic system differed significantly from all
other drugs used apart from drugs targeting the opioid and oxytocin system (Table
2.3). Drugs targeting the adrenergic system had the opposite effect than expected; a
negative judgement bias was induced when a positive judgement bias was hypothe-
sised. Other moderators with non-significant effects included: species (F(4,552)=0.835,
p=0.503), dosing frequency (F(2,554)=0.108, p=0.898), time since last dose (F(1,406)
=0.467, p=0.495), number of days since first treatment (F(1,95)=1.169, p=0.282),
sex (F(2,554)=0.328, p=0.720), response type (F(1,555)=0.040, p=0.842), proportion of




Table 2.3: Pairwise comparison of each level of significant moderators
from the meta-regression
Variable Model Mean difference CI lower bound CI upper bound p-value
Cue Midpoint - Positive 0.168 0.028 0.307 0.019
Negative - Positive 0.119 -0.022 0.260 0.099
Near Negative - Positive 0.181 -0.059 0.421 0.140
Near Positive - Positive 0.253 0.015 0.492 0.037
Midpoint - Near Positive -0.086 -0.324 0.153 0.480
Negative - Near Positive -0.135 -0.375 0.105 0.270
Near Negative - Near Positive -0.073 -0.357 0.212 0.616
Negative - Midpoint -0.049 -0.190 0.091 0.493
Near Negative - Midpoint 0.013 -0.227 0.253 0.914
Negative - Near Negative -0.062 -0.304 0.179 0.612
Cue type Reference - Probe -0.122 -0.232 -0.012 0.030
Manipulation Type Negative - Positive 0.746 0.380 1.112 <0.001
Neurobiological Target Serotoninergic - Adrenergic 0.895 0.118 1.672 0.024
Dopaminergic - Adrenergic 1.152 0.254 2.049 0.012
GABAergic - Adrenergic 1.362 0.540 2.184 0.001
Glucocorticoid - Adrenergic 1.505 0.017 2.993 0.047
Multiple - Adrenergic 1.056 0.346 1.766 0.004
Opioid - Adrenergic 0.682 -0.365 1.729 0.201
Oxytocin - Adrenergic 0.824 -0.676 2.324 0.281
Serotoninergic - Multiple -0.161 -0.622 0.300 0.493
Dopaminergic - Multiple 0.096 -0.533 0.724 0.766
GABAergic - Multiple 0.306 -0.244 0.855 0.276
Glucocorticoid - Multiple 0.449 -0.914 1.812 0.518
Opioid - Multiple -0.374 -1.208 0.459 0.378
Oxytocin - Multiple -0.232 -1.608 1.144 0.741
Dopaminergic - Serotoninergic 0.256 -0.435 0.948 0.467
GABAergic - Serotoninergic 0.466 -0.156 1.088 0.141
Glucocorticoid - Serotoninergic 0.610 -0.777 1.996 0.388
Opioid - Serotoninergic -0.214 -1.035 0.608 0.610
Oxytocin - Serotoninergic -0.071 -1.471 1.328 0.920
GABAergic - Dopaminergic 0.210 -0.542 0.962 0.584
Glucocorticoid - Dopaminergic 0.353 -1.114 1.821 0.636
Opioid - Dopaminergic -0.470 -1.469 0.529 0.356
Oxytocin - Dopaminergic -0.328 -1.807 1.152 0.664
Glucocorticoid - GABAergic 0.143 -1.283 1.570 0.843
Opioid - GABAergic -0.680 -1.626 0.266 0.159
Oxytocin - GABAergic -0.538 -1.976 0.901 0.463
Opioid - Glucocorticoid -0.823 -2.355 0.708 0.292
Oxytocin - Glucocorticoid -0.681 -2.507 1.145 0.464
Oxytocin - Opioid 0.142 -1.401 1.686 0.856
Reinforcement Type Reward/Punisher - Reward/Null 0.150 -0.702 1.002 0.730
Reward/Reward - Reward/Null 0.487 -0.395 1.369 0.279
Reward/Reward - Reward/Punisher 0.337 0.089 0.585 0.730
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Figure 2.3: Forest plot with a meta-analytic mean (intercept-only
model) and significant moderators from univariate meta-regression
models. Each point represents the mean effect size for each moder-
ator and error bars represent the 95% confidence interval
The best fitting model included cue (i.e. positive reference cue, midpoint probe
cue, negative reference cue, near negative probe cue and near positive probe cue)
instead of cue type (i.e. reference or probe; ∆AIC (i.e. difference in AIC values
between models)=0.437), and all significant moderators identified in the univariate
meta-regression. Removal of the neurobiological target of the drug (∆AIC=13.511),
dosage (∆AIC=6.705), cue (∆AIC=3.583), reinforcement type (∆AIC=7.573), and
manipulation type (∆AIC=6.465) resulted in a poorer fit according to the AIC
values. The best fitting model had a marginal R2 value (sensu (Nakagawa and
Schielzeth, 2013)) of 72.844%. In this model, the difference between effect sizes
where a relatively positive compared with relatively negative affective state had
been induced was significant, with a moderate effect size (∆mean=0.582, CI=0.054-
1.110 t506=2.164, p=0.031). Effect sizes from drugs targeting the adrenergic system
were overall in the opposite direction to expected and there was a large and signif-
icant difference in effect sizes between adrenergic system targeting drugs and mul-
tiple system targeting drugs (∆mean=0.852, CI=0.043-1.661, t507=2.069,p=0.039)
and GABAergic system targeting drugs (∆mean=1.299, CI=0.369-2.228, t507=2.746,
p=0.006 ), and a large but marginally non-significant difference in effect sizes be-
tween adrenergic system targeting drugs and serotonergic system targeting drugs
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(∆mean=0.817, CI=-0.073-1.707, t507=1.803, p=0.072), dopaminergic system target-
ing drugs (∆mean=0.936, CI=-0.083-1.956, t507=1.804, p=0.072), glucocorticoid sys-
tem targeting drugs (∆mean=1.451, CI=-0.250-3.151, t507=1.676, p=0.094). There
was a large but non-significant difference between the effect sizes of drugs target-
ing the adrenergic and oxytocin system (∆mean=0.961, CI=-0.894-2.815, t507=1.018,
p=0.309) and moderate but non-significant difference between the effect sizes of drugs
targeting the adrenergic compared with opioid targeting drugs (∆mean=0.555, CI=-
0.621-1.732, t507=0.927, p=0.354). Effect sizes were significantly weaker at the posi-
tive reference cue compared with the midpoint probe cue (∆mean=0.163, CI=0.019-
0.308, t507=2.218, p=0.027), and near-positive probe cue (∆mean=0.289, CI=0.025-
0.553, t507=2.148, p=0.032). Effect sizes at the positive reference cue were not signif-
icantly different from effect sizes at the negative reference cue (∆mean=0.118, CI=-
0.028-0.264, t507=1.592, p=0.112) or at the near-negative probe cue (∆mean=0.206,
CI=-0.060-0.472, t507=1.519, p=0.129). There was a small and significant differ-
ence between effect sizes from studies using high and low rewards as the more and
less favourable outcome, respectively, compared with studies which used rewards and
punishers (∆mean=-0.366, CI=-0.626–0.106, t543=-2.764 p=0.006), while there was
a moderate but non-significant difference between studies that used high and low
rewards and those that used a reward and null outcome (∆mean=-0.546, CI=-1.548-
0.457, t543=-1.070, p=0.285).
2.3.5 Study exclusion
As the initial analysis revealed that drugs targeting the adrenergic system had the
opposite effect on judgement bias than hypothesised, which differed significantly from
the majority of the other drugs not specifically targeting the adrenergic system, our
assumption about the effect of these drugs on affective state was called into question.
Moreover, there is conflicting evidence about the affect altering properties of adren-
ergic system targeting drugs in non-human animals (Inoue et al., 2006; Tanaka et al.,
2000). Consequently, we made the post-hoc decision to re-analyse the data excluding
effect sizes from studies using adrenergic system targeting drugs. Three studies had
used adrenergic system targeting drugs; one study had used clonidine and the other
two studies had used reboxetine. Both clonidine and reboxetine are considered to
induce a relatively positive affective state. These studies accounted for 7.719% (43)
of the effect sizes analysed.
2.3.6 Post-exclusion meta-analysis
Following the exclusion of these effect sizes, a moderate overall effect was observed;
pharmacological manipulations of affective state were found to significantly influence
judgement bias in the predicted direction (mean=0.400, CI=0.056-0.744, t513=2.287,
p=0.023). However, there again existed high heterogeneity (I2=89.746%); with
38.362% attributable to between-effect-size effects, 20.732% to between-drug effects,
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and 30.653% to institutional variation. The meta-analysis using both data subsets
(using only one probe cue) revealed a significant and moderate overall effect of phar-
macological manipulations of affect on judgement bias (absolute greatest probe cue
effect sizes: mean=0.520, CI=0.116-0.924, t144=2.543, p=0.012; and absolute great-
est probe cue effect in direction of mean: mean=0.579, CI=0.157-1.001, t144=2.711,
p=0.008).
2.3.7 Post-exclusion meta-regression
While manipulation type (Fig. 2.4: F(1,512)=15.700, p<0.001) and dose (Fig. 2.4:
F(1,476)=5.169, p=0.023), remained significant as moderators when studies using
adrenergic system targeting drugs were excluded, the presented cue (Fig. 2.4:
F(4,509)=2.396, p=0.049) was now significant as opposed to marginally non-significant
and drug target (F(6,506)=0.578, p=0.748) cue type (F(1,512)=2.594, p=0.108), and
reinforcement type (F(2,511)=0.144, p=0.866) were no longer significant. The model
which included all three significant moderators provided a better fit than the mod-
els which excluded manipulation type (∆AIC=13.465), cue (∆AIC=2.299), and dose
(∆AIC=5.430). This full model had a marginal R2 value of 61.008%.
The difference between effect sizes at the midpoint probe cue and positive refer-
ence cue was very small but significant (∆mean=0.154, CI=0.011-0.297, t471=2.111,
p=0.035, and the difference between effect sizes at the positive reference cue and
near-positive probe cue was small but marginally non-significant (∆mean=0.245,
CI=-0.035-0.525, t471=1.716, p=0.087). Contrary to the previous analysis including
adrenergic-targeting drugs, a very small but significant difference was found between
effect sizes at the negative and positive reference cues, with greater effect sizes at the
negative reference cue (∆mean=0.183, CI=0.039-0.327, t471=2.491, p=0.013). The
difference in effect sizes between the positive reference and near-negative probe cue
remained non-significant (∆mean=0.192, CI=-0.089-0.474, t471=1.341, p=0.181). Ef-
fect sizes were still observed to be greater when the anxiogenic or depressant drugs
were used compared to the antidepressant or anxiolytic drugs with a moderate differ-
ence in effect sizes (∆mean=0.701, CI=0.348-1.055, t471=3.897, p<0.001), and effect
sizes remained significantly greater when there were smaller differences in dosage be-
tween the relatively positive and relatively negative treatment, although the effect
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Figure 2.4: Forest plot with a meta-analytic mean (intercept-only
model) and significant moderators from univariate meta-regression
models following the exclusion of adrenergic system targeting drugs.
Each point represents the mean effect size for each moderator and error
bars represent the 95% confidence interval
2.3.8 Publication bias and sensitivity analysis
The results of the Bayesian meta-analysis were consistent with the results of our
likelihood-based meta-analyses both prior to and following the removal of effect sizes
from studies using drugs targeting the adrenergic system. The effect of the pharma-
cological manipulations on judgement bias was not significant prior to data exclusion
(mean=0.242, 95% credible interval=-0.097-0.666, p=0.194), but a marginally non-
significant overall effect emerged following data exclusion from studies using adrener-
gic system targeting drugs (mean=0.387, credible interval=0.020-0.864, p=0.056).
Visual inspection of the funnel plots produced from the meta-analytic residuals
and raw effect sizes (Fig. 2.5) did not indicate that a publication bias was present, nor
did the results of Egger’s test on either the analysis prior to (t519=-0.419, p=0.675)
or following (t476=0.568,p=0.570) the exclusion of data.
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Figure 2.5: Funnel plots of a) the meta-analytic residual values
(residuals + sampling errors) for the full meta-regression model prior
to exclusion of effect sizes from studies using adrenergic system tar-
geting drugs; b) the raw effect sizes and the inverse standard errors
prior to exclusion of effect sizes from studies using adrenergic system
targeting drugs; c) the meta-analytic residual values for the full meta-
regression model following exclusion of effect sizes from studies using
adrenergic system targeting drugs; d) the raw effect sizes and the in-
verse standard errors following exclusion of effect sizes from studies
using adrenergic system targeting drugs
Re-analysis of the intercept-only model using the effect sizes and variances
that had been adjusted for shared controls did not alter the results qualitatively.
The result prior to data exclusion was statistically non-significant (mean=0.240,
CI=-0.047-0.527, t522=1.641,p=0.101) while following data exclusion was significant
(mean=0.401, CI=0.057-0.745, t476=2.291, p=0.022).
2.4 Discussion
Judgement bias is a relatively new and promising measure of animal affect that may
provide a useful alternative to more common behavioural assays used to assess the
efficacy of potential pharmacological treatments of mood disorders, such as the forced
swim test. Empirical studies with human subjects have supported its construct va-
lidity (Anderson et al., 2012; Johnson and Tversky, 1983; Nygren et al., 1996; Paul
et al., 2011; Wright and Bower, 1992). To examine its predictive validity, we con-
ducted a systematic review and meta-analysis of studies investigating the effect of
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affect-altering drugs on judgement bias in non-human animals. We analysed data
from 20 published research articles which yielded 557 effect sizes.
There was high heterogeneity (>75%) between the effect sizes observed (Senior
et al., 2016) indicating strong variability in the extent to which pharmacological ma-
nipulations of affective state alter judgement bias. The drug used accounted for some
of this variability, as did the institution at which the research was conducted, yet a
high proportion of heterogeneity was also attributed to variation within drug and insti-
tution. Our meta-regression further highlighted a number of factors which explained
variation in effect sizes including the neurobiological drug target, manipulation type
(whether the drug was hypothesised to induce a negative or positive affective state),
dosage, cue, and cue type (reference or probe).
Initially, considering all effect sizes across all cues equally (including references
cues), we found no significant overall effect of affect-altering drugs on judgement bias.
However, because there are theoretical and empirical reasons for an effect being more
likely at ambiguous cues as opposed to reference cues, and/or to occur at one ambigu-
ous cue but not others (e.g. because the others may happen to be too perceptually
similar to the reference cues, see Methods), considering all cues equally may obscure
an effect of a treatment manipulation. Indeed, judgement bias studies often report ef-
fects that are observed at only a subset of (ambiguous) cues (e.g. Bethell and Koyama
(2015)). Consequently, we also carried out analyses using subsets of data that included
only (i) effect sizes for the probe cue with the largest absolute effect size; (ii) effect
sizes for the cue with the absolute largest effect size in the direction of the mean
effect size. These analyses revealed that the pharmacological manipulations altered
judgement bias in the predicted direction.
The results of the meta-regression showed a clear moderating effect of the neuro-
biological drug target, particularly of drugs targeting the adrenergic system, whose
effect differed significantly from the majority of other drugs used. A small to medium
effect using data from all cues was found following the removal of data from studies
targeting the adrenergic system, and a moderate effect was found when considering
data from the subset analyses described above. Thus, this meta-analysis supports
judgement bias as measure of affect in non-human animals, having demonstrated that
pharmacological manipulations of affect overall alter judgement bias at the probe cues
in the predicted direction.
The three excluded studies used either reboxetine, an antidepressant, or clonidine,
which is used off-licence to treat anxiety disorders. Jointly, these drugs were found to
exert an opposite effect on judgement bias; inducing a negative judgement bias when
a positive judgement bias was predicted. Paradoxically, depression and anxiety are
known side effects of these drugs (Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, 2019).
Moreover, these studies both used an acute dose which may explain why their effects
were not in the predicted direction. Both norepinephrine and cortisol increase in
response to stress and acute dosing of drugs which simultaneously elevate levels of
norepinephrine and cortisol have been shown to result in stress-like changes in the
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neural response to negative stimuli in humans (Kukolja et al., 2008). It is therefore
feasible that the acute delivery of adrenergic system targeting antidepressant drugs
induced a relatively negative rather than a positive affective state which resulted in
the relatively negative judgement bias observed. This potential explanation is further
supported by studies that have observed anxiety-like states in rodents following the
administration of similar adrenergic system targeting drugs (Inoue et al., 2006; Tanaka
et al., 2000).
An alternative explanation could be related to another side effect of adrenergic
agonists that has been documented in human and non-human animal subjects; seda-
tion (Buerkle and Yaksh, 1998; Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, 2019) A
sedated animal may not have been able to fully partake in the experiment or have been
considerably slower to respond, leading to seemingly ‘pessimistic’ responses. This is
perhaps further supported by the finding that clonidine and reboxetine led to an in-
creased latency to respond to the positive reference cue, as described by the authors of
the studies included in this meta-analysis. However, further studies would be required
to reveal the extent to which the results from these two studies can be generalised to
all adrenergic system targeting drugs.
Drugs inducing negative affect (e.g. depressants and anxiogenics), had a greater
effect on measured judgement bias than drugs inducing positive affect (e.g. antide-
pressants and anxiolytics). This result may reflect an interaction between the drugs
administered and affective states arising from the process of being tested, which may
sometimes be negative in their own right (e.g. invasive administration of drugs, so-
cial isolation during testing, and potential delivery of an aversive decision outcome).
These factors may have enhanced the effect of the negative affect inducing drugs,
while dampening the effect of the positive affect inducing drugs. Notably, the po-
tential negative affective state induced by testing may also explain the finding, prior
to exclusion of adrenergic targeting drugs, that effect sizes were greater when only
rewards were used as reinforcement, as opposed to both reward and punishers. In-
deed, in humans there is evidence to suggest that some affect-altering recreational
drugs intensify the affective state of an individual prior to consumption, or result in
the exaggerated interpretation of emotional stimuli (Foisy et al., 2007; Parrott et al.,
2011). With regards to the development of novel treatments for mood disorders such
as depression and anxiety, this perhaps suggests that attention should be given to the
potential effects of the testing procedure on affect, and that greater sample sizes may
be required to provide sufficient power for an effect of the potential pharmacological
treatment to be detected.
Another possible explanation for the moderating effect of manipulation type is that
there are floor effects which limit the impact positive affect inducing drugs may have on
judgement bias. There will be a physical limit to how quickly an animal can approach
a cue, and the control animals may already be performing at or close to this limit,
meaning that the animals that had been given the positive drug could not respond any
quicker. However, this explanation will only be relevant to studies measuring approach
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latency. Similarly, the smoke-detector principle states that individuals should be
overly responsive to potential threats (Nesse, 2001); just as the cost of a smoke detector
not detecting a fire is far greater than the cost of the smoke detector sounding an alarm
when there is no fire, false positives are also optimal in the detection of predators. An
individual may continue to appear relatively cautious even when in a more positive
affective state because the cost of not avoiding punishers (i.e. potential death) is so
high that it would be suboptimal for an individual to behave in a more risky manner
(i.e. making the ‘optimistic’ response which could lead to a punisher, as opposed to
the ‘pessimistic’ response which is the safe option) (Nesse, 2001; Nettle and Bateson,
2012).
Although this meta-analysis did not identify a difference in effect sizes between
studies which analysed proportion or latency data, it is important to discuss these
two outcome measures. Typically, both latency and proportion data can be collected
from judgement bias studies and it is unclear what drives a researcher to select either
measure. There are merits and disadvantages of using either measure; while latency
contains more information than proportion data, in the sense that as a continuous
variable it may identify variation that proportion data cannot, it may also be more
subject to influences from other factors such as any effect of the drug on motor re-
sponses as outlined above or other cognitive biases such as attention biases (Mendl
et al., 2009).
Greater effects were observed when there were relatively smaller differences in
dosage between treatments. This is consistent with the inverted U-shaped dose-
response function that is sometimes observed in drug studies (Calabrese and Baldwin,
2001a,b,c). This result may reflect that higher doses increase the probability of side ef-
fects which may interfere with task performance (Furukawa et al., 2002; Lazarou et al.,
1998). Adverse effects that alter the motivation of the animal (e.g. reduced appetite),
their consummatory behaviour (e.g. nausea), or psychomotor abilities (e.g. sedation)
are likely to affect judgement bias. Such side effects are common to several affect-
altering drugs (Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, 2019). It may therefore be
sensible to take measures of activity or food consumption concurrent to the judgement
bias task to assess the potential impact of side effects of drug manipulations.
The meta-analysis also found that the effects of the pharmacological manipulations
on judgement bias were weakest at the positive reference cue, and that the effect of
pharmacological manipulations was greater when only the probe cue with the greatest
effect size within each drug and article were analysed. This reflects that pharmacologi-
cal manipulations of affect exert a stronger influence on trials where there is ambiguity
about the outcome of the trial compared with trials where the reward is certain. On
presentation of the positive reference cue, there should be little ambiguity about the
outcome, and it would be expected that the animal should make the response that
allows them to obtain the reward on a high proportion of trials. The influence of any
affective manipulation should be greatest when there is uncertainty about the outcome
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as subjective probabilities of uncertain outcomes are thought to be more strongly in-
formed by an individual’s affective state (Mendl et al., 2010; Mendl and Paul, prep;
Trimmer et al., 2013). Thus, this finding is consistent with the theoretical framework
underlying judgement bias. However, given that a number of cognitive processes could
lead to a shift in judgement bias at the probe but not the positive reference cue, this
finding does not negate the possibility that cognitive processes other than probability
estimation underlie the relationship between the pharmacological manipulations and
decision-making on the judgement bias task.
It is unclear why the extracted effect sizes were not smaller at the negative reference
cue following exclusion of effect sizes from studies that had used adrenergic-targeting
drugs. The pharmacological manipulations were not expected to exert a similar effect
at the negative reference cue compared with the probe cues, as there should be little
uncertainty about the outcome when the reference cues are presented. Moreover, in
studies in which multiple probe cues were presented, the pharmacological manipu-
lations rarely exerted the greatest influence at midpoint cue, where there should be
the greatest uncertainty about the outcome. This further suggests that pharmaco-
logically induced affective states do not necessarily induce a greater judgement bias
as uncertainty about the decision outcome increases. Both valuation and probability
of decision outcomes are key components of decision-making; an individual might be
more likely to make a risky or more ‘optimistic’ response if they considered the reward
to more probable or punisher to be less probable or if they considered the reward to
be more valuable or punisher to be less aversive (Mendl et al., 2009; Rangel et al.,
2008). Speculatively, it is possible that the pharmacological manipulations altered the
valuation of the punisher, hence altering responses to its presentation. Indeed, several
neurobiological systems implicated in affect have also been found to underlie reward
and punisher valuation. For example, the dopaminergic system has been associated
with the incentive salience (‘wanting’) of rewards; the opioid system has been asso-
ciated with the hedonic value (‘liking’) of rewards; while the serotonergic system has
been associated with punisher avoidance (Berridge et al., 2009; Boureau and Dayan,
2011). A better understanding of the cognitive processes underlying judgement bias,
which could be achieved through a battery of tests or computational modelling of
judgement bias data, would be highly valuable. Similarly, it is possible that some
findings reflect differences between the reward and punisher systems, especially given
that the majority of studies reinforced the negative cue using a punisher, as opposed
to null outcome or lower reward.
Our meta-analysis found no evidence to indicate that the species used, the dosing
frequency, the time since last dose in acute studies, the number of days since first
treatment in chronic studies, the outcome variable used, the biological sex of the in-
dividuals studied, the reinforcement type, or response type had moderating effects on
the influence of pharmacological manipulations of affect on judgement bias. While
this might reflect that there is insufficient power to detect an effect, it might indicate
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that judgement bias is robust to variation in methodology and across species. In-
terestingly, despite being one of the most commonly used non-human animal species
in research, none of the studies included in this meta-analysis used mice (National
Research Council, 1988; UK Home Office, 2017). As judgement bias tasks have been
successfully conducted in mice (Hintze et al., 2018; Krakenberg et al., 2019), we con-
sider that it would be highly worthwhile to examine the extent to which pharmaco-
logical manipulations alter judgement bias in mice. We found no evidence to suggest
a publication bias.
Future studies should attempt to account for the potential side effects of phar-
macological manipulations. Observing behaviour following drug administration, for
example activity levels and food and water consumption, may help to highlight poten-
tial adverse effects. The majority of effect sizes extracted in this meta-analysis were
from studies using serotonergic system targeting drugs. While this is unsurprising
given that commonly prescribed antidepressants target the serotonin system (Mars
et al., 2017), mood disorders are associated with dysfunction in several neurologi-
cal systems and further investigation of the influence of pharmacologically-induced
changes in the activity of these systems may be beneficial (Joëls and Baram, 2009;
Nemeroff and Owens, 2002; Nestler et al., 2002). This meta-analysis has highlighted
that multiple probe cues may be preferable in future studies. Pharmacological manip-
ulations of affective state do not necessarily exert the strongest influence of judgement
bias at the most ambiguous cue, as found in this meta-analysis, and using multiple
cues would allow a more comprehensive assessment of the effect of the manipulation.
Finally, it would be worthwhile to assess the efficacy of judgement bias as a measure
of pharmacological manipulations of affect in mice.
2.5 Conclusions (see Fig. 2.6)
This meta-analysis has provided evidence that judgement bias has predictive validity
as a measure of the affective impact of pharmacological manipulations. However, a key
issue is the potential interference of drug side effects on judgement bias. In particular,
the contrary effect of adrenergic-targeting affect-altering drugs and the greater effect
of drugs on judgement bias at lower doses, may be attributed to side effects or to the
complex nature of adrenergic drug effects. The effect of drugs hypothesised to induce
a negative affective state was greater than the effect of drugs hypothesised to induce a
positive affective state, and therefore larger sample sizes may be required when testing
the efficacy of potential pharmacological treatments for mood disorders. However, if
consideration is given to these potential shortcomings, the judgement bias task for
which there is evidence of construct validity and now of predictive validity, appears
to be a viable measure of pharmacologically-induced affect in non-human animals.
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Figure 2.6: Diagrammatic summary of the results of Chapter 2: the
nodes represent variables relating to affect, decision-making (where
CL denotes loss/punisher sensitivity, CR denotes reward sensitivity, ω
denotes the prior belief about outcomes, and JB denotes judgement
bias), experience (where wPE denotes the weighted reward prediction
error, wPE2 denotes the squared weighted reward prediction error,
and R̄ denotes the average earning/reward rate), and vigour, the lines
between nodes represent observed associations between those variables.
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Chapter 3
How do fluctuating monetary
rewards and losses influence human
affect and judgement bias?
Chapter summary: An individual’s ongoing experience of re-
wards and punishers is considered to be a fundamental deter-
minant of both affect and decision-making. The judgement bias
task uses a series of one-shot decisions to measure affect, but little
consideration has been given to the influence that the outcomes
of these decisions might exert on subsequent affect and decision-
making. To better understand how affect and decision-making
vary across a judgement bias test session in accordance with ex-
perience, which ultimately may inform our understanding of the
adaptive function of affect, we examined the relationship between
reward and punisher experience, affective state, and decision-
making in humans. To do this, we conducted a judgement bias
study in which either the offered monetary rewards or threatened
monetary losses fluctuated systematically, and asked participants
to regularly report both their affective valence and arousal. We
also developed a novel computational model for the analysis of
judgement bias choice data. We found that participants reported
more positive affective valence and were faster to initiate trials in
the task when the average earning rate was higher, although the
average earning rate did not influence judgement bias. However,
participants were more likely to opt for the risky choice when
recent outcomes had been more predictable, which operated via
loss sensitivity. Moreover, the extent to which the predictabil-
ity of recent outcomes modulated judgement bias was signifi-
cantly associated with affective valence; greater predictability-
dependent modulation of judgement bias was associated with
more positive valence. Thus, reward and punisher experience,
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specifically the average earning rate and unpredictability of out-
comes, influences affect and decision-making, which may suggest
that these variables provide important information about envi-
ronmental conditions.
3.1 Introduction
There is a traditional gulf in the field of decision-making between one-shot tasks, in
which each trial is independent of the others, and ongoing tasks, in which subjects are
supposed to apply what they learn from the consequences of their actions in earlier
trials to later trials. Signal detection theory (Green et al., 1966) is the paradigm for
the former, and reward-based reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998) for
the latter. In reality, the distinction is blurred – adaptation paradigms use repeated
stimulus presentations to ‘set’ the state for one-shot psychophysical examinations
(Clifford, 2002); subjects perform exquisite Bayesian learning in stop signal reaction
time tasks, despite being instructed not to (Ma and Yu, 2015).
Here, we exploit the judgement bias task (Harding et al., 2004) as a paradigmatic
example of this blurring. At the heart of the judgement bias task is a series of
apparently independent one-shot psychophysical choices. However, decision-making
on each trial, particularly trials with perceptually ambiguous stimuli, is considered to
be indicative of a longer timescale notion of affective state (i.e. ‘mood’), with greater
risk-aversion typically associated with more positively valenced affect which should
reflect approximate sufficient statistics about the characteristics of the interaction
between an individual and their environment (Eldar et al., 2016; Mendl et al., 2010;
Trimmer et al., 2011). These statistics could encompass such things as the present
provision of rewards and punishers or surprise at the past provision of these outcomes,
and could affect decision-making in various ways, for instance changing the prior
expectations of subjects, or their sensitivities to reward and punisher (Eldar et al.,
2016; Mendl et al., 2009, 2010; Nettle, 2008; Trimmer et al., 2011). To illustrate this,
consider an individual in a reward-barren environment. Such an environment has been
proposed to induce a depression-like state which is associated with a reduced reward
valuation (‘anhedonia’) and a reduced expectation of future rewards, and hence should
result in more risk-averse decision-making in the judgement bias task (Eldar et al.,
2016; Mendl et al., 2009, 2010; Nettle, 2008; Trimmer et al., 2011). However, there
are significant gaps in our knowledge about the bi-directional relationship between
affect and choice in the judgement bias task: what characteristics of past decisions
and outcomes influence affective state, and also how they influence present choices,
either directly, or indirectly by manipulating affective state.
We aimed to examine this relationship by considering the impact of ongoing ex-
perience within the judgement bias task, in which either reward or loss magnitude
is systematically varied, on psychophysical decision-making and self-reported affect
in human participants. This systematic variation of reward or loss was inspired by
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Beierholm et al. (2013) and allowed reward and loss sensitivity to be more easily
disentangled through computational modelling (see Fig 3.1 for demonstration). The
fluctuating offered reward or threatened loss also allowed greater variation in the val-
ues of the average earning rate and reward prediction error across trials so that the
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Figure 3.1: The probability of making the ‘stay’ response, calculated
using a softmax function and assuming a 0.5 probability of each out-
come, on three trials (n, n+1, n+2) with a varying offered reward and
static threatened loss and different scaling (1.5×reward, no scaling,
1.5×loss) of the rewards and loss (i.e. reward and loss sensitivity).
The probabilities of ‘staying’ across trials differs depending whether
the reward or loss is scaled, allowing reward and loss sensitivity to be
disentangled
A detailed computational model of a go/no-go version of the judgement bias task
allowed us to investigate the cognitive mechanisms underlying the relationship between
reward and punisher experience, affect, and decision-making. While decision-making
(or latency) is the typical outcome measure in judgement bias tasks, the modelling
approach used in this study sought to identify underlying, and perhaps more funda-
mental, variables that link affect, experience, and decision-making in the judgement
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bias task. Here, we modelled decision-making in the judgement bias task under the
framework of a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP). The model
considers that, on each trial, participants transition through a two-dimensional state
space: one dimension represents their (discretised) belief about the presented stimu-
lus which is informed by their observations, and the other dimension represents the
(discretised) time elapsed on the trial. The probability that a participant executes
a ‘go’ or ‘no-go’ action will depend on their transitions through this state space and
subjective value of occupying each state. This is determined by a number of param-
eters, including those characterising task performance, such as a slope and a lapse
parameter (Wichmann and Hill, 2001), and those characterising reward and punisher
experience, such as those mapping the influence of the average earning rate, predic-
tion error, and predictability to prior beliefs about the stimulus and reward and loss
sensitivity. Since we expect predictions, prediction errors and surprise to play an im-
portant role in affect given that unexpected rewards have been proposed to induce
positive affect (Eldar et al., 2016; Rutledge et al., 2014), we needed a robust quan-
tification of the predictions that our subjects are making, which we derived from the
computational model. We also examined the vigour with which participants engage in
the task, as measured by latency to initiate trials, since this has been another promi-
nent correlate of longer-term aspects of decision-making such as the average reward
rate, with several studies demonstrating that vigour increases concurrently with the
average rate of rewards or losses (Griffiths and Beierholm, 2017; Guitart-Masip et al.,
2011; Niv et al., 2007).
We hypothesised that more positive prediction errors and a greater average earning
rate (differing from the average reward rate in that it also encodes punishing and null
outcomes) would reflect that the test environment is both relatively and absolutely
favourable, thereby promoting activity and risk-seeking behaviour and hence a bias
towards the risky choice on the judgement bias task, faster trial initiation, and would
be associated with a positively valenced high arousal affective state (Eldar et al.,
2016; Guitart-Masip et al., 2011; Mendl et al., 2010; Fig. 3.2). Environments that are
unpredictable have also been proposed to induce negative affect (Clark et al., 2018;
Fig. 3.2)), hence we hypothesised that we might also observe more negative affect and
risk-averse decision-making following less predictable outcomes. We did not expect
differences in the direction of these effects depending on whether the reward or loss
was varied, although given that losses can be more salient than gains, consider that
stronger effects might be observed when losses were varied (Kahneman and Tversky,
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Figure 3.2: Diagrammatic summary of hypotheses; (A) different as-
pects of reward and punisher experience (i.e. the prediction error -
PE; squared prediction error - PE2; average earning rate - R̄; and the
offered reward and threatened loss) would modulate affective valence
and arousal; (B) which in turn would alter risk-aversion and vigour
with which trials were initiated
3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Participants
Thirty-nine students (34 female, 5 male, mean age ±SE=24.590±0.457) from the
University of Bristol participated in the study and were paid £5 per session for their
participation plus a performance-dependent bonus. Participants provided written,
informed consent, and the study was approved by the Faculty of Science Research
Ethics Committee at the University of Bristol.
3.2.2 Procedure
Twenty participants undertook the experiment in the context of obtaining variable re-
wards (fluctuating reward condition), and nineteen in the context of avoiding variable
losses (fluctuating loss condition). The task was written in Matlab (MathWorks,
Natwick, MA, USA) using the PsychToolBox extensions.
3.2.3 Judgement bias task (see Fig. 3.4)
This task provided a human version of the rat judgement bias task described by Jones
et al. (2018). Participants were required to make go/no-go responses to classify the
direction of motion of random dot kinematograms (RDK) as leftwards or rightwards,
with one direction being associated with a monetary reward and the other with a
monetary loss. To initiate each trial, participants were required to press and hold the
‘enter’ key, this led to a fixation cross being displayed for 500ms, followed by a RDK
displayed for 2000ms. The true direction of motion of the RDK was always either
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leftwards or rightwards, and the proportion of dots moving coherently was varied to
alter the difficulty with which the motion could be classified by the participant as
leftwards or rightwards. Half of the participants were told that when the direction of
motion was rightwards (threatened loss trials), they must release the ‘enter’ key (‘go’)
prior to two seconds to avoid a loss (see below), and when the motion was leftwards
(offered reward trials) they must continue to press the ‘enter’ key (‘stay’) for two
seconds to obtain a monetary reward (see below) following an on-screen prompt to
‘Please press and hold the enter key’, while the other half of the participants were
told the obverse (i.e. leftwards=threatened loss; rightwards=offered reward). The
duration of the RDK display was 2000ms regardless of choice. In all blocks of trials,
the true direction of motion was leftwards on half of the trials and rightwards on the
remaining half, and each coherence level used within each block occurred an equal
number of times within each direction of motion. The order of trials was randomised.
Participants completed three training blocks consisting of 24, 60, and 24 trials
respectively, followed by one test block of 180 trials. In the first practice block, the
direction of motion of the dots were unambiguous, with a coherence level of 0.32. In
the second block, the direction of motion of the dots was difficult for the participants
to determine (i.e. ambiguous) on a third of trials with a coherence level of 0.04, and
unambiguous on two thirds of trials with coherence levels of 0.32 or 0.16. Stimuli in the
third training and also the test block had a coherence level of 0.16, 0.02, or 0.01, with
ambiguous coherence levels (0.01 or 0.02) on two thirds of trials. The coherence levels
required for the direction of motion to be perceptually ambiguous were determined in
a pilot study.
Following each presentation of the RDK and response, participants were provided
with on-screen feedback. For the ‘offered reward’ trials the correct response was to
continue holding the key for two seconds (‘stay’) to gain a monetary reward, while
for the ‘threatened loss’ trials the correct response was to release the key prior to
two seconds (‘go’) to avoid a monetary loss. In the first two practice blocks either
‘Correct’ (in green font) or ‘Incorrect’ (in red font) was displayed for 1500ms. In
the final practice block and test block, the notional amount won (in green figures)
or lost (in red figures) was displayed for 1500ms. Participants were told that the
amounts they saw on the screen during these blocks would be multiplied by a factor,
and then added to or deducted from an initial £2 endowment, and a £5 turn-up fee.
To sustain motivation across the test session, participants were informed that the
top-three ranking participants would have their bonus doubled.
In the final (third) training block, if an individual made a risky response (‘stay’)
they would notionally win or lose £10, depending on the stimulus presented, otherwise
they would get £0. For the test block, following Guitart-Masip et al. (2011), the
notional amount rewarded in the fluctuating reward condition, or potential loss, in
the fluctuating loss condition, for correct or incorrect stay responses respectively varied
across trials according to a sine function with added noise. In the fluctuating reward
condition, the reward varied between £0.87 and £19.16 and the loss was fixed at £10.
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In the fluctuating loss condition, the loss varied between £0.87 and £19.16 and the
reward was fixed at £10 (Fig. 3.3). The potential monetary reward and loss were
displayed on screen for 1500s using connected green and red bars prior to each trial.
The length of the green bar was proportional to the potential reward and the length
of the red bar was proportional to the potential loss, with the amounts written in
figures at the non-connecting end of each bar.
Fluctuating loss Fluctuating reward

























Figure 3.3: Offered monetary reward and threatened monetary loss
on each trial of the judgement bias task in the fluctuating reward and
loss conditions
3.2.4 Self reports of affect (see Fig. 3.4)
At the start of the test block of each task and following every 10 subsequent trials,
participants were asked to report their current mood using a 9 by 9 computerised self-
report affect grid (Killgore, 1998). To complete the affect grid participants had to move
a cross, which was initially central in the grid, to the location that best described their
current mood using the arrow keys on a keyboard. Horizontal movements represented
changes in mood valence, with movements to the right reporting a more positively
valenced mood. Vertical movements represented arousal, with upwards movement
reporting higher levels of arousal.
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Investigating the relationship between experienced reward and punishment and
decision-making, vigour, and affective state
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1University of Bristol, 2UCL
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Research Questions
• Which aspects of reward and punishment experience alter future risk
aversion and vigour to obtain rewards?
• Which aspects of reward and punishment experience alter the valence and
arousal of an affective state?
• Do the same learning processes that influence judgement bias also
influence affective state?
Introduction
• Judgement bias tasks are assumed to measure affective state in non-human
animals. The task originates from studies which found that humans
experiencing anxiety tend to exhibit a pessimistic judgement bias; they are
more likely to consider an ambiguous cue to signal a punishment.
Example cues and outcomes used in a judgement bias task.
• An understanding of the cognitive processes underlying judgement bias, and
how these processes relate to subjectively-experienced affective state, could
support the validity of judgement bias as a measure of animal welfare.
• In this study we used humans subjects, who provided subjective reports of
affective state, enabling us to investigate whether the cognitive and subjective
components of affective state are influenced by the same aspects of reward
experience.
Methods: Reward Magnitude Manipulation
• The magnitude of the reward offered
varied across trials, whilst the loss
remained fixed. Subjects were shown
the amount they could win or lose at
the start of each trial and were
informed of the outcome at the end of
each trial.
Methods: Procedure
• Subjects initiated each trial by pressing and holding a key. They were then
required to classify the direction of motion of a random dot kinematogram
(RDK) as leftwards or rightwards by making one of two responses; continuing
to hold the key for two seconds (stay) or releasing the key before two seconds
had elapsed (leave). The coherence level of the RDK varied between trials so
that direction of motion was either unambiguous, moderately ambiguous, or
highly ambiguous. Subjects reported their mood using affect grids.










• Response latency (judgement bias), latency to initiate a trial (vigour), and the
x (valence) and y (arousal) coordinates of the affect grid were recorded.
• We analysed whether weighted reward prediction error (wRPE), average





















• We found no evidence that the learning processes that influence
judgement bias also influence affective state.Figure 3.4: Structure of the human monetary judgement bias test
session
3.2.5 Model dependent analysis
POMDP model
The decision-making process was modelled as a partially observable Markov deci-
sion process (POMDP) (Åström, 1965; Smallwood and Sondik, 1973) with a two-
dimensional state space s = (t,X) in which participants accumulate evidence (X)
from observations of the RDK (x) over (veridical) time (t). The true direction of mo-
tion of the RDK (µ) takes one of two values, 1 or −1, where 1 represents motion in the
favourable direction and −1 represents motion in the unfavourable direction. When
µ= 1, the participant should ‘stay’, which results in a reward, and when µ=−1 the
correct response is to ‘go’ before the trial ends, which avoids a loss. Participants have
to use the evidence they collect, together with the costs and benefits of being correct
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or incorrect, to decide what to do. The participants’ capacity to perform interval
timing of the stay period is noisy.
For convenience, we discretise the objective time between zero and two seconds
into bins of ∆t, and use integer states t = {0, 1, 2, . . . , T}∆t. Thus, we write xt to
represent the observations from time (t − 1)∆t to t∆t, and x0:t to represent all the
observations from the beginning of the trial up to time t. The participant’s relative
belief that the stimulus is favourable at time t will depend on their prior belief that
the stimulus would be favourable, the relative likelihood of their observations prior to

































We assume that the likelihood follows a Gaussian probability distribution with
a mean dependent on the true value of µ and the coherence level θ, and (fixed)
variance σ2 that reflects the participant’s ability to detect the direction of motion of
the RDK1: P (xt|µ, θ) ∼ N (xt : µθ, σ2). Thus, the relative posterior probability for



























Again, for convenience, we discretise the belief state X. Since the participant does
not know the value of θ, we accumulate statistics X =
∑t
τ=0 xτ in discrete steps
χ× [· · · − 3,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3, . . .] for discretisation χ:
The state space contains two special states along with {t,X}: one, leave, is
the inevitable consequence of choosing action go, the other, timeout, arises after 2
seconds if the participant does not actively go.
We describe the probabilistic transition structure (T ) of the chain in stages, i.e.,
the probability of going from state s to state s′ when executing action a. First, we have
Ts;leave(go) = 1, and Ts;leave(a) = 0, a 6= go. Second, we simplify the stochastic,
interval-timing (Gibbon, 1977) relationship between objective and subjective time by
imagining that timeout can happen probabilistically when the participant chooses a=
stay2. We consider that this happens according to a gamma distribution Γ(k, φ), with
1For convenience, we suppress the dependence of µ and σ2 on ∆t.
2It would be more realistic for the participants’ time to evolve subjectively rather than objectively,
and for timeout to happen deterministically in objective time. However, this would mean a non-
uniform acquisition of evidence (i.e. the statistics of xt would not be homogeneous), making for extra
complexities of only modest import.
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shape and scale parameters k, φ respectively. Thus, considering the hazard function,
we have:
Pt;timeout = P (timeout ∈ (t, t+ 1)∆t|continuing at t & at = stay) (3.5)
=
∫ (t+1)∆t
t∆t dτ Γ(τ ; k, φ)
1−
∫ t∆t
0 dτ Γ(τ ; k, φ)
(3.6)
and imposing timing out at the end of the trial by fiat:
PT ;timeout = 1 (3.7)
Inclusion of the hazard function allows us to capture a core feature of the task;
the participant experiences a trade-off between accruing more evidence to make a
more informed decision, and ensuring that the decision is made before the end of the
two-second trial (which could result in a loss). This is particularly relevant to trials
where low coherence stimuli are presented as an individual may not accrue sufficient
evidence to be certain about the outcome of the ‘stay’ response, and consequently may
inadvertently make the ‘stay’ response by not making a decision before the end of the
trial. Moreover, by considering this time pressure, the model can be easily adapted for
fitting of reaction time data (see equation 3.22). The use of a hazard function based
on the Gamma distribution with the the given values of ζ and φ is based on a well-
established phenomenon in the time perception literature; the increase in variability
of estimates of time as the duration of time increases (Gibbon, 1977; Matell and Meck,
2000). More specifically, the logarithmic shape of the hazard function captures the
scalar properties of time perception.
Next, if the participant knows the quality of the stimulus, µ, θ, and there is no
timeout when choosing stay, we have for a single sample of x over time ∆t:
Pµ,θX;X′ = P
(


















where Φσ is the cumulative normal function for N (0, σ2).
Of course, the participant does not know the true value of µ or θ. Thus, the
evidence component of the subjective transition matrix Ts;s′(a) comes from averaging
over the possible µ and θ, given the information available at the current state, i.e.,
using the posterior probability:
P (µ, θ|t,X) = P (µ)P (θ)P (X|µ, θ, t)
ΣjΣkP (µ)P (θ)P (X|µj , θk, t)
,where: (3.10)
P (µ = 1) =
ω
ω + 1
P (µ = −1) = 1
ω + 1
(3.11)






where ω is a parameter that determines the prior probability of µ, and P (X|µ, θ, t)
is determined by the discretisation of the normal distribution around Xχ− µθt (Fig.
3.5).
Unfavourable direction, coherence=0.01 Unfavourable direction, coherence=0.02 Unfavourable direction, coherence=0.16
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(a) ω = 10
Unfavourable direction, coherence=0.01 Unfavourable direction, coherence=0.02 Unfavourable direction, coherence=0.16
Favourable direction, coherence=0.01 Favourable direction, coherence=0.02 Favourable direction, coherence=0.16



















(b) ω = 1
Unfavourable direction, coherence=0.01 Unfavourable direction, coherence=0.02 Unfavourable direction, coherence=0.16
Favourable direction, coherence=0.01 Favourable direction, coherence=0.02 Favourable direction, coherence=0.16



















(c) ω = 0.1
Figure 3.5: Heatmaps illustrating the probability that a participant
transitions to each state given the stimulus (i.e. true values of µ and
θ) and prior (i.e. values of ω). The coherence level (θ) governs the
rate of the transition towards a stronger belief that the ‘stay’ response
will lead to a reward or loss; the direction of the stimulus (µ) governs
the direction of the transitions; and the prior belief (determined by ω)
governs the starting point.
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In sum, the subjective transition structure from current state s = (t,X) is therefore
given by:
T(t,X);leave(go) = 1 (3.13)
T(t,X);timeout(stay) = Pt;timeout (3.14)









A participant’s policy π is determined by the long-run values Qπ(s, a) of executing
action a in state s = (t,X), and then following the policy thereafter. In general, these
action values are determined by the Bellman equation (Bellman, 1952). We assume
that no discounting occurs given the short duration of the trial. In this case:
Qπ(s,go) = 0 (3.16)




where s′ = (t+ 1, X ′). Here, the expected timeout value depends on the likelihood of
the two possibilities:
V timeout(s) = CRRnP (µ=1|s) + CLLnP (µ=−1|s) (3.18)
where CR and CL are parameters that reflect the participant’s sensitivity to gains
and losses respectively, and Rn and Ln are the potential reward and loss on trial n.
Further:
V π(s′) = π(s′,go′)× 0 + π(s′, stay)Qπ(s′, a) (3.19)
where π is determined by:
π(s′, stay) = λ+ (1− 2λ)σ(B[Qπ(s′, stay)−Qπ(s′,go)]); π(s′,go′) = 1− π(s′, stay)
(3.20)
with σ(z) = 1/(1 + exp(−z) being the logistic sigmoid, and λ and B being lapse and
inverse temperature parameters respectively (Fig. 3.6).
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Reward=10, Loss=−10 Reward=10, Loss=−20 Reward=20, Loss=−10

















Figure 3.6: Heatmap illustrating the value of occupying each state
as the value of the subjective reward and loss varies; this could either
result from variation in the true value of the reward and loss, or fluc-
tuations in CR or CL which scale the true value of the reward and loss.
The state values earlier in the trial in which there is a weaker belief
that the trial will be rewarded (i.e. bottom y-axis; left-side x-axis)
are close to zero; this reflects that the ‘leave’ action is the most likely
future action and hence the trial outcome will most likely be zero. The
value of states representing no strong belief about the outcome of the
trial (i.e. central y-axis) changes across time; this reflects that transi-
tions to a state with a high value (e.g. resulting from a strong certainty
of reward) are possible earlier in the trial, but if there is uncertainty
about the stimulus further into the trial, then it is most likely that the
stimulus has a low coherence and that reaching a high value state is
unlikely.
To calculate the distribution of leaving times, we consider the probability
P remains (µn, θn) of staying until state s = (t,X) on trial n, which is defined by di-
rection µn and coherence θn. This enjoys a recursive form:
P remain0,X (µn, θn) = 1 (3.21)





t−1,X−xt(µn, θn)π(stay, (t− 1, X − xt))(1− Pt−1;timeout)P (xt|µn, θn)
(3.22)
from which we can calculate the overall probability of remaining until timing out as:






= 2sP remaint,X (µn, θn)π(stay, (t,X))Pt;timeout (3.23)
In this framework, individual differences in decision-making, which will appear as
biases, arise through variation in CR, CL, and ω. As we hypothesise that judgement
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bias will depend on past experience, specifically the average earning rate (R̄n), the
weighted (low pass filtered) prediction error (wPEn), the weighted (low pass filtered)
squared prediction error (wPE2n), and the most recent outcome (On−1) we allow CR,
CL, and ω potentially to depend additively on these values as well as on a constant
term, which reflects baseline individual variation in these parameters. This is mapped
through an exponential so that the values of CR, CL, and ω are always positive. To
allow the relative contribution of R̄n−1 , wPEn−1, wPE2n−1, On−1 to CR, CL, and ω
















































R̄n−1 and wPEn−1 are updated following the outcome of each trial On (which is
scaled by reward or loss sensitivity such that On is CRRn, CLLn, or zero). Specifically,
following Rutledge et al. (2014), wPEn−1 is the prediction error on past trials PE1:n−1







Participants may make predictions about the outcome of a trial both prior to and
following stimulus presentation, but it is unclear which of these predictions would
lead to prediction errors most relevant to future decision-making. We assess these
two possibilities by fitting a set of models in which PEn is defined as the difference
between On and expected outcome of the trial prior to stimulus presentation, as given
by the average of the value function:
PEn = On − V (0, 0) (3.28)
Then, comparing this set of models to a set of models in which PEn is zero where
the ‘go’ response is made, and the difference between On and the stimulus-dependent
expected value of the state when the trial terminates:
PEn =

0, if action = leave
On −
[∑t=2s




Where P (t|X = timeout) is:
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P (t|X = timeout) = P (X = timeout|t)
Σj=1P (X = timeout|tj)
(3.30)
Overall, a prediction error based on a prediction prior to the presentation of the
stimulus was found to provide the best model fit (∆AIC=301.457) The average earning
rate (αR̄n), which reflects the learnt value of the test session from previous wins and
losses, updates according to a Rescorla-Wagner learning model, with learning rate
αR̄n (Rescorla et al., 1972):
R̄n = R̄n−1 + αR̄(On − R̄n−1) (3.31)



























γwPE and αR̄, although these were not fitted simultaneously (see below section). The
remaining parameters which were of no interest here (i.e. B, k, and φ) were fixed,











































































































































Figure 3.7: Plots of judgement bias data generated using the de-









0 each govern the extent to which participants make the
‘stay’ or ‘go’ response, with βCL0 exerting an opposite effect to β
CR
0
and βω0 ; λ governs the accuracy of response – the asymmetry results
from there being several opportunities to make a ‘go’ response after
a ‘stay’ response, but no further opportunities to make the ‘stay’ re-
sponse after a ‘go’ response; σ governs the extent to which participants
can discriminate between the stimuli, and hence accuracy.
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Learning rate for the average earning rate; higher values reflect faster
updating of the average earning rate.
B [0,∞]
Inverse temperature parameter; higher values reflect that decisions are
less stochastic and more heavily based on the expected value of actions.
βCL0 [−∞,∞]
Loss sensitivity baseline; higher values reflect greater that losses are




Average earning rate dependent loss sensitivity; higher values reflect
that losses are weighted more heavily when the average earning rate is
higher.
βCLO [−∞,∞]
Outcome dependent loss sensitivity;
higher values reflect that losses are weighted more heavily when the
most recent outcome is higher.
βCLwPE [−∞,∞]
Weighted prediction error dependent loss sensitivity; higher values reflect that losses are
weighted more heavily when the weighted prediction error is higher.
βCL
wPE2 [−∞,∞]
Weighted squared prediction error dependent loss sensitivity; higher
values reflect that losses are weighted more heavily when the weighted
squared prediction error is higher.
βCR0 [−∞,∞]
Reward sensitivity baseline; higher values reflect greater that rewards




Average earning rate dependent reward sensitivity; higher values reflect
that rewards are weighted more heavily when the average earning rate is
higher.
βCRO [−∞,∞]
Outcome dependent reward sensitivity;
higher values reflect that rewards are weighted more heavily when the
most recent outcome is higher.
βCRwPE [−∞,∞]
Weighted prediction error dependent reward sensitivity; higher values reflect that rewards are
weighted more heavily when the weighted prediction error is higher.
βCR
wPE2 [−∞,∞]
Weighted squared prediction error dependent reward sensitivity; higher
values reflect that rewards are weighted more heavily when the weighted
squared prediction error is higher.
βn [−∞,∞]
Time-dependency of the policy: higher values reflect that the ‘stay’
action is less likely as more trials are completed.
βω0 [−∞,∞]
Prior baseline; higher values reflect greater that rewards are overall




Average earning rate dependent prior; higher values reflect a greater
prior belief about reward when the average earning rate is higher.
βωO [−∞,∞]
Outcome dependent prior; higher
values reflect a greater prior belief about reward when the previous outcome
is higher.
βωwPE [−∞,∞]
Weighted prediction error dependent prior; higher values reflect a greater prior
belief about reward when the weighted prediction error is higher.
βω
wPE2 [−∞,∞]
Weighted squared prediction error dependent prior; higher values reflect
a greater prior belief about reward when the weighted squared prediction
error is higher.
γwPE [0, 1]
Forgetting factor for the weighted prediction error; higher values
reflect slower forgetting of previous prediction errors.
ζ [0,∞]
Shape parameter for the Gamma function determining the hazard function
for the likelihood of timeout; values lower than one indicate that timeout is
more likely at earlier timesteps, while the steepness of the function
increases from values greater than one (i.e. timeout becomes increasingly
likely with increasing timesteps).
λ [0, 1]
Lapse rate: higher values a greater likelihood of executing the action
with the lowest value (i.e. the ‘wrong’ action).
σ [0,∞]
Slope parameter: higher values reflect a poorer ability to detect the
true direction of the stimulus.
φ [0,∞]
Scale parameter for the Gamma function determining the hazard function
for the likelihood of timeout; higher values decrease the likelihood of
timeout across all timesteps.
Table 3.1: Glossary of model parameters
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However, due to significant correlations between wPEn−1 wPE2n−1, and On−1,
with the extent of the correlation dependent on the model parameters, parameters
characterising the influence of these variables on the same aspect of the decision-
making process (e.g. βωwPE, β
ω













βCLO ) were not fitted simultaneously in the same model, but instead fitted separately
and the goodness of fit of each model compared using their AIC values.
Model-fitting and analysis of parameter estimates
We fitted the data for a given model to each subject’s data individually by maxi-
mum likelihood, adding parameters in stepwise manner, and compared models using
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) values. Thus, parameters that did not increase
the parsimony of the model were excluded. The model was found to provide accurate
recovery of parameters, as determined by simulating data and assessing the correla-
tions between the parameters recovered by the model and those used to simulate the
data (see Appendix B).
Model-fitting was carried out using the computational facilities of the Advanced
Computing Research Centre, University of Bristol - http://www.bris.ac.uk/acrc/.
This involved using 16 nodes of the high-performance computer (BlueCrystal Phase
3) to fit each model to each participant’s data in parallel, allowing each model to be
fitted to the whole dataset in under 24 hours. The likelihood function and associated
code for the model was written using Matlab and the model was fitted to the data
using the Matlab function fmincon. The initial values are shown in Table 3.2. Val-
ues for parameters constrained between zero and ∞ were exponentiated within the
likelihood function, and likewise values for parameters constrained between zero and
one were transformed using a logistic function within the likelihood function.
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Table 3.2: Initial values for the model fitting procedure using fmin-



































The aim of the model-dependent analysis was to investigate the relationship be-
tween reward and loss experience and decision-making, specifically to examine which,
if any, cognitive processes involved in decision-making were modulated by different
aspects of reward and loss experience. Hence, analysis of the parameter estimates
from the POMDP model examined the key predictions of this study.
We used permutation tests (PT) to assess whether the parameter estimates from
the most parsimonious model as determined in model-fitting differed significantly from
zero. To examine whether the parameter estimates correlated with reported affect or
condition, and hence to examine how affect might mediate the relationship between
reward and punisher experience and decision-making, a general linear model was fitted
to the parameter estimates with mean reported arousal (from the affect grid data),
mean reported valence (from the affect grid data), and condition as the predictor
variables. Visual inspection of the model residuals verified that the assumptions of
each model were met.
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3.2.6 Model-agnostic statistical analysis
Generalised linear mixed models (GLMMs) were fitted to the affect grid, trial initia-
tion, and judgement bias data in R (R Core Team, 2017) using the lme4 (Bates et al.,
2015) and nlme (Pinheiro et al., 2018) packages and likelihood ratio tests were then
used to assess whether the difference in model deviance was significant following re-
moval of a parameter from a model. Reported affective valence and arousal as well as
trial initiation data were log-transformed to ensure that assumptions of normality and
homogeneity of variance were not violated. Visual inspection of the model residuals
verified that the assumptions of each model were met.
Analysis of the affect grid data allowed us to examine the relationship between
reward and loss experience and affect; a key aim of this chapter. Analysis of the
trial initiation data allowed us to examine whether reward and loss experience altered
vigour; a secondary aim of this chapter. These model agnostic analyses also allowed us
to assess whether there were overall differences in affect, vigour, or decision-making be-
tween the fluctuating reward and loss conditions; whether there were time-dependent
changes in affect, vigour, and decision-making; and assess the extent to which partic-
ipants were attending to the offered reward and threatened loss.
Each GLMM included a random effect of participant and fixed effects of number
of trials completed, the potential outcome (Rn+Ln2 ), and condition. In addition to
the variables described, the model of judgement bias included a fixed effect of the
RDK presented (the combined coherence and direction). To examine if and how af-
fect and trial initiation latency depended on reward and punisher experience, R̄n−1,
wPEn−1, wPE2n−1, and On−1 were extracted from the model which best explained
the judgement bias data, and included as predictor variables in the GLMMs of ini-
tiation latency, reported valence, and reported arousal. Due to significant correla-
tions between wPEn−1, wPE2n−1, and On−1, these variables were not included in
the same GLMM but instead separate GLMMs including each variable were com-
pared according to their AIC value and the GLMM which provided the best fit was
selected for further analysis. In the GLMM of trial initiation the best-fitting pre-
dictor variable was wPEn−1 (∆AIC=6.410, comparing saturated model containing
wPEn−1 and not wPE2n−1 or On−1 with the next best-fitting saturated model which
contained On−1 but not wPEn−1 or wPE2n−1), in the model of reported arousal it was
wPE2n−1 (∆AIC=0.260, ∆AIC=6.410, comparing saturated model containing wPE
2
n−1
and not wPEn−1 or On−1 with the next best-fitting saturated model which contained
wPEn−1 but not On−1 orwPE2n−1), and in the model of reported valence this was
On−1 (∆AIC=7.238; comparing saturated model containing On−1 and not wPEn−1
or wPE2n−1 with the next best-fitting saturated model which contained wPEn−1 but
not On−1 or wPE2n−1).
The GLMMs predicting affect and trial initiation also included interaction terms
between each of the variables encompassing reward and punisher experience and con-
dition. To investigate significant and marginally non-significant interaction terms, the
data were split by condition and further GLMMs were fitted to these subsetted data.
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The p-values obtained from these additional GLMMs were adjusted using the false




Variation in judgement bias might arise through an altered sensitivity to rewards or
losses or a prior belief that the reward was more or less likely. Individually, inclu-
sion of parameters characterising reward sensitivity (βCR0 , ∆AIC=233.834; compar-
ing model fitting βCR0 , λ, and σ with model fitting λ and σ), loss sensitivity (β
CL
0 ,
∆AIC=275.350; comparing model fitting βCL0 , λ, and σ with model fitting λ and
σ), and prior belief (βω0 , ∆AIC=313.037; comparing model fitting βω0 , λ, and σ with
model fitting λ and σ) was found to improve the model fit (resulted in decreased
AIC values) confirming that variation in these parameters could explain variation in
judgement bias.
To examine whether and how different aspects of reward and punisher experience,
specifically the average reward rate R̄n−1, prediction error wPEn−1, and squared pre-
diction error wPE2n−1, and the previous outcome On−1, influenced judgement bias we
allowed reward sensitivity, loss sensitivity, and prior belief to depend on these values.
The model fit did not improve when the prior belief depended on R̄n−1, wPE2n−1,











wPE) but not R̄n−1 or On−1 (individual inclusion of β
CR
R̄
and βCRO ), and




wPE2), but not wPEn−1 or On−1 (individual inclusion of β
CL
wPE and
βCLO ), Table 3.3.
Inclusion of a variable learning rate for R̄n−1 and variable forgetting factor for
wPEn−1 was not found to be necessary. Instead, a fixed learning rate for R̄n−1
(αR̄=0.018, ∆AIC=79.648; comparing all models in which decision-making depended
on R̄ and αR̄ was allowed to vary, to the same set of models in which αR̄ was fixed)
which allowed slow updating of the average earning rate based on that reported by
Guitart-Masip et al. (2011), and fixed forgetting factor for wPEn−1 (γwPE=0.018,
∆AIC=768.885; comparing all models in which decision-making depended on wPE
and γwPE was allowed to vary, to the same set of models in which γwPE was fixed)
based on that reported by Rutledge et al. (2014) which allowed rapid forgetting of
recent prediction errors resulted in more parsimonious models.
Further models were then fitted to the data to assess whether the experience-
dependent parameters characterising biases jointly contributed to variation in judge-
ment bias (Table 3.3). The model with the lowest AIC included the following param-
eters: σ, λ, βCL0 , and β
CL
wPE2 . The fit of this model is demonstrated in Fig. 3.8. The
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model-derived probability of making a ‘stay’ response on each trial was found to be a
strongly significant predictor of the observed response when analysed using a binomial
GLMM with a random effect of subject (Fig. 3.9: LRT=3285, p<0.001). Thus, judge-
ment bias was modulated by the squared weighted prediction error through variation
in loss sensitivity.
Table 3.3: ∆AIC values for computational models of judgement bias
choice data: the difference between the AIC values of each model and
the AIC value for the best model
Model parameters ∆AIC
σ, λ, βCL0 , β
CL
wPE2 0.000





σ, λ, βω0 92.501
σ, λ, βω0 , βωO 95.778
σ, λ, βω0 ,βωwPE 98.442









σ, λ, βCR0 , β
CR
wPE2 122.224
σ, λ, βω0 , βωR̄ 122.853
σ, λ, βCL0 130.189
σ, λ, βCL0 ,β
CL
wPE 130.773
σ, λ, βCR0 , β
CR
wPE 145.073
σ, λ, βCR0 171.704




σ, λ, βω0 , βωwPE2 224.933
σ, λ, βCL0 , β
CL
O 250.035







σ, λ, βCR0 , β
CR
O 304.957







































Figure 3.8: The mean proportion of ‘stay’ responses for each stimulus
level for both the model-generated and observed judgement bias data.






0−0.1 0.1−0.2 0.2−0.3 0.3−0.4 0.4−0.5 0.5−0.6 0.6−0.7 0.7−0.8 0.8−0.9 0.9−1
















Figure 3.9: The proportion of ‘stay’ responses for intervals of model-
derived probabilities of executing the ‘stay’ response
The estimates of βCL0 (PT; mean±SE=-0.299±0.095, p=0.003) were significantly
lower than zero, indicating that participants had a reduced value of the loss relative to
the true value. Participants were also more sensitive to losses when wPE2 was higher
(βCL
wPE2 , PT: mean±SE=0.004±0.001, p=0.001).
The analysis revealed that these effects were associated with self-reported affect.
Specifically, more negative values of βCL0 (representing weaker overall loss sensitivity)
were significantly associated with greater reported arousal (LRT=3.828, p=0.050), but
not reported valence (LRT=0.594, p=0.441), whereas, estimates of βCL
wPE2 (represent-
ing the extent to which the squared prediction error modulated loss sensitivity) were
significantly correlated with reported valence (LRT=4.623, p=0.032) but not arousal
(LRT=1.401, p=0.236). Participants that reported more positive affective valence
overall had a loss sensitivity that was modulated to a greater extent by wPE2n−1, with
greater loss aversion when wPE2n−1 was higher. The estimates of β
CL
wPE2 were signif-
icantly greater in the reward condition (LRT=3.845, p=0.050) and the estimates of
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βCL0 did not depend on condition (LRT=0.075, p=0.785).
3.3.2 Model-agnostic statistical analysis results
Judgement Bias
As anticipated, both the stimulus presented (LRT=3520.530, p<0.001) and the poten-
tial outcome (Fig. 3.10: LRT=5.361, p=0.021) on each trial were significant predic-
tors of judgement bias. More specifically, participants were significantly more likely to
make the ‘go’ response when the RDK presented was moving more coherently in the
unfavourable direction and when the potential outcome (the averaged offered reward
and threatened loss) was lower. Participants became more risk-averse as the test ses-
sion progressed (LRT=15.727, p<0.001). Judgement bias did not differ significantly
























Figure 3.10: The mean proportion of ‘stay’ responses for each stim-
ulus split by whether the potential outcome of the trial was higher
(red) or lower (blue) than the median value.
Trial initiation latency
While trial initiation latencies were significantly shorter when R̄n−1 (the average
earning rate) was higher (LRT=12.503, p<0.001), trial initiation latencies were
significantly longer when wPEn−1 (weighted prediction error) was more positive
(LRT=65.976, p<0.001). The number of trials completed (LRT=291.277, p<0.001)
was also a significant predictor of trial initiation latency; individuals were faster to
initiate trials as the number of trials completed increased. Although the potential
outcome (LRT=1.572, p=0.210) was not significant as a main effect and there was
no overall difference in trial initiation latency between the fluctuating reward and
fluctuating loss condition (LRT=0.255, p=0.614), there was a significant interaction
between the potential outcome and condition (Fig. 3.11: LRT=11.690, p=0.001) as
well as between R̄n−1 and condition (Fig. 3.11: LRT=41.299, p=0.000), and wPEn−1
and condition (Fig. 3.11: LRT=11.169, p=0.001).
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While participants initiated trials more slowly when the potential outcome was
higher (potential reward was more positive) in the fluctuating reward condition
(LRT=8.185, p=0.006), they tended to initiate trials more slowly when the potential
outcome was lower (potential loss was more negative) in the fluctuating loss condition
(LRT=2.730, 0.098). Although participants were faster to initiate trials when R̄n−1
and wPEn−1 were more positive in both the fluctuating reward (R̄n−1: LRT=9.656,
p=0.004; wPEn−1: LRT=55.305, p<0.001) and loss condition (R̄n−1: LRT=3.546,
p=0.072; wPEn−1: LRT=15.801,p<0.001), the regression weight associated with the


































Figure 3.11: Standardised GLMM coefficients from the model of
the log-transformed latency to initiate each trial for both the fluctu-
ating reward and fluctuating loss condition. Error bars represent one
standard error
Reported Affect
The analysis of reported affective valence showed that several aspects of reward and
punisher experience influenced reported affective valence. Participants reported signif-
icantly more positive affective valence when R̄n−1 (average earning rate; LRT=42.767,
p=<0.001), On−1 (previous outcome; LRT=12.460, p<0.001), and the potential out-
come (LRT=16.593, p<0.001) were more positive. There was a strong negative shift in
reported affective valence as the number of trials increased (LRT=41.588, p=<0.001).
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There was no difference in reported valence between the fluctuating reward and fluctu-
ating loss conditions (LRT=1.255, p=0.263). Yet, there was a significant interaction
between On−1 (Fig. 3.12: LRT=4.199, p=0.040) and condition; the effect of On−1
was significant in the fluctuating reward condition (LRT=21.216, p<0.001) but not
the fluctuating loss condition (LRT=0.644, p=0.422). The interactions between the
potential outcome and condition (LRT=0.128, p=0.721) and also between R̄n−1 and






































Figure 3.12: Standardised GLMM coefficients from the model of the
log-transformed affective valence. Error bars represent one standard
error
Participants reported significantly greater arousal when wPE2n−1 (squared
weighted prediction error) was higher (LRT=8.516, p=0.004). As with affective
valence, the number of trials completed had a strong effect on reported arousal
(LRT=12.244, p=<0.001) with participants reporting lower arousal when they had
completed a greater number of trials. Neither R̄n−1 (average earning rate; LRT=1.570,
p=0.210), the potential outcome (LRT=0.105, p=0.746), or condition (LRT=0.013,
p=0.909) were significant as main effects. However, there was a significant interac-
tion between the potential outcome and condition (Fig. 3.13: LRT=6.746, p=0.009).
Participants tended to report greater arousal when the potential outcome was more
positive in the fluctuating reward condition (LRT=3.022, p=0.082) but tended to re-
port greater arousal when the potential outcome was more negative in the fluctuating
loss condition (LRT=3.507, p=0.082). The interactions between condition and R̄n−1
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Figure 3.13: Standardised GLMM coefficients from the model of the
log-transformed reported affective arousal for both the fluctuating re-
ward and fluctuating loss condition. Error bars represent one standard
error
3.4 Discussion
The aim of this study was to assess how reward and punisher experience, specifically
recent prediction errors, recent squared prediction errors and the average earning
rate influence both decision-making within a judgement bias task and self-reported
affective state. To achieve this, we used a judgement bias task in which we manipulated
reward and punisher experience by systematically varying either the offered punisher
or reward and regularly asked participants to report their affective state using an affect
grid. Data were analysed using both model-agnostic and a model-dependent analyses,
the latter interpreting decision-making on judgement bias task through the lens of a
POMDP. This novel model of choice data from a judgement bias task provided a good




3.4.1 Does experience of reward and punisher modulate decision-
making?
Reward and punisher experience did influence judgement bias, indicating that past
experience is indeed a key determinant of decision-making within the judgement bias
task. More specifically, the model-based analysis suggested that the squared weighted
prediction error (which is a measure of local uncertainty) was an important factor
in the decision to ‘stay’ or ‘go’. Participants were more loss averse, and hence more
likely to make the safe (‘go’) response, when there was greater uncertainty. It has
been proposed that individuals should act to reduce uncertainty and minimise surprise
(Clark et al., 2018; Friston et al., 2006). In the context of the judgement bias task,
this can be achieved by opting for the ‘go’ response which has a certain outcome (i.e.
no reward and no punisher). Hence, participants may have been more risk-averse
when the squared weighted prediction error was higher to avoid further uncertainty.
However, it should be noted that opting for the risky response rather than the safe
response would have provided information about the contingency between the stimulus
and outcome and have potentially reduced uncertainty in the longer term.
3.4.2 Does experience of reward and punisher modulate self-
reported affective valence?
Participants reported more positive affective valence when the average earning rate
was higher. This is in accordance with the theoretical framework for affect proposed
by Mendl et al. (2010) in which affective valence is theorised to reflect environmental
levels of rewards and punishers; high-reward environments are considered to induce a
positively valenced state to drive reward acquisition, and high-punisher environments
are suggested to induce a negatively valenced state to promote punisher avoidance.
However, it is contrary to more recent suggestions that affect reflects relative but not
absolute levels of rewards and punishers; positively valenced affect arises from envi-
ronments where rewards are greater than expected (Eldar et al., 2016; Rutledge et al.,
2014). In contrast to our study, the study conducted by Rutledge et al. (2014) used
cumulative earnings as a measure of the absolute favourability of experience within
the task, which was not found to influence reported affective valence. However, cumu-
lative earnings may not provide a sufficiently rich measure of current circumstances.
For example, an individual could have earned large amounts of money on the first few
trials and then lost small amounts of money on every trial thereafter, or could have
earned small amounts on all trials, or even lost a large amount initially but won large
amounts subsequently, but unlike the average earning rate the cumulative earnings
could not distinguish these possibilities. Our results thus support the hypothesis that
affective valence should depend on absolute reward and punisher experience. How-
ever, as the task is conducted over a very short timescale, further research should
be conducted to determine whether absolute levels of rewards and punishers might
influence longer-term affect (mood).
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Additionally, it is unclear why the average earning rate was not found to influence
judgement bias despite influencing affective valence. Likewise, despite influencing
decision-making, there was no evidence that the squared prediction error influenced
affective valence. This result thus highlights that changes in risk aversion can occur
without concurrent changes in self-reported affective valence, and vice versa. This
should be explored further in future studies.
However, participants did report greater arousal when recent outcomes had been
less predictable. This perhaps reflects the fact that surprise is generally considered to
be a high arousal state (Fontaine et al., 2007; Reisenzein, 1994), which could poten-
tially function to prepare individuals to act to reduce future uncertainty.
3.4.3 How do variables underlying decision-making behaviour relate
to affective valence and arousal?
The extent to which the squared weighted prediction error (indicating less pre-
dictable/more surprising outcomes in recent trials) modulated a participant’s decision
to stay or go in the judgement bias task depended on affective valence. Specifically,
participants whose decision-making was modulated to a lesser extent by surprising
outcomes reported overall more negative affective valence. Depression has been as-
sociated with blunted prediction error signalling (Gradin et al., 2011; Kumar et al.,
2008; Steele et al., 2004). Thus, although this study was conducted in a non-clinical
population, this finding may further support the relationship between affective state
and prediction error responsivity.
This result is also reminiscent of cautious optimism; the finding that positive
affect can induce greater caution, despite a more optimistic belief about the outcome
of decisions (Isen et al., 1988; Isen and Patrick, 1983; Nygren et al., 1996). Cautious
optimism has been explained as a self-protecting mechanism which leads individuals
to make decisions that allow them to maintain their positive affect, specifically by
altering the value of the loss (Isen et al., 1988; Isen and Patrick, 1983; Nygren et al.,
1996). Therefore, an alternative or additional explanation for the finding that affective
valence correlates with the model parameter characterising the influence of uncertainty
on loss aversion is that individuals in more positive affective states were more averse
to losing money and spoiling their positive affective state in periods of greater surprise
or uncertainty than those in less positive affective states.
Given that we cannot infer causation in this instance, it is also possible that
participants that had been less cautious following less predictable outcomes were in a
more negatively valenced affective state resulting directly from their lack of caution
(i.e. greater losses due to greater risk-seeking behaviour). However, although weaker
loss aversion could lead to greater losses it could also lead to greater gains.
Loss sensitivity was found to be associated with reported arousal; individuals who
were less sensitive to losses reported overall greater arousal. This might suggest that
individuals who were more willing to take risks (via a decreased value of loss) were also
in a state of greater arousal, perhaps induced by risk-taking. This would be supported
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by the finding that risking-taking increases physiological measure of arousal (Krueger
et al., 2005; Meyer et al., 2000; Wulfert et al., 2005).
3.4.4 Does reward and punisher experience influence trial initiation
latency?
Although the main aim of the study was to investigate decision-making, the trial
initiation latency provided an opportunity to investigate another aspect of behaviour
likely to be influenced by prior experience, namely vigour. Vigour has operationally
been defined as inverse latency; it corresponds to the alacrity with which actions
are made. Vigour can be optimised in accordance with the opportunity cost of time;
actions should be made more vigorously when the rewards forgone by acting slothfully
are greater (Niv et al., 2007). The opportunity cost of time is determined by the
overall reward rate, encouraging participants to capitalise on periods of good fortune
and delay unfavourable outcomes. Participants were indeed faster to initiate trials
when the average earning rate was higher which is consistent with previous findings
(Griffiths and Beierholm, 2017; Guitart-Masip et al., 2011; Niv et al., 2007).
The weighted prediction error was also a determinant of trial initiation but in the
opposite direction. Participants were slower to initiate trials following unexpectedly
good outcomes compared with unexpectedly bad outcomes. One potential explanation
for this is that negative prediction errors might imbue the individual with a sense of
urgency to improve their situation, whereas positive prediction errors might inform
the individual that no behavioural change is necessary, or that expectations could be
met with reduced effort.
The average earning rate and weighted prediction error therefore have opposing ef-
fects on vigour; participants are faster when both the average earning rate is higher and
weighted prediction error is more negative. This might reflect differences in timescale;
the average earning rate being generated over a longer timescale than the weighted
prediction error. Experiencing unexpectedly aversive outcomes might invigorate the
individual, allowing them to move on to the next trial where they might recoup their
loss more quickly, whereas longer-term poor conditions might promote sloth (i.e. en-
courage slower initiation) to delay trials where a poor outcome is expected. Similarly,
an individual might be slower to savour a positive outcome especially if the following
outcome may not be as good, but when the environment is particularly rewarding it
is advantageous to capitalise on those good conditions and initiate trials with greater
vigour.
While significant across both conditions, the effect of both the prediction error
and average earning rate was more pronounced in the fluctuating reward condition.
This might reflect that loss avoidance can be guaranteed on any trial by making the
safe response, but reward gain cannot similarly be assured. So, the average earning
rate prediction error and more relevant in the context of variable rewards. This might
also provide an explanation as to why the influence of surprise on judgement bias was
greater in the reward condition.
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3.4.5 How do immediate rewarding and punishing experiences in-
fluence decision-making and affect?
Although we were particularly interested in the effects of prediction error, squared
prediction error, and average earning rate, as we considered that these aspects of
reward and punisher experience would be most relevant to future experience and
hence behaviour, it is important to also consider also the impact of the magnitude of
the offered and most recent rewards and losses on self-reported affect and decision-
making.
Individuals were more likely to make the risky response when the offered reward
was higher or potential loss was lower, indicating that they were attending to infor-
mation about the outcomes and acted rationally (Von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1953). Additionally, participants reported more positive affective valence when the
most recent trial had offered a higher reward or lower loss, which could reflect that
the opportunity to win greater amounts is likely to induce a positive emotional state,
while the potential to lose greater amounts is likely to induce a negative emotional
state (Rolls, 2013). Affective arousal was also influenced by the potential outcomes.
Greater affective arousal tended to be reported when both the offered reward and
threatened loss were higher, demonstrating that high stakes trials required greater
alertness.
Participants were slower to initiate trials when the potential reward was higher in
the fluctuating reward condition. We would expect this effect to be in the opposite
direction, with higher rewards leading to greater invigoration. Our sole explanation for
this is that this reflects some form of speed/accuracy trade-off whereby the individual
takes time to prepare for the trial. Participants also tended to be slower to initiate
trials when the potential loss was higher in the fluctuating loss condition, perhaps
reflecting an attempt to delay more unfavourable trials or potentially also an increased
preparation time.
A more favourable outcome on the previous trial led to more positive reported
affective valence, although only in the fluctuating reward condition. We found that
the outcome on the most recent trial provided a better explanation of variation in
affective valence and arousal than recent prediction errors or recent squared prediction
errors. A study by Rutledge et al. (2014) found that more positive prediction errors
were associated with increased happiness. However, they reported high forgetting
factors in the mapping of recent prediction errors to affective valence, and so there
might have been, at least in some participants, a similarly outsized effect of just the
last trial.
The task itself influenced reported affect and decision-making, potentially due to
its repetitive nature. Participants reported more negative affective valence and arousal
as the task progressed which is indicative of boredom. They also became less risky
in their decision-making which could reflect boredom (negative affect) induced risk-
aversion. Despite reporting lower arousal, participants were faster to initiate trials
as the test session progressed. This could reflect either being more familiar with the
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task or also an attempt to get through the task more quickly in the face of increasing
boredom.
3.5 Conclusions (see Fig. 3.14)
This study revealed a number of novel relationships between reward experience, affec-
tive state, and behaviour. It implicates the average earning rate in affective valence,
with individuals reporting more positive affective valence when their average earning
rate was higher. The study also highlights the role of predictability in decision-making,
with increased risk aversion when recent outcomes were more unpredictable/surpris-
ing. Moreover, the extent to which predictability modulated decision-making was
associated with self-reported affective valence; more negatively valenced affect was
linked to weaker predictability-dependent modulation of decision-making. Addition-
ally, we found that unexpectedly good outcomes decreased vigour to initiate trials,
while unexpectedly poor outcomes increased vigour to initiate trials. These findings
would not have been revealed without the development of a novel computational model
for examining decision-making on the judgement bias task, which also demonstrated
that variation in loss sensitivity determined variation in judgement bias. The study
also confirmed many well-known relationships, such as that between a measure of
vigour and the average earning rate and between potential outcomes and risk-taking.
Overall, the results provide evidence that rewarding and punishing experiences deter-
mine both future decision-making and subjectively experienced affective state.
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Figure 3.14: Diagrammatic summary of the results of Chapter 3:
the nodes represent variables relating to affect, decision-making (where
CL denotes loss/punisher sensitivity, CR denotes reward sensitivity, ω
denotes the prior belief about outcomes, and JB denotes judgement
bias), experience (where wPE denotes the weighted reward prediction
error, wPE2 denotes the squared weighted reward prediction error,
and R̄ denotes the average earning/reward rate), and vigour, the lines
between nodes represent observed associations between those variables.
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How do fluctuating primary
rewards influence human affect and
judgement bias?
Chapter summary: The translatability of behavioural mea-
sures of affect between human and non-human animals is impor-
tant to the accurate assessment of animal welfare and for the
development of novel pharmacological treatments for affective
disorders. However, there is a disparity between the modality of
reinforcers used in studies with human and non-human animals;
human studies typically use secondary reinforcers (e.g. money)
while non-human animal studies typically use primary reinforcers
(e.g. food and electric footshocks). To address this deficiency,
we repeated our human judgement bias task (Chapter 3) using
apple juice as a reward, and cold salty tea as a punisher, instead
of monetary rewards and losses. The potential volume of ap-
ple juice on each trial fluctuated according to a noisy sine wave,
and computational modelling of the judgement bias data allowed
insight into the cognitive processes underlying decision-making.
The results were largely similar to that reported in Chapter 3:
the average earning rate determined affect and vigour, unpre-
dictability influenced judgement bias (although via reward sen-
sitivity and altered prior beliefs as opposed to loss sensitivity in
Chapter 3), and affective valence was correlated with the param-
eters characterising the extent to which unpredictability modu-
lated judgement bias. Thus, we have developed a task that more
closely resembles the judgement bias tasks used with non-human
animals, and with results that replicate and hence support the
reliability and validity of the results of the human monetary task.
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4.1 Introduction
Typically, operant testing in non-human animals is conducted using primary rein-
forcers such as food or electric shocks, whereas operant testing in humans involves
secondary reinforcers such as monetary gain or loss. However, a number of studies
have identified differences in the neural processing of primary and second reinforcers
(Beck et al., 2010; Delgado et al., 2011; Grimm and See, 2000; Sescousse et al., 2013).
Consequently, making comparisons and drawing conclusions between the results of
human and non-human animal tasks is complicated by the issue that we cannot pre-
clude the possibility that any differences may relate to reinforcer type (primary vs.
secondary) as opposed to species differences.
The need for translatable results is particularly apparent in the study of affect in
non-human animals. Measures of animal welfare are commonly derived from observa-
tions in humans, for example anhedonia in human depression (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013) or cognitive biases first described in humans (MacLeod et al., 1986;
Williams et al., 1996; Wright and Bower, 1992), and the development of new treat-
ments for affective disorders in humans depends on the use of animal models of affect
(Rupniak, 2003). Judgement bias has been demonstrated to overall provide a measure
of affective states that are pharmacologically induced in a range of non-human animals
(Chapter 2). However, assessing the extent to which judgement bias corresponds to
subjective reports of affect in humans would enhance its value as measure of affect
and further support its validity. Moreover, studies with humans may help to provide
a better insight into precisely what judgement bias measures in terms of cognition,
and how reward and punisher experience alters decision-making. While studies have
examined whether measures of subjectively reported affect in humans correlate with
judgement bias, and have indeed found that risk aversion correlates with PANAS
(Positive and Negative Affective Scale) questionnaire results (Paul et al., 2011) and
state anxiety (Anderson et al., 2012), these studies used secondary reinforcers and
hence may not be entirely comparable to the studies in non-human animals which use
primary reinforcers.
To address this deficiency, we aimed to develop a translation of the automated rat
judgement bias task (Jones et al., 2018) for humans which uses primary reinforcers:
apple juice and cold salty tea. Using this novel variant of the judgement bias task
alongside computational modelling, we aimed to examine how reward and punisher
experience (specifically recent prediction errors and the average earning rate) relates
to judgement bias, affect, and vigour, and how this compares to a monetary version
of the task (see Chapter 3) in which the average earning rate was a key determinant





Thirty-three people (26 female, 7 male, mean age±SE=31.182±2.0139) from the Bris-
tol Veterinary School community participated in the study. The inclusion criteria were
that the participant enjoyed apple juice, was not allergic to apple juice, salt, or black
tea, was not hypertensive or had any medical condition that meant that they must
limit their salt intake, and was over the age of 18. Participants were asked to abstain
from drinking anything (except water) or eating in the hour prior to the study. To
cover their time and expenses, participants were paid £7 for the hour-long session. To
encourage full engagement with the study, participants were informed that the top-
three ranking participants in terms of accuracy would receive an additional £7 bonus.
All participants provided written informed consent, and the study was approved by
the Faculty of Science Research Ethics Committee at the University of Bristol.
Apparatus (see Fig. 4.1)
The task was conducted on a laptop (Dell Latitude) which was connected to two
syringe pumps (World Precision Instruments, Hertfordshire, UK; SPLG100) which
were set to pump liquid at a rate of 2ml per minute. Sterilised food grade PVC
tubing (OD:11 mm, ID: 8mm) attached to syringes (Becton Dickinson, Swindon, UK;
50ml Plastipak) driven by the syringe pumps were connected via a tube connector to
smaller sterilised PVC tubing (OD: 6mm, ID: 4mm) and held in place in front of the
participant using a retort clamp and stand, the height of which could adjusted by the
participant at the start of the experiment. Individuals made responses on a keyboard
connected to the laptop. The task was written in Matlab (MathWorks, Natwick,
MA, USA) using the PsychToolBox extensions.
Figure 4.1: Photograph of the experimental set-up. The two syringe
pumps containing salty tea or apple juice are located on the left side of
the table, the laptop is located on the back centre of the table, a retort
stand and clamp holding the tubes delivering the juice are located in
front of the laptop, and a keypad is also located in front of the laptop.
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4.2.1 Training
The methodology was adapted from that of the human monetary judgement bias task
(Chapter 3). On each trial of the task, participants were instructed to press and hold
the enter key before being presented with a fixation cross for 1000ms followed by a
random dot kinematogram (RDK) displayed for 2000ms, which across trials varied in
direction of motion (leftwards or rightwards) and coherence (proportion of dots moving
in a coherent direction: 0.01, 0.02, 0.16, or 0.32). Participants had two options when
the RDK was presented: to release the key prior to the end of the two second RDK
presentation (‘go’) or continue to hold the key for two seconds (‘stay’). The outcome
associated with either response depended on the stage of training and the direction
of the RDK with one direction being favourable and the other being unfavourable
(either leftwards or rightwards, counterbalanced across participants).
Training comprised two practice blocks of 48 trials. The aim of the first practice
block was to introduce the participants to the task and train them on the correct
responses to the RDK. In this first practice block, the word ‘correct’ was shown on
screen for correct responses; ‘staying’ when the RDK moves in the favourable direction
and ‘going’ otherwise. The direction of motion of the RDK was very easy to detect
(coherence=0.32) on all trials, and the direction of motion was leftwards on 50% of
trials and rightwards on the remaining 50%. The aim of the second practice block
was to acquaint participants with the delivery and taste of the apple juice (Morrisons,
West Yorkshire, UK; Apple Juice from Concentrate) and salty tea. Salty tea was
prepared each morning following Pauli et al. (2015) with two black tea bags (Bettys
& Taylors of Harrogate, Harrogate, UK; Yorkshire Tea) and 29g of salt per litre of
boiling water which was chilled prior to data collection. In this block, the direction
of the RDK was easy to detect (coherence=0.16) on 50% of trials, of which half were
leftwards and half rightwards, and moderately difficult to detect (coherence=0.02) on
the remaining 50%, of which half were leftwards and half rightwards. The volume
of juice received for stay responses when the direction of the RDK was favourable
was 0.7ml and likewise the volume of salty tea received for stay responses when the
RDK was unfavourable was 0.7ml. While juice was delivered and for 3000ms following
delivery, the words, ‘Juice delivered’ were displayed on screen while during salty tea
delivery and for 3000ms following this, the words ‘Salty tea delivered’ were displayed
on screen. The potential volume of juice on each trial (i.e. ‘0.7ml’) was shown above
an orange coloured bar with a height proportional to the potential juice volume,
similarly the volume of salty tea (i.e. ‘0.7ml’) was displayed above a brown bar
positioned directly below the orange coloured bar with a height proportional to the
potential tea volume. These bars were shown prior to the instruction to press and
hold the enter key. The participant received nothing for making the go response and
the words ‘Nothing delivered’ were displayed on screen for 3000ms. Across all blocks
the direction and coherence level of the random dot kinematogram was randomised
prior to the start of the study and was identical for all participants.
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4.2.2 Testing (see Fig. 4.2)
The test session comprised 180 trials and on 50% of trials the direction of the RDK
was leftwards and on the remaining 50% it was rightwards, while the coherence level
was either low (0.01), moderate (0.02), or high (0.16). Hence each possible stimulus
was shown on 16.7% of trials. The potential volume of juice fluctuated across trials
according to a noisy sine wave with a mean volume of 0.686ml and standard deviation
of 0.325ml, ranging from a minimum of 0.031ml to a maximum of 1.171ml (Fig. 4.3).
The potential volume of salty tea remained at 0.7ml throughout testing. As in the
second practice block, the potential volume of juice and salty tea was displayed on
screen both as text and graphically using two coloured bars with heights proportional
to the volume of juice and salty tea. Prior to the first trial and every subsequent 10
trials, participants were asked to report how they were feeling using a computerised
affect grid (Killgore, 1998). To complete the affect grid, participants had to move a
cross which was initially central in the grid to the location that best described their
current mood using the arrow keys on a keyboard. Horizontal movements represented
changes in mood valence, with movements to the left reporting a more positively
valenced mood. Vertical movements represented arousal, with upwards movement
reporting higher levels of arousal.
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Research Questions
• Which aspects of reward and punishment experience alter future risk
aversion and vigour to obtain rewards?
• Which aspects of reward and punishment experience alter the valence and
arousal of an affective state?
• Do the same learning processes that influence judgement bias also
influence affective state?
Introduction
• Judgement bias tasks are assumed to measure affective state in non-human
animals. The task originates from studies which found that humans
experiencing anxiety tend to exhibit a pessimistic judgement bias; they are
more likely to consider an ambiguous cue to signal a punishment.
Example cues and outcomes used in a judgement bias task.
• An understanding of the cognitive processes underlying judgement bias, and
how these processes relate to subjectively-experienced affective state, could
support the validity of judgement bias as a measure of animal welfare.
• In this study we used humans subjects, who provided subjective reports of
affective state, enabling us to investigate whether the cognitive and subjective
components of affective state are influenced by the same aspects of reward
experience.
Methods: Reward Magnitude Manipulation
• The magnitude of the reward offered
varied across trials, whilst the loss
remained fixed. Subjects were shown
the amount they could win or lose at
the start of each trial and were
informed of the outcome at the end of
each trial.
Methods: Procedure
• Subjects initiated each trial by pressing and holding a key. They were then
required to classify the direction of motion of a random dot kinematogram
(RDK) as leftwards or rightwards by making one of two responses; continuing
to hold the key for two seconds (stay) or releasing the key before two seconds
had elapsed (leave). The coherence level of the RDK varied between trials so
that direction of motion was either unambiguous, moderately ambiguous, or
highly ambiguous. Subjects reported their mood using affect grids.










• Response latency (judgement bias), latency to initiate a trial (vigour), and the
x (valence) and y (arousal) coordinates of the affect grid were recorded.
• We analysed whether weighted reward prediction error (wRPE), average





















• We found no evidence that the learning processes that influence























Figure 4.3: Offered volume of apple juice on each trial of the judge-
ment bias task
4.2.3 Model dependent analysis
Judgement bias choice data (‘stay’ – risky, or ‘go’ – safe) were fitted to the partially
observable Markov decision process model used to model human judgement bias in
Chapter 3. Briefly, we consider that participants transition through a two-dimensional
state space in which they construct and maintain a belief about the direction of the
RDK that is informed by their momentary observations of the RDK across time. The
probability that an individual will opt for the safe response will depend on their likely
transitions through the state space and their subjective value of occupying each state.
In addition to the direction and coherence of the presented RDK, this is determined
by a number of parameters including σ, which reflects the ability of the participant
to discriminate between the stimuli, a lapse rate (λ), and a set of parameters which
characterise the influence of reward and punisher experience, including the average
earning rate (R̄n−1), weighted prediction error (wPEn−1), squared weighted prediction
error (wPE2n−1), and most recent outcome (On−1) on reward sensitivity (CR) which
scales the true volume of juice, punisher sensitivity (CP ) which scales the true volume
of salty tea, and the prior belief that the trial will be rewarded (ω) which allows the
delivery of juice to be perceived as more or less probable. The model assumes that
R̄n−1, wPEn−1, wPE2n−1, and On−1 influence CR, CP , and ω additively, with beta
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A learning rate (αR̄) which determines the speed of learning following reward and
punisher experience and hence modulates the average earning rate and forgetting fac-
tor (γwPE) which allows variation in how quickly recent prediction errors are forgotten
are also included.
We assessed whether the prediction error between the prediction either prior to or
following RDK onset and the outcome was most relevant to decision-making. Con-
sistent with the monetary task, the prediction error most relevant to decision-making
was that between the prediction prior to stimulus onset and the outcome, as opposed
to between the prediction post-stimulus and outcome (∆AIC=516.063, comparing
all models in which decision-making depended on wPE using either the pre or post
stimulus onset prediction error).
The aim of the model-dependent analysis was to investigate the relationship be-
tween primary reward and punisher experience and decision-making, specifically to
examine which, if any, cognitive processes involved in decision-making were modu-
lated by different aspects of reward and punisher experience. Hence, analysis of the
parameter estimates from the POMDP model examined the key predictions of this
study.
Potential models were fitted in a stepwise manner, first assessing whether σ and
λ both improved model fit, then assessing the contribution of each aspect of reward
and punisher experience individually, before finally assessing the goodness of model fit
when parameters determining reward sensitivity, punisher sensitivity, and the prior
belief were jointly included. Model comparison was made using the AIC (Akaike’s
information criterion) values. The parameter estimates of interest from the most par-
simonious (lowest AIC) model were analysed using permutation tests (PT) to assess
whether they varied significantly from zero, and using general linear models which in-
cluded and mean reported affective valence and mean reported affective arousal (from
each individual’s set of affect grids) as dependent variables to assess how the parame-
ter estimates corresponded to reported affect. Model-fitting was carried out using the
computational facilities of the Advanced Computing Research Centre, University of
Bristol - http://www.bris.ac.uk/acrc/, as described in Chapter 3.
4.2.4 Model-agnostic statistical analysis
Judgement bias choice, log-transformed trial initiation latency, log-transformed re-
ported valence (affect grid x-coordinate), log-transformed reported arousal (affect grid
y-coordinate) were analysed using general linear mixed models (GLMM) with a ran-
dom effect of participant in R (R Core Team, 2017) using the lme4 (Bates et al., 2015)
and nlme (Pinheiro et al., 2018) packages. The judgement bias choice model included
a binomial link function while the remaining models included a Gaussian link func-
tion. The model assumptions were verified in all cases, where data is log-transformed
this transformation allowed the model assumptions to be met. All models included
the potential outcome (offered juice (ml)−potential salty tea (ml)2 ) and the number of trials
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completed prior to the current trial as independent variables. The GLMM of judge-
ment bias also included a variable for the stimulus presented (combining coherence
and direction), and the models of trial initiation latency and reported affect included
variables encompassing reward and punisher experience which were extracted from
the best POMDP model (i.e. R̄n−1, wPEn−1, wPE2n−1, and On−1).
Analysis of the affect grid data allowed us to examine the relationship between
primary reward and punisher experience and affect; a key aim of this chapter. Analysis
of the trial initiation data allowed us to examine whether primary reward and punisher
experience altered vigour. These model-agnostic analyses also allowed us to assess
whether there were time-dependent changes in affect, vigour, and decision-making;
and to assess the extent to which participants were attending to the potential outcome
of each trial.
Due to correlations between wPEn−1, wPE2n−1, and On−1, the predictor variables
were not included in the same GLMM but instead were included separately and each
model was then compared using their AIC values. The GLMM which provided the
best fit was analysed further. In the model of trial initiation latency this was wPE2n−1
(∆AIC=4.775; comparing saturated model containing wPE2n−1 and not wPEn−1 or
On−1 with the next best-fitting saturated model which contained On−1 but not
wPEn−1 or wPE2n−1), in the model of reported valence this was On−1 (∆AIC=1.214;
comparing saturated model containing On−1 and not wPEn−1 or wPE2n−1 with the
next best-fitting saturated model which contained wPEn−1 but not On−1 and not
wPE2n−1), and in the model of reported arousal this was wPE
2
n−1 (∆AIC=0.241; com-
paring saturated model containing wPE2n−1 and not wPEn−1 or On−1 with the next
best-fitting saturated model which contained wPEn−1 but not On−1 or wPE2n−1).
Likelihood ratio tests were used to assess the significance of each dependent variable.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Model dependent results
The model of judgement bias with the lowest AIC value included the following pa-





(Table 4.1, Fig. 4.4). The model-derived
probability of making a ‘stay’ response was found to be a strongly significant predic-
tor of the observed response when analysed using a binomial GLMM with a random
effect of subject (Fig. 4.5: LRT=2087, p<0.001). Inclusion of a fixed learning rate
(αR̄; ∆AIC=49.012, comparing all models in which decision-making depended on R̄
and αR̄ was allowed to vary, to the same set of models in which αR̄ was fixed) and fixed
forgetting factor provided a more parsimonious fit (γwPE; ∆AIC=195.098, comparing
all models in which decision-making depended on wPE and γwPE was allowed to vary,
to the same set of models in which γwPE was fixed) than models in which the learning
rate and forgetting factor fitted to each individual’s data was allowed to vary.
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Table 4.1: ∆AIC values for computational models of judgement bias
choice data: the difference between the AIC values of each model and
the AIC value for the best model
Model parameters ∆AIC
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Figure 4.4: The mean proportion of ‘stay’ responses from the model-









0−0.1 0.1−0.2 0.2−0.3 0.3−0.4 0.4−0.5 0.5−0.6 0.6−0.7 0.7−0.8 0.8−0.9 0.9−1
















Figure 4.5: The proportion of ‘stay’ responses for intervals of model-
derived probabilities of executing the ‘stay’ response
The estimates of βω0 (the baseline prior probability) were significantly lower than
zero (PT: mean±SE=-1.378±0.493, p=0.007) while the estimates of βCR0 (the baseline
reward sensitivity) were significantly higher than zero (PT: mean±SE=1.964±0.293,
p<0.001) indicating that participants both had an increased value of the juice rel-
ative to its absolute value (i.e. volume) but had a stronger belief overall that each
trial would be punished. Participants were less sensitive to rewards when wPE2 was
higher (PT, βCR
wPE2n
– characterising the effect of the squared prediction error on re-
ward sensitivity: mean±SE=-0.316±0.109, p=0.003) although the estimates of βω
wPE2n
(characterising the effect of the squared prediction error on the prior probability) did
not differ significantly from zero (p=0.827).
More negative reported valence was associated with increased reward sensitivity





: LRT=10.511, p=0.001), and more negative values of βω
wPE2n
(LRT=6.789,
p=0.009) where more negative values indicate a decreased belief that a trial would be
rewarded as wPE2n−1 increased. There was no significant correlation between βω0 and
reported valence (LRT=0.164, p=0.686). The estimates of βω0 (LRT<0.001, p=0.997),
βω
wPE2n




p=0.659) did not depend significantly on reported arousal.
4.3.2 Model-agnostic statistical analyses
Judgement bias
The decision to ‘stay’ (risky) or ‘go’ (safe) depended on the stimulus presented
(LRT=2154.599, p<0.001), with more ‘go’ responses made towards RDKs that
were unfavourable and increasingly coherent, and the potential outcome (Fig. 4.6:
LRT=8.543, p=0.003), with a greater likelihood of the ‘go’ response when the po-
tential juice volume was lower. Participants became increasingly risk-averse as they
completed more trials (LRT=27.733, p<0.001).
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Figure 4.6: The mean proportion of ‘stay’ responses for each stimulus
split by whether the expected value was higher (red) or lower (blue)
than the median value
Affective state
More positive values of R̄n−1 (the average earning rate, Fig. 4.7: LRT=8.019,
p=0.005), a greater volume of juice offered on the previous trial (Fig. 4.7:
LRT=15.353, p<0.001), and more positive values of On−1 (the previous outcome, Fig.
4.7: LRT=4.302, p=0.038) were significantly associated with more positive affective
valence as reported using the affect grid. However, reported affective valence became







































Figure 4.7: Standardised GLMM coefficients from the model of the
log-transformed reported valence. Error bars represent one standard
error
Participants tended to report greater arousal using the affect grid when the po-
tential outcome (Fig. 4.8: LRT=2.767, p=0.096) on the most recent trial was higher,
while wPE2n−1 (squared weighted prediction error, Fig. 4.8: LRT=0.261, p=0.610)
and R̄n−1 (Fig. 4.8: LRT=0.131, p=0.717) were not found to significantly influence
reported arousal. Reported arousal decreased significantly throughout the test session
(Fig. 4.8: LRT=11.702, p=0.001).
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Figure 4.8: Standardised GLMM coefficients from the model of the
log-transformed reported arousal. Error bars represent one standard
error
Trial initiation
All aspects of reward and punisher experience influenced the participants’ latency to
initiate trials. Participants were slower to initiate trials both when the volume of juice
offered on the trial was higher (Fig. 4.9: LRT=5.091, p=0.024) and when wPE2n−1
(squared weighted prediction error) was greater (Fig. 4.9: LRT=18.395, p<0.001),
while they were faster to initiate trials when R̄n−1 (average earning rate) was more
positive (Fig. 4.9: LRT=33.283, p<0.001). Additionally, participants were faster to




































Figure 4.9: Standardised GLMM coefficients from the model of the
log-transformed latency to initiate each trial. Error bars represent one
standard error
4.4 Discussion
In this study we aimed to develop a human judgement bias task which more closely
mirrored non-human animal versions of the task. To achieve this, we modified a human
judgement bias task that we had previously used (Chapter 3), replacing monetary gain
with apple juice, and monetary loss with salty tea. By using a near identical task,
and the same computational approach to data analysis, we could assess whether and
how replacing secondary with primary reinforcers influenced the relationship between
reward and punisher experience, affect, and decision-making.
4.4.1 How does reward and punisher experience influence decision-
making?
Consistent with the results of the monetary version of the task (Chapter 3), recent
surprise (i.e. the squared weighted prediction error) was a key determinant of decision-
making. When recent outcomes were more surprising, participants overall had a re-
duced reward sensitivity leading to greater risk-aversion. Thus, although the weighted
prediction error was found to operate via reward as opposed to loss sensitivity, the
direction of the effect was identical between the different versions of the task. In both
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cases, this may reflect an attempt to resolve local uncertainty; the higher weighted
squared prediction error reflects that the individual’s predictions about the environ-
ment are unreliable, and so to increase certainty they opt for the safe option which
has a known outcome.
The extent to which outcomes were surprising also modulated the participants’
belief that the trial would be rewarded. However, this effect had no clear overall
direction which likely indicates that the direction of the effect differed between indi-
viduals. This perhaps reflects that both the safe and risky actions could ultimately
reduce future uncertainty, the latter being over a longer timescale. Participants can
reduce uncertainty most straightforwardly by choosing the safe (go) response, since
there is no uncertainty about the null outcome that will result. However, choosing
the risky (stay) response is necessary to learn and reduce uncertainty about the con-
tingency between the stimuli and outcomes. However, it is not clear why the effect
of surprise on reward sensitivity had a clear direction, while the effect of surprise
on prior belief was variable between participants. Speculatively, this might suggest
that an altered prior belief and reward sensitivity fulfil different (although unknown)
functions in terms of optimising decision-making in accordance with environmental
conditions. This would be an interesting avenue for future research.
4.4.2 How does reward and punisher experience influence reported
affect?
The study revealed that a higher average earning rate was associated with more pos-
itive affective valence. This finding further supports the relationship between the av-
erage earning rate and affective valence identified using the monetary task (Chapter
3) and extends it to the context of primary reinforcers, thus confirming that abso-
lute reward and punisher experience does modulate momentary subjective affective
valence.
This study also raises the issue that, in humans at least, a change in affect does
not necessitate shifts in risk-aversion, while changes in risk aversion do not necessarily
correspond to an altered affective state.
Yet, in contrast to the monetary task (Chapter 3), we found no evidence that
the squared weighted prediction error influenced arousal. This could reflect that the
volumes of juice and salty tea delivered were very small and consequently could be
less arousing generally than monetary rewards or losses.
4.4.3 How do parameters characterising decision-making relate to
affect?
Interestingly, more negative ratings of affective valence were associated with weaker
surprise-dependent modulation of reward sensitivity. This is in accordance with the
results of the monetary task (Chapter 3) in which decision-making of individuals
reporting more negative affective valence were less influenced (albeit via loss aversion)
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by the squared weighted prediction error. Hence, this firstly provides further evidence
for a potential link between prediction error blunting and affective state, which has
been demonstrated neurophysiologically (Gradin et al., 2011; Kumar et al., 2008;
Steele et al., 2004). Secondly, it might also provide further support for the concept of
cautious optimism which suggests that happier individuals may be more risk-averse
in their actual decision-making despite a stronger belief that an outcome will be
favourable (Isen et al., 1988; Isen and Patrick, 1983; Nygren et al., 1996). Similarly,
in line with cautious optimism, participants who reported more negative affective
valence were more likely to have a stronger belief that the ‘stay’ response would result
in salty tea in periods of greater uncertainty. This result may be explained by the
finding that poorer mood states can lead to the immediate dismissal of actions that
could lead to large punishers, even if they would be beneficial in the longer term (Huys
et al., 2012). Here, learning from the outcome of the risky response may ultimately
improve performance and increase overall juice intake, but the increased belief that
the trial would lead to delivery of salty tea may have increased risk-aversion and
decreased willingness to make the risky but potentially beneficial action in periods
of uncertainty. It might also reflect that there is an interaction between longer-term
mood and environmental conditions, such that individuals in more negative affective
states have a greater expectation of punishers (or reduced expectation of rewards) but
that this only arises, or is particularly apparent, in periods of uncertainty.
Participants who reported more negative affect were more sensitive to rewards.
Although one might typically expect more negative (particularly clinical) affective
states to be associated with anhedonia and so a reduced reward value, negative affect
has been associated with increased reward value on numerous occasions (Neville et al.,
2017; Simmons et al., 2016; Spruijt et al., 2001; Van der Harst et al., 2003). This could
reflect a form of mood-repair (Sanchez et al., 2014) whereby individuals seek rewards
to enhance their negative mood, which could potentially arise in less severe negative
states as opposed to more severe negative states in which anhedonia is observed. It
might also reflect cautious optimism; that individuals in more positively valenced
affective states are more risk-averse (resulting from reduced reward sensitivity) as a
means to maintain their positive affect. This potential explanation has important
implications for the judgement bias task as a measure of welfare as it suggests that
risk-seeking behaviour may be associated with more negative affective states (although
potentially only mild as opposed to severe negative states), and so caution should be
taken when interpreting judgement bias results. However, it might generally be the
case that negative affect is also associated with a decreased expectation of reward
which more than offsets the increased reward sensitivity to produce risk aversion.
This has been previously observed (Iigaya et al., 2016; Nygren et al., 1996) although
we did not find an affect-dependent prior belief here. Alternatively, an increased
reward sensitivity in participants reporting more negative affect could more simply
reflect negative affect which resulted from hunger or thirst hence increasing the value
of the juice.
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4.4.4 The influence of reward and punisher experience on trial ini-
tiation
Corroborating the findings of the monetary task (Chapter 3), as well as other studies
(e.g. Griffiths and Beierholm, 2017; Guitart-Masip et al., 2011), a higher average
earning rate was associated with faster trial initiation. This confirms that participants
do attempt to optimise vigour (Niv et al., 2007) in line with reward and punisher
experience.
Despite a lack of evidence that surprise (squared weighted prediction error) in-
fluenced subjective arousal in this study, it did significantly influence vigour. More
specifically, participants were slower to initiate trials when there was greater uncer-
tainty. Previous research has suggested that humans react more slowly following a
surprising outcome (Bestmann et al., 2008; Browning et al., 2015) which potentially
reflects an attempt to process and learn from the surprising outcomes to reduce sub-
sequent prediction errors and optimise behaviour. However, this contrasts with the
results of the monetary task (Chapter 3) in which the weighted prediction error pro-
vided a better explanation of variation in vigour than the squared weighted prediction
error. This suggests that the main difference between the tasks is in the response to
negative prediction errors, with individuals slowing following negative prediction er-
rors in this task but decreasing their latency following negative prediction errors in the
monetary task. One potential explanation for this is that losses may fundamentally
differ from punishers; it might be worthwhile for a participant to initiate trials with
greater vigour to more quickly recoup losses, but as punishers cannot be undone, a
better solution in the case of unexpected salty tea or unexpectedly low volumes of
juice may be to learn from experience and hence decrease vigour.
4.4.5 The influence of immediate rewards and punishers on be-
haviour
Across both the primary and secondary (Chapter 3) reinforcer tasks, participants were
slower to initiate trials but tended to report greater arousal when the offered volume of
juice was greater; perhaps indicating the participants were more alert and took time to
prepare on trials with higher stakes. Participants also reported more positive affective
valence and were more likely to make the ‘stay’ response when the potential outcome
was higher across both tasks. This indicates that participants were attending to the
task, found greater potential juice to be more rewarding, and adjusted their behaviour
rationally according to the expected value of the trial, which provides good validation
that the task works as anticipated. In future, a within-subject design may help to
better understand differences in the influence of primary and secondary reinforcers on
behaviour and to determine if there are reliable differences in effect size, allowing us to
comment on whether primary rewards and punishers might exert a greater or weaker
impact on behaviour than secondary rewards and punishers. Similarly, in accordance
with the monetary task (Chapter 3), the previous outcome was a better predictor of
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reported valence than the prediction error. Further research could be conducted to see
whether this result is generalisable, or whether there are circumstances under which
the prediction error better accounts for variation in affective valence.
As observed in the monetary task (Chapter 3), we found a strong effect of the
number of trials completed on affective state and behaviour. Participants were re-
ported lower arousal, more negative affective valence, and were faster to initiate trials,
and more risk-averse as the task progressed which perhaps suggests that the task in-
duced boredom. This is potentially an issue for the backtranslation of the task given
that cognitive tasks have been suggested to be enriching to animals (Krakenberg and
Melotti, pers. comm.)
4.5 Conclusions (see Fig. 4.10)
In summary, we have developed a human judgement bias task which uses primary in-
stead of secondary rewards and punishers that more closely resembles the automated
task designed for rats (Jones et al., 2018). The results of this study are overall in
agreement with that of the human monetary task (Chapter 3) and demonstrate the
importance of local uncertainty in decision-making, and how this may relate to affec-
tive valence (i.e. affect may play a modulating role), and further supports the average
earning rate as an important determinant of affect. There were differences between
the human studies in how unexpected outcomes influenced the trial initiation latency
which perhaps reflects differences between losses and punishers. The study highlights
several issues that would benefit from further research, such as why the average earn-
ing rate influences affective valence but not decision-making, and an investigation
of the factors which determine the direction in which affect might influence reward
sensitivity (e.g. severity of negative affect/timing).
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Figure 4.10: Diagrammatic summary of the results of Chapter 4:
the nodes represent variables relating to affect, decision-making (where
CL denotes loss/punisher sensitivity, CR denotes reward sensitivity, ω
denotes the prior belief about outcomes, and JB denotes judgement
bias), experience (where wPE denotes the weighted reward prediction
error, wPE2 denotes the squared weighted reward prediction error,
and R̄ denotes the average earning/reward rate), and vigour, the lines
between nodes represent observed associations between those variables.
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How does pre-test reward and
punisher experience influence rat
judgement bias and vigour?
Chapter summary: Affect is thought to guide adaptive
decision-making. However, it is not clear what information af-
fect encodes about the environment, the situation of an individ-
ual within this environment, and how affect influences decision-
making. To investigate this, we created environments by present-
ing either many or few rewards or punishers of different modal-
ities to rats, and then administered two decision-making tasks
to quantify the effects of these different environments on choice
and motivation. The rewards (sucrose and 50kHz ultrasonic vo-
calisations) and punishers (air-puffs and 22kHz ultrasonic vocal-
isations) were designed to induce temporary shifts in affective
state. The tasks were a progressive ratio lever pressing task and
a judgement bias task. We found that rats pressed a lever to ob-
tain sucrose more frequently in the test sessions following delivery
of punishers than rewards. Judgement bias data were analysed
in both model-agnostic and model-dependent manners. In con-
trast to our initial hypothesis, rats who received many sucrose
pellets prior to testing were more risk-averse in the judgement
bias task than rats who received many air-puffs. The computa-
tional analysis revealed that this resulted from a higher weighting
of punishers relative to rewards following pre-test sucrose com-
pared to pre-test air-puff experience. While we can conclude
that reward and punisher experience alter rat decision-making
and vigour, the specific affective states that might arise from
such experiences remain unclear.
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5.1 Introduction
Certain features of negatively and positively valenced affective states are phylogeneti-
cally widespread which suggests that affect confers an evolutionary advantage (Ander-
son and Adolphs, 2014; Bateson et al., 2011; Darwin, 1872; Mendl et al., 2010; Nettle
and Bateson, 2012). A prominent hypothesis is that affect, having both transient and
longer-lasting components, provides information about the state of the environment
and an individual’s situation within it to allow adaptive decision-making (Bach and
Dayan, 2017; Mendl et al., 2010; Nettle and Bateson, 2012; Trimmer et al., 2013).
More specifically, affect is thought to encode information about reward and punisher
experience to optimise future reward acquisition and punisher avoidance (Bach and
Dayan, 2017; Mendl et al., 2010; Nettle and Bateson, 2012; Trimmer et al., 2013).
This functional framework for affect suggests that decision-making should depend on
reward and punisher experience. More specifically, rewards and punishers, regardless
of modality, should alter decision-making, with the extent to which they do so being
dependent on the prevalence of rewarding and punishing experiences. In general, re-
wards should be perceived as more likely in environments in which they are frequent,
and punishers should be considered more likely in environments in which they are
more prevalent. However, to our knowledge, this has yet to be explicitly tested.
A better understanding of the functional significance of affect is crucial to its inves-
tigation, particularly in non-human animals. Judgement bias testing is a prominent
method for investigating the relationship between affect and decision-making that has
been used in numerous species, including rats, starlings, sheep and humans (Doyle
et al., 2010; Harding et al., 2004; Iigaya et al., 2016; Matheson et al., 2008). Judge-
ment bias has become a widely used tool for the investigation of affect and welfare
in a range of non-human animals (Baciadonna and McElligott, 2015; Mendl et al.,
2009; Mendl and Paul, 2004; Yeates and Main, 2008). One issue that complicates the
interpretation of judgement bias is a poor understanding of the cognitive mechanisms
that contribute to affect-induced changes in judgement bias. Although apparent opti-
mism in the judgement bias task is often assumed to reflect an increased expectation
of reward or a decreased expectation of punisher (Bateson, 2016; Mendl et al., 2009),
decision-making within the task involves evaluation of both the likelihood and value
of potential outcomes (Glimcher et al., 2009; Loewenstein et al., 2008; Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1944). Thus, an altered subjective valuation of the reward or punisher
could also lead to variation in judgement bias (Mendl et al., 2009). Moreover, there
is evidence to suggest that affect might alter both these aspects of cognition (Mendl
et al., 2009). Examining these possibilities would aid a better understanding of judge-
ment bias as a measure of affect and welfare and potentially shed light on contradictory
findings in the judgement bias. In particular, it could elucidate the circumstances that
lead individuals in putatively negative affective states to be more risk-seeking.
The aim of this study was therefore to investigate the putative adaptive func-
tion of affect, namely as a Bayesian prior over future outcomes, and to gain a better
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understanding of judgement bias as a measure of affect and welfare. Our central
hypotheses were that reward and punisher experience would determine the affective
(specifically ’emotional’) state of an individual according to Roll’s (2013) definition of
affect (i.e. rewards induce positive affect; and punishers induce negative affect) and
that the resulting affective state would influence decision-making and vigour. Given
this, we aimed to address six specific questions about the relationship between re-
ward and punisher experience, affect, and decision-making: (1) are individuals more
risk-seeking in the judgement bias task following experience of rewards compared to
punishers; (2) is this effect dependent on reward and punisher prevalence; (3) does this
effect also depend on the extent to which the modality of the rewards and punishers
experienced matches that of the potential outcome of the decision; (4) does this risk-
seeking behaviour arise from modulation of the likelihood or the value of rewards and
punishers, (5) what is the relationship between reward and punisher experience and
vigour; and (6) as self-determined inter-trial intervals gave us an opportunity to ex-
amine vigour across the test session, does within-test reward and punisher experience
alter decision-making and vigour?
To answer these questions, we administered two different sucrose delivering
decision-making tasks to animals who had been exposed to one of eight different
environments, and used two structurally different analysis methods to examine the
results. The tasks were a standard progressive ratio lever pressing task (Hodos, 1961)
and an automated judgement bias task in which trials were self-initiated (Jones et al.,
2018). The environments crossed valence (reward versus punisher), modality (audi-
tory versus sucrose or air puff unconditioned stimuli) and prevalence (low versus high).
We employed a model-agnostic analysis to summarize the raw data; and fit a Bayesian
decision-theoretic model (Iigaya et al., 2016) which allowed us to estimate parameters
relating to the decision-making process, namely reward valuation and probability es-
timation, as well as modelling the duration of the self-determined inter-trial intervals
to assess how measures of pre-test and within-test reward and punisher experience
altered vigour. The progressive ratio lever pressing task provided a behavioural mea-
sure of reward valuation to complement the measure of reward and punisher valuation
obtained through the model-dependent analysis of the judgement bias data.
We hypothesised that rats would be more risk-seeking immediately following re-
ward compared to punisher experience, regardless of modality (i.e. there would be
a significant effect of manipulation valence but not a significant interaction between
manipulation valence and manipulation modality on judgement bias, Fig. 5.1). Addi-
tionally, we hypothesised that the prevalence of reward and punisher experience would
modulate the extent to which the rat exhibited risk-seeking behaviour; rats would be
most risk-seeking following experience of rewards at a high prevalence, and least risk-
seeking following experience of punishers at a high prevalence (i.e a there would be a
significant interaction between manipulation valence and manipulation prevalence on
judgement bias, Fig. 5.1). We expected that the model-dependent analysis would re-
veal that relatively risk-seeking behaviour would arise from a bias towards executing
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the risky response. Given the conflicting evidence in the literature about the rela-
tionship between experience, affect, and reward and punisher valutation (see Chapter
1), we were agnostic as to whether and how the rats’ valuation of rewards/punishers
would depend on reward and punisher experience prior to testing. However, we ex-
pected that the results of the progressive ratio lever pressing task would be consistent
with the results of the model-dependent analysis; rats that had a greater value of
sucrose compared to air-puffs according to the model parameter characterising the
relative sensitivity of punishers to rewards, would also make a greater number of lever
presses to obtain sucrose. With regards to the inter-trial interval data, in line with
Beierholm et al. (2013); Niv et al. (2007), we hypothesised that rats would be faster
to initiate a trial when the average reward rate was higher. Also, we expected that if
rats became satiated as a result of an increasing intake of sucrose, this be apparent
as an effect of trial on the inter-trial interval (i.e. increased latencies as the number
































Figure 5.1: Diagrammatic summary of hypotheses; experiencing re-
wards and punishers non-specific (A) and specific (B) to the task would
influence affect; these predicted affective states would be associated
with changes in risk-aversion (C).
5.2 Methods
5.2.1 Subjects
Subjects were 16 male Lister Hooded rats (Charles River, Margate, UK). The rats were
housed in stable pairs in cages measuring 560x340x190mm and kept under a 12-hour
reverse light cycle, with lights off at 7am and on at 7pm. Two cardboard tubes and an
aspen block were provided as enrichment and subjects had ad libitum access to food
(LabDiet) and water. This research was conducted under University Investigation
Number UB/16/004 and adhered to ASAB/ABS guidelines for the use of animals in
research. Subjects were rehomed as pet rats on completion of the experiment.
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5.2.2 Procedure
Subjects first completed training and testing on the progressive ratio lever pressing
task, before being trained and tested on the judgement bias task. Prior to each test
session, rats received rewards and punishers at a high or low prevalence. Once rats
had met the criterion to progress to testing for each task, test sessions occurred twice
per week, on a Tuesday and Thursday, with additional training sessions on Monday,
Wednesday, and Friday. Rats were not food or water restricted prior to training or
testing.
5.2.3 Apparatus (see Fig. 5.2)
Four identical shuttle boxes measuring 508×254×305mm placed in acoustic isola-
tion chambers were used for both the judgement bias and progressive ratio lever
pressing task. A wall divided each box into two sections which each measured
254×254×305mm. Training and testing of each task occurred in only one of these
sections. During the progressive ratio lever pressing task a retractable lever was at-
tached to the centre of the end wall of each operant box and a plastic pot was attached
to a pellet feeder was placed adjacent to this lever. For the judgement bias task, the
retractable lever was replaced with a pellet/air-puff delivery trough, the pot was re-
moved, and a speaker was placed on top of each operant box facing down into the
operant box. The pre-test treatment took place in one of two identical operant boxes,
both measuring 305×178×355mm in separate isolation chambers in separate rooms
adjacent to the testing room. A plastic pot was attached to the end wall in both boxes.
This pot was attached to a pellet feeder in one box, and an ultrasonic speaker was
placed in the chamber containing the other box. The operant equipment was manu-
factured by Coulbourn Instruments (Allentown, PA, USA), and operated by Graphic
State (v4) software. The ultrasonic vocalisations (USVs) were broadcast using Avisoft
software and ultrasound gate hardware (Avisoft Bioacoustics, Berlin, Germany). The
sucrose pellets used throughout the experiment were Bioserv (Frenchtown, NJ, USA)
Dustless Precision Pellets (45 mg).
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Figure 5.2: The shuttle box within a sound isolation chamber used
for the judgement bias task; there is a pellet dispenser connected to
the trough on the end wall.
5.2.4 Progressive ratio lever pressing task
To train rats to press a lever to obtain sucrose, each lever press resulted in the lever
retracting for one second and a sucrose pellet being delivered into the pot. An au-
toshaping procedure ran simultaneously, such that every 60 seconds the lever would
retract and a sucrose pellet would be delivered, even if the lever had not been pressed,
after which the lever became re-available (Brown and Jenkins, 1968; Parker et al.,
2014). Initially, the duration of the training sessions was 15 minutes. Once sub-
jects had completed at least three 15-minute training sessions and had made at least
15 lever presses in a session, the duration of training sessions was increased to 30
minutes. Rats progressed to testing following completion of two 30-minute training
sessions in which at least 30 lever presses were made. During testing, the number of
presses required before the sucrose pellet was delivered increased in increments of five
lever presses starting at one lever press. The test session ended after 30 minutes had
elapsed.
5.2.5 Judgement bias task
The judgement bias task followed the methodology of Jones et al. (2018); see Fig. 5.3.
Judgement bias task trials were self-initiated by the rat inserting his snout into the
food delivery trough which led to a tone being played. Rats were trained to keep their
snout in the trough for two seconds when the positive tone played to receive a sucrose
pellet, and remove it when the negative tone played to avoid an air-puff. Removal
of the snout before two seconds had elapsed resulted in no sucrose or air-puff being
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delivered regardless of the tone presented. The reference tones had a frequency of 2kHz
or 8kHz, and the positive tone was 2kHz for half of the rats and 8kHz for the remaining
half. In test sessions, three probe tones (2.8kHz, 4kHz, 5.6kHz) were presented on
six trials each in addition to the reference tones on 21 trials each. The order of tone
presentation was randomised and the ambiguous tones were non-reinforced.
+ve tone
-ve tone
Go Stay Go Stay
Ambiguous 
tone
Figure 5.3: An example of judgement bias test, using the task de-
scribed by Jones et al. (2018): following trial initiation, the rat is
presented with a tone which is either +ve, -ve, or ambiguous. If they
execute the risky response (‘stay’) when the +ve tone is presented
they will be rewarded with food, but executing this response when the
-ve tone is presented will result in a punishing air-puff. The safe re-
sponse (‘go’) results in no reward or punisher. During testing, the rat
is presented with several ambiguous tones and must decide whether to
execute the ‘stay’ or ‘go’ response
5.2.6 Affect manipulation
Reward or punisher experience was manipulated in the 15 minutes prior to each testing
session. We adopt Rolls’ (2013) definition of rewards as anything that an animal will
work for, and a punisher as anything that an animal will attempt to escape from or
avoid. The rewards delivered were one sucrose pellet or playback of a 50kHz USV
lasting eight seconds, and the punishers delivered were an air-puff directed towards
the rat that was stopped as soon as the rat moved away or playback of a 22kHz USV
of eight second duration (Fig. 5.4). Rats will work to hear playback of 50kHz USVs,
which are emitted by rats in situations considered to be affectively positive, and will
work to avoid playback of 22kHz USVs which are emitted by rats during unpleasant
experiences (Burgdorf et al., 2008). Similarly, rats will work to obtain sucrose pellets,
and will actively escape air-puffs (Cimadevilla et al., 2001; Engelmann et al., 1996;
Sclafani and Ackroff, 2003). Each reward or punisher was delivered at either a high or
low prevalence. The reward or punisher was delivered at 15 randomly selected times
in the high prevalence condition, and once at a randomly selected point during the low
prevalence condition. The experimental design was within-subject and therefore each
rat experienced eight manipulations of reward or punisher experience per task over
four weeks. Rats experienced the same reward or punisher at different prevalences
within the same week, and the order of rewards or punishers experienced was unique
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for each rat on each task and was assigned randomly. Each rat experienced the high
prevalence condition on the first test day of the week for half the test weeks which were
selected at random for each rat. Except for the air-puff which was administered by
the experimenter using an air-cannister (Fellowes, Doncaster, UK: Air Duster 300ml),
delivery of the rewards and punishers was automated. The 50kHz USV playback
and 22kHz playback were recorded from rats unknown to the experimental subjects.
The 50kHz vocalisations were induced by placing the rats back into their home cage
following a brief period in a neutral holding cage. The 22kHz USVs were induced by
placing the rats in an open arena.




































Figure 5.4: Spectrogram of excerpt from USV recordings used for
the affect manipulation: (A) the 22 kHz playback; (B) the 50kHz
playback.
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5.2.7 Data analysis
Two rats did not complete judgement bias testing due to poor performance in train-
ing. Data analysis comprised two approaches: a model-agnostic and model-dependent
approach. Choice data from the judgement bias task were analysed using both ap-
proaches which assessed whether there were treatment differences in judgement bias
(model-agnostic analysis) and explored the potential cognitive processes underlying
these treatment differences (model-dependent analysis). Data from the progressive
ratio lever pressing task were only analysed using a model-agnostic approach to as-
sess whether there were treatment differences in the number of lever presses made
in a session, which could be compared to the parameter characterising sensitivity
to rewards and punishers from the model-dependent analysis. These data were un-
suitable for analysis using a model-dependent approach as each test session provided
only one data point (i.e. number of lever presses). Self-determined interval data
were analysed solely using a model-agnostic approach which assessed whether overall
treatment differences existed in self-determined inter-trial intervals, examined which
variables relating to reward and punisher experience might contribute to variation in
inter-trial intervals, and examined whether the influence of these variables depended
on treatment.
Model-agnostic analysis
The response variables analysed were: the total number of lever presses in the pro-
gressive ratio lever pressing task, and the decision to ‘stay’ (risky) or ‘go’ (safe) in the
judgement bias task. These data were analysed using generalised linear mixed models
(GLMM) implemented in the lme4 (Bates et al., 2015) and nlme (Pinheiro et al.,
2018) packages in R (R Core Team, 2017). Where models assumed a Gaussian error
function, the residuals of each model were visually inspected to verify that the model
assumptions of normality of error and homogeneity of variance were met. Following
log-transformation of the total number of lever presses, these assumptions were not
violated in any model. Likelihood-ratio tests (LRT) were used to assess whether the
difference in model deviance was significant when a parameter was removed from the
model.
These GLMMs included a random effect of individual and session, with session
nested within individual. All models included the following fixed effects: manipu-
lation valence (reward or punisher), manipulation modality (USV or task specific),
manipulation prevalence (high or low), and interactions between manipulation va-
lence, modality, and prevalence. Additional fixed effect terms included in the model
of decision were: a variable which coded whether the 2kHz or 8kHz tone was used as
the rewarded test stimulus, number of trials completed prior to the decision, the tone
presented, and the prediction error on the previous trial (as determined by the model-
dependent analysis of the self-determined inter-trial intervals), the previous outcome,
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and interactions between stimulus and valence, and valence, prevalence, and modal-
ity. To investigate significant and marginally non-significant interaction terms in the
model, post-hoc comparisons were conducted using a simultaneous pairwise Tukey
procedure for general linear hypotheses within the R package multcomp (Hothorn
et al., 2008).
Model-dependent analysis: judgement bias
We used a Bayesian-decision theoretic model to characterise decision-making in the
judgement bias task (Iigaya et al., 2016; Whiteley and Sahani, 2008). On each trial
of the task, subjects are presented with a tone (s) which we consider to take values
between −2 and 2, where −2 represents the punished reference tone, 2 represents
the rewarded reference tone, and 0 is equidistant from the reference tones and is
thus entirely ambiguous. The subject’s perception of the tone, x, will inform their
estimation of the probability that the tone signals the delivery of a punisher, assuming




ds P (s|x) (5.1)
The expected value of making the ‘stay’ response depends on both the probability
that the tone presented (s) signals a test punisher, given the subject’s perception of
the tone (x) and the subject’s subjective value of the test sucrose and air-puff, c+ and
c− respectively:
Ep/r(x) = c
+(1− P (pun|x))− c−P (pun|x) (5.2)
The expected reward for making the ‘go’ response is 0. Thus, assuming that the
posterior probability of s given x follows a Gaussian distribution with mean x and
variance σ2, i.e. P (s|x) ∼ N (s : x, σ2), it is optimal for a subject to make the ‘stay’
response under the following condition:
c+(1− P (pun|x))− c−P (pun|x) > 0 (5.3)
c+(1− φσ(−x))− c−φσ(−x) > 0 (5.4)






and Cp/r = c
−
c+
is the differential sensitivity of the air-puff to sucrose (Fig. 5.5).
The probability that a subject opts to ‘stay’ given the true tone is therefore:
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We include two additional parameters: a lapse rate λ to account for non-perceptual
errors, and a bias term δ to allow biases towards or away from ‘stay’ response which
thus provides a representation of risk-aversion (Fig. 5.5; Table 5.1). The probability
of a subject making the ‘stay’ response on any given trial is given as:




A relatively risk-seeking judgement bias can therefore arise from either values of Cp/r













































































































Figure 5.5: Data generated using the described model to demon-
strate parameter-dependent variation in judgement bias for each of
the model parameters
Table 5.1: Glossary of judgement bias model parameters
Parameter Range Interpretation
CP/R [0,∞]
Relative scaling of punishers to rewards: higher values reflect that
avoiding the air-puff is of greater value than obtaining a sucrose pellet
δ [−∞,∞] Bias: higher values reflect a bias towards executing the ‘stay’ response
λ [0, 1]
Lapse rate: higher values a greater likelihood of executing the action
with the lowest value (i.e. the ‘wrong’ action).
σ [0,∞]
Slope parameter: higher values reflect a poorer ability to detect the
true direction of the stimulus.
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Model-dependent analysis: self-determined inter-trial intervals
The log-transformed self-determined inter-trial interval data was modelled using linear
regression with a constant term k and the following regressors: weighting for the
previous outcome (βRt−1), where the previous outcome (Rt−1) was either 1 (sucrose),
0 (nothing), or −Cp/r (air-puff scaled by relative sensitivity of losses to rewards),
weighting for the prediction error (βPEt−1), weighting for the squared prediction error
(βPE2t−1), and a weighting for the number of trials completed (βt).
The prediction error on each trial was calculated as the difference between Rt and
the average of the potential outcomes:












This was found to provide a better fit than a prediction error based on the pre-
diction following stimulus presentation (∆AIC=510.050, comparing all models fitted
calculating the prediction error as above the same set of models that instead calculated
the prediction error as below):
PE(t) = Rt − ((1− P (pun|xt)− Cp/r(pun|xt)) (5.11)
where P (pun|xt) is sigmoidal and dependent on the ability of the rat to discriminate
between the stimuli (σ) and the stimulus presented on the trial (st):
P (pun|xt) = φσ(st + φ−1σ (0.5)) (5.12)




where ε is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance ς
(ε ∼ N (0, ς)).
Model Fitting
Model fitting was conducted using a three-level hierarchical Bayesian random effects
analysis. We assume that the parameters hij for each subject i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} across
test sessions j ∈ {1, . . . , N i} are a random sample from a Gaussian distribution
hij ∼ N (µi,Σ) parameterised by µi, which is itself a random sample from a Gaussian
distribution µi ∼ N (m, ν) parameterized by m and ν (with diagonal ν). Here, Σ is
also diagonal, and is another parameter.
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The aim of model-fitting is to identify the parameters which maximize the likeli-
hood of the data, D = {Dij} for session j of rat i:










P (µi|m, ν)P (hij |µi,Σ)P (Dij |hij)dµidhij
}
(5.15)
We estimated these parameters using an expectation-maximisation procedure, which
involved iterating between the E and M steps described below until convergence
(Guitart-Masip et al., 2012). This is a common procedure for the fitting of behavioural
data (Guitart-Masip et al., 2012; Iigaya et al., 2016). For the kth iteration of the
E-step, we use a Laplacian approximation based on the model parameters that max-
imized the likelihood of the data given the prior distributions (for convenience, not
integrating out µi, as would be possible under the current circumstances):
µ̄i(k), {h̄ij(k)} = argmaxµ,{hj}
{
logP (µi|m(k), ν(k)) +
N i∑
j=1
logP (hij |µi;Σ(k))P (Dij |hij)
}
(5.16)
The inverse Hessian of this maximization leads to M covariance matrices, the ith of
which,Mi(k) has dimensions (1+N i)h×(1+N i)h where h is the number of parameters
(with rows and columns organized as µi,hi1,hi2, . . . ,hiN i). We write M
i
xy(k) for the
x, yth, [x, y ∈ {0, 1, . . . N i}] block of this matrix, withMi00(k) being the covariance of
µi(k),Mijj(k) being the covariance of hij(k), [j ∈ {1, . . . , N i}], andMi0j(k) being the
covariance between µi(k) and hij(k), all on iteration k.








































−N i(hij(k+1)− µ̄i(k))[(hij(k+1)− µ̄i(k))]T
]
(5.20)
Model-fitting was carried out using the computational facilities of the Advanced
Computing Research Centre, University of Bristol - http://www.bris.ac.uk/acrc/.
This involved using one node of the high-performance computer (BlueCrystal Phase
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3) to fit each model the data, with multiple models fitted simultaneously, allowing all
models to be fitted in under 300 hours. The likelihood function and code for the EM
procedure were written using Matlab. The initial values for all parameters were a
number drawn at random between zero and one. Values for parameters constrained
between zero and∞ were exponentiated within the likelihood function, likewise values
for parameters constrained between zero and one were transformed using a logistic
function within the likelihood function.
An alternative approach to model-fitting would be characterise the full posterior
distributions of the parameters. However, even with use of the high-performance
computer, this would have taken an an impractical amount of time.
Model comparison
We compared models according to their Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) scores:










where Np is the number of fitted parameters.
Permutation test and condition comparisons
We used a permutation test to assess whether parameter estimates differed from zero,
where this was meaningful. This involved calculating the mean parameter estimate
and multiplying randomly selected parameter estimates by minus one and recalculat-
ing the mean parameter estimate 10000 times. A p-value was obtained by calculating
the proportion of resampled means with an absolute difference greater than or equal
to the observed mean.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Statistical analysis: progressive ratio lever pressing data
When rats had experienced punishers prior to the progressive ratio lever pressing task
they pressed the lever more than when they had experienced pre-test rewards (mean
number of lever presses ± SE: reward: 159±20.4, punishers: 167±14.1, LRT=4.944,
p=0.026). The numerical prevalence of pre-test rewards and punishers (LRT<0.001,
p=0.993), or modality (LRT=1.927, p=0.165) did not significantly predict the number
of lever presses. There was a marginally non-significant interaction between manip-
ulation valence and prevalence (Fig. 5.6: LRT=3.003, p=0.083). While there was a
significant difference between rats that experienced high prevalence rewards and high
prevalence punishers (mean number of lever presses ± SE: reward: 159.094±32.076,
punishers: 173.594±20.164, LRT=-2.913, p=0.013), no significant difference was ob-
served between rats that experienced rewards and punishers at a low prevalence
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(LRT=0.421, p=0.967), between rats experiencing rewards at a high or low preva-
lence (LRT=1.248, p=0.533), or punishers at a high or low prevalence (LRT=-1.247,
p=0.534). There was no significant interaction between manipulation valence and
modality (LRT= 0.074, p=0.785), or between manipulation valence, modality, and



























Figure 5.6: The effect of manipulation valence and prevalence on
the log-transformed number of lever presses collapsed across modality.
Error bars represent one standard error
5.3.2 Statistical analysis: judgement bias data
There was a high degree of correlation between the weighted prediction error, squared
prediction error, and previous outcome across individuals. To avoid issues arising
from multicollinearity, GLMMs containing only one of these variables were com-
pared according to their AIC values and the GLMM with the lowest AIC value was
selected for further analysis. The model which included the previous outcome in-
stead of the squared weighted prediction error or weighted prediction error provided
a marginally improved fit (∆AIC=1.744; comparing a saturated model containing
the previous outcome and not the squared weighted prediction error or weighted
prediction error with the next best saturated model which contained the weighted
prediction error but not the previous outcome or squared weighted prediction er-
ror) and hence the previous outcome was included as a predictor variable in the
GLMM. The stimulus tone was a significant predictor of response, indicating that
rats were able to discriminate between the stimuli used in the judgement bias task
(LRT=3387.919, p<0.001). Rats were more risk-seeking when the previous outcome
122
5.3. Results
was more aversive (LRT=4.604, p=0.032) and when the 2Khz compared with the 8kHz
tone was rewarded (LRT=14.716, p<0.001). Valence (LRT=2.451, p=0.117), modal-
ity (LRT=0.092, p=0.762), prevalence (LRT=0.756, p=0.385), and number of trials
completed (LRT=2.263, 0.132) were not significant as main effects. However, there
was a marginally non-significant interaction between valence and prevalence (Fig. 5.7:
LRT=3.467, p=0.063) and a significant interaction between valence and modality
(Fig. 5.8: LRT=6.682, 0.010). Post-hoc analyses found a marginally non-significant
difference in risk-aversion between rats that experienced highly prevalent prior pun-
ishers and highly prevalent pre-test rewards (mean proportion ‘stay’ responses ± SE:
highly prevalent rewards 0.506±0.031 vs. highly prevalent punishers 0.591±0.031,
z=-2.302, p=0.074) and no significant difference between rats that experienced pre-
test rewards and punishers at a low prevalence (z=-0.331, p=0.984). Additionally,
there was no significant difference between high and low prevalence pre-test reward
conditions (z=1.994, p=0.150), and no significant difference between high and low
prevalence pre-test punisher conditions (z=-0.632, p=0.900). Rats made significantly
fewer risk-seeking responses in the pre-test sucrose condition compared to the pre-
test air-puff condition (mean proportion ‘stay’ responses ± SE: sucrose 0.520±0.031
vs. air-puff 0.604±0.031, z=-2.763, p=0.021), but there was no significant difference
between the two pre-test USV conditions (z=-0.755, p=0.843). There was no signif-
icant difference in judgement bias after experiencing pre-test sucrose compared with
50kHz USVs (z=1.435, p=0.413) and also no significant difference in judgement bias
following pre-test air-puffs compared with 22kHz USVs (z=-2.103, p=0.117).
The interaction between valence and stimulus was non-significant (LRT=0.070,
p=0.791) as was the interaction between manipulation valence, prevalence, and modal-
ity (LRT=0.795, p=0.672).
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Figure 5.7: Mean proportion of risk-seeking responses split by tone
presented following experience of high or low prevalence rewards or































Figure 5.8: Mean proportion of risk-seeking responses split by tone
presented following experience of rewards or punishers that were either




Each model was fitted using a three-level hierarchical Bayesian random effects analysis
with a single top level empirical prior distribution of the model parameters across all
subjects and within each subject. Therefore, the model fitting procedure was blind
to the existence of the different conditions. We subsequently assessed the association
between the posterior parameters and the conditions.
Judgement bias data
The Bayesian-decision theoretic model that was fitted to the judgement bias data
included four parameters: bias (δ), differential sensitivity to the outcome (Cp/r), a
slope parameter (σ) and a lapse rate (λ). According to the AIC values, the most
parsimonious model included only two of these parameters (Cp/r and σ); inclusion of
δ λ and resulted in a less parsimonious model (Table 5.2).
Table 5.2: ∆AIC scores for computational models of judgement bias
choice data: comparing the AIC value from each model to the AIC
value of the best model
Model Parameters ∆ AIC
Cp/r, σ 0
δ,Cp/r, σ 20.93
Cp/r, Plapse, σ 20.98











Across all conditions and subjects, the log-transformed parameter estimates of
Cp/r (PT, mean ± SE: -0.143±0.047, p=0.003) were significantly less than zero, sug-
gesting that general risk-seeking behaviour observed in the rats during the judge-
ment bias task is attributed to greater sensitivity to rewards relative to punish-
ers. While the estimates of Cp/r did not vary significantly depending on the ma-
nipulation valence (LRT=2.054, p=0.253), prevalence (LRT=0.504, p=0.597), or
modality (LRT=0.012, p=0.912), or the interaction between prevalence and valence
(LRT=2.712, p=0.249), there was a significant interaction between modality and
valence (Fig. 5.9: LRT=8.456, p=0.018). This significant interaction was driven
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by the difference in parameter estimates between the pre-test sucrose and pre-test
air-puff treatment groups, with significantly lower estimates of Cp/r for the air-puff
group (air-puff, mean±SE=-0.280±0.085; sucrose: mean±SE=0.001±0.104;LRT=-
3.135, p=0.007) while the estimates of Cp/r did not differ significantly between the
22kHz USVs and 50kHz USVs (LRT=0.981, p=0.695), 22kHz USVs and air-puff
(LRT=-1.010, p=0.676), or 50kHz USVs and sucrose (LRT=-2.154, p=0.102) treat-
ment groups. The estimates of σ did not depend on valence (LRT=1.208, p=0.453),
prevalence (LRT=2.104, p=0.453), or modality (LRT=0.564,p=0.566), or the interac-























Figure 5.9: The mean parameter estimates of Cp/r following expe-
rience of rewards or punishers that were either task specific or USVs
Error bars represent one standard error
Self-determined inter-trial interval data
The linear regression model included a constant (k), which accounted for individual
differences in the absolute speed of trial initiation, and regression weights for the
previous outcome (βRt−1), weighted prediction error from the previous trial (βPEt−1),
squared weighted prediction error from the previous trial (βPE2t−1), and number of
trials completed (βt), as well as parameters σ and Cp/r which described the expected
outcome on each trial and hence, along with the actual outcome, determined the
prediction error and scaled the previous outcome. The fitted learning rate for the
average earning rate (mean±SE=0.794±0.014) indicated that the average earning
rate largely reflected the most recent outcome. As the previous outcome provided
a more parsimonious fit of the self-determined inter-trial intervals than the average
earning rate, the average earning rate was not included in the model (∆AIC=17.994;
comparing all models including the average earning rate but not the previous outcome,
to the same models instead including the previous outcome but not the average earning
rate). As a result of the high degree of correlation between the weighted prediction
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error, squared prediction error, and previous outcome the parameter estimates of
βPE2t−1 , βPEt−1 , and βRt−1 were highly correlated when fitted simultaneously. Models
including both these regression weights were hence excluded from model comparison.
The most parsimonious model according to the AIC value included k, βRt−1 , βt, and
Cp/r (Table 5.3).
Table 5.3: ∆AIC scores for computational models of self-determined
inter-trial interval data: comparing the AIC value from each model to
the AIC value of the best model
Model parameters ∆AIC
k, βRt−1 , βt, Cp/r 0.000
k, βPEt−1 , βt,
Cp/r
3.002
k, βRt−1 , Cp/r 119.539
k, βPEt−1 , Cp/r 122.601
k, βPE2t−1 , βt 135.366
k, βRt−1 144.216
k, βPEt−1 146.045
k, βPE2t−1 , Cp/r 177.077
k, βPEt−1 , γwpe 194.291
k, βPE2t−1 211.824
k, βt 225.492
k, βPE2t−1 , γwpe 255.943
k 336.645
δ,Cp/r 25068.36
Overall, the parameter estimates for βRt−1 (Fig 5.10: PT, 0.126±0.039, p=0.001),
and Cp/r (Fig 5.10: PT, 0.667±0.055, p<0.001) were found to differ significantly from
zero. Rats were faster to initiate trials when the outcome of the most recent trial
was more aversive and were more sensitive to losses than rewards. The estimates of
βt did not differ significantly from zero (Fig 5.10: p=0.616). With the exception of
the estimates of Cp/r which tended to be higher in the low prevalence compared with
high prevalence condition (LRT=5.490, p=0.096), the parameter estimates did not
significantly depend on manipulation valence, modality, prevalence, or the interactions
between manipulation valence and modality, and manipulation valence and prevalence
(Table 5.4).
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Figure 5.10: The mean estimate of regression weights βRt−1 , and βt
and estimate of Cp/r. Error bars represent one standard error
Table 5.4: The LRT values and p-values from the statistical analysis
of the parameter estimates from the model of self-determined inter-
trial intervals
Parameter Predictor variable LRT p-value























Risky decision-making in the judgement bias task is considered to reflect a relatively
positively valenced affective state (Bateson, 2016; Mendl et al., 2009). However, in
our study, rats who had consumed sucrose prior to testing were more risk-averse than
those who had received air-puffs, and rats worked less hard for sucrose in the lever
pressing task when they had received pre-test rewards rather than pre-test punishers,
irrespective of modality. Moreover, both these effects depended on the prevalence of
the prior rewards or punishers, being significant only in the case of highly prevalent
pre-test affective stimuli. Thus, although as hypothesised, judgement bias was mod-
ulated by the extent to which an individual’s experience was rewarding or punishing,
our results do not support the hypothesis that reward experience necessarily induces a
more positively valenced affective state and consequently more risky decision-making
relative to punisher experience. Instead, our results may reflect either that rewards
are more valuable in negative affective states, or that the contrast from the negative
affect induction to the test induced a relatively positive affective state.
Reward and punisher experience may indeed have induced a relatively more pos-
itive and negative affective state respectively, but expressed this in a way we had
not originally hypothesised. An individual experiencing a negatively valenced affec-
tive state could be more risk-seeking if they valued rewards more highly or punishers
less negatively. Rats that received pre-test punishers were more vigorous in their lever
pressing in the progressive ratio-lever pressing task compared with those that received
pre-test rewards. This suggests that pre-test punisher experience increased the subjec-
tive value of the sucrose pellet relative to pre-test reward experience. This is further
supported by the results of the model-dependent analysis of data from the judgement
bias task which revealed that rats that had experienced prior sucrose weighted present
within-test punishers more heavily relative to within-test rewards than those that had
experienced prior air-puffs.
Although it is arguably atypical, with anhedonic depression being more commonly
observed, greater reward valuation has been observed in individuals experiencing more
negative affective states. For example, depression in humans has been associated
with increased valuation of a number of rewards including food (Simmons et al.,
2016), cigarettes (Spring et al., 2003), and alcohol (Murphy et al., 2013). Similarly,
animal studies have demonstrated that short-term stress can result in increased reward
valuation (Spruijt et al., 2001; Van der Harst et al., 2003). It has been suggested
this might function to regulate mood by encouraging individuals in poorer mood
states to seek mood-enhancing rewards (Morris and Reilly, 1987; Sanchez et al., 2014).
Additionally, Trimmer et al. (2017) suggested that food should be valued more highly
in environments in which threats are more frequent as maintaining the high energy
reserves needed to evade predation becomes more important (Trimmer et al., 2017).
An alternate explanation is that our results reflect a contrast effect. A few other
studies have found an ‘optimistic’ judgement bias in individuals in affective states that
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were putatively negative (e.g. Briefer and McElligott, 2013; Doyle et al., 2010; Sanger
et al., 2011). A commonality between our study and some of these other studies is
the release of individuals from an aversive situation prior to testing. In our study
the putative affect manipulation occurred in a different location to the judgement
bias task, and thus the context changed between the prior experience of rewards and
punishers and the present test. As demonstrated by contextual fear conditioning, the
context of an environment becomes associated with emotionally-salient experiences
(Bouton and King, 1983; Hall and Honey, 1989). Therefore, it is possible that rats
experienced a relief-like state following removal from the environment in which they
had been exposed to punishers, and a disappointment-like state following removal
from the environment in which they had experienced rewards.
This would be consistent with the successive negative and positive contrast effect
observed in rats and other species; the disappointment-like or elation-like response
observed when an individual experiences a downshift or upshift in the availability of
a food reward (Burman et al., 2008b; Flaherty, 1982; Neville et al., 2017). Similarly,
research with human subjects has demonstrated that self-reported affect is modulated
by the difference between actual and expected earnings (reward prediction error) and
not the absolute amount earned (Rutledge et al., 2014). The finding that reward
sensitivity was enhanced following pre-test air-puff compared to pre-test sucrose ex-
perience would also be consistent with the contrast induced affective changes proposed
here. Numerous studies have identified an association between negative affect and a
decreased reward valuation (Huys et al., 2013; Treadway et al., 2012). This explana-
tion would imply that use of environmental priors is context-dependent. In particular,
an individual may recognize that prior experience might not be relevant in new con-
texts, and instead rely on the comparison of conditions between contexts to inform
behaviour.
This study also revealed that decision-making depended on the modality of prior
experience. While there was a difference in judgement bias between rats exposed to
task specific rewards and punishers (i.e. pellets and air-puffs), contrary to the findings
of Saito et al. (2016) in which a difference in judgement bias was observed between
rats that were presented with 22kHz and 50kHz USVs, there was no difference between
rats exposed to the rewarding and punishing USVs. The simplest explanation for this
result is that the USVs were not as rewarding or punishing as the sucrose and air-puff,
and consequently exerted a weaker effect on judgement bias. Additionally, unlike the
study by Saito et al. (2016), the rats in this study were not housed in social isolation
which may perhaps, as a result of increased exposure to USVs and social interaction,
have reduced the salience of the USVs. However, this would be incongruent with
the findings from the progressive lever ratio task in which the effect of manipulation
valence was not found to depend on manipulation modality. An alternative or ad-
ditional explanation could be that the prediction of outcomes in the judgement bias
task was influenced by specific prior experience. The possibility that prior reward or
punisher experience may have both general and specific effects on decision-making is
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supported by human neural imaging studies which have demonstrated that there is
only partial overlap of prediction error signals during learning with different reward
and punisher modalities (Metereau and Dreher, 2012; Valentin and O’Doherty, 2009).
The observed interaction between manipulation valence and modality thus raises the
question of whether judgement bias is sensitive to the modality of the affect manip-
ulation. Although numerous studies have found that affect manipulations unrelated
to the task influence judgement bias, further investigation is needed to determine to
what extent the congruity of prior experience to within-task decision-making modu-
lates judgement bias.
Reward and punisher experience within the test session also altered behaviour.
Rats were more likely to make the risky response when the previous outcome was
more aversive. This could indicate that rats are able to more easily recall the most
recent tone and compare whether its frequency is higher or lower than the current
tone to deduce the likely outcome. It might also reflect a process similar to the tilt-
shift effect (Gibson and Radner, 1937) whereby recently perceived stimuli alter the
perception of subsequent stimuli.
The previous outcome also influenced the self-determined inter-trial intervals; rats
were faster to initiate a trial when the previous outcome was more aversive. This
finding could simply be attributed to the time spent consuming the sucrose pellet
hence increased inter-trial intervals following rewarded trials. There was no evidence
to suggest that the pre-test reward and punisher experience had an overall influence
on self-determined inter-trial interval; the constant parameter in the model of self-
determined inter-trial intervals which characterised the overall speed of trial initiation
for each test session did not vary depending on pre-test experience suggesting that
there was no detectable effect of the reward and punisher pre-treatments on latency
to initiate trials.
In contrast to the model of judgement bias, the estimate of relative sensitivity to
rewards and punishers in the model of self-determined inter-trial intervals suggested
that rats were overall more sensitive to punishers than rewards. More specifically,
given the structure of the model this finding indicates that experiencing an air-puff
on the previous trial had a greater impact than sucrose on self-determined inter-trial
intervals than the delivery of sucrose. This tended to be more pronounced in the loss
condition. Although the reasons for this are unclear, it could speculatively reflect dif-
ferences in the influence of potential and actual rewards on behaviour. The parameter
in the model of judgement bias task reflected sensitivity to potential rewards and pun-
ishers, whereas in the model of inter-trial interval the parameter reflected sensitivity
to recently experienced rewards and punishers.
One could argue that pre-test sucrose consumption could lead to satiation and
accordingly a reduction of sucrose valuation which would result in risk-averse decision-
making independent of changes in affect. However, although satiation could provide
a partial explanation for our results, rats will consume far more sucrose pellets within
a similar time period given free availability (Jones et al., 2018). Moreover, if satiation
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did underlie our results it might be expected that rats would be more risk-averse as
the session progressed and more sucrose was consumed, but our analysis found no
time-dependent changes in judgement bias. Satiation would also not explain why the
observed difference was between rats that had experienced the high and low rewards
and punishers and also between rats that had experienced sucrose compared with air-
puffs, as opposed to following the delivery of sucrose at a high frequency compared
with all other pre-test reward and punisher conditions.
5.5 Conclusions
In summary, we found that (1) individuals were not more risk-seeking in the judge-
ment bias task following reward compared with punisher experience but instead were
more risk-averse; (2) this effect was dependent on reward and punisher prevalence
with a greater effect found between rats that experienced the high compared to low
prevalence rewards and punishers; (3) it was also dependent on the extent to which
the modality of the rewards and punishers experienced matched that of the potential
outcome of the decision, with a greater effect observed when the pre-test reward and
punisher modality matched the within-test reward and punisher modality; (4) the
observed judgement bias was found to result from a greater weighting of punishers
relative to rewards of rats with prior experience of rewards compared with punish-
ers as demonstrated by the results of the progressive ratio lever pressing task and
model-dependent analysis; (5) the pre-test reward and punisher experience was not
found to alter self-determined inter-trial intervals; however (6) vigour within the test
session was modulated by the most recent outcome. The affective state induced by
the manipulation is therefore unclear. The rats in the sucrose condition could have
experienced a relatively positive affective state compared with the rats in the air-
puff condition, with the observed shift in judgement bias reflecting an uncommon but
nonetheless observed affect-related change in the subjective valuation of rewards or
punishers. However, it is also possible that the contrast between the manipulation
and test environment induced a relatively negative affective state in the rats that had
experienced pre-test sucrose compared to pre-test air-puffs. This would suggest that
affect not only depends on prior experience but also the context of such experience.
This study therefore highlights that caution should be taken when interpreting risk-
aversion as an indicator of relatively negative affect and relatively poor welfare in
the judgement bias task. Although we can conclude that prior experience is a key
determinant of vigour and decision-making, in future studies it will be important to




How does fluctuating reward
magnitude influence rat judgement
bias?
Chapter summary: It is common for affect manipulations to
be conducted prior to behavioural tasks which attempt to mea-
sure the resulting affective state. However, interpretation of re-
sults using this methodology may be complicated by several con-
founding factors such as contrast effects or the affective impact
of the behavioural task itself. To permit a better understand-
ing of the relationship between reward and punisher experience,
considered to govern affective state, and decision-making in rats,
we conducted a judgement bias task in which we manipulated re-
ward experience within testing by varying the volume of the po-
tential apple juice reward on each trial. However, we encountered
challenges in training rats on our novel variant of the judgment
bias task and only four out of twenty rats completed the test ses-
sion. Yet, even with this small sample size, we found that reward
and punisher experience did influence behaviour. Rats were more
likely to execute the risky action and were faster to initiate trials
when they had learnt that the magnitude of apple juice received
would be greater. Additionally, rats (although only one indi-
vidual significantly) were more risk-seeking when they had been
more successful on the task, which according the computational
analysis specifically influenced decision-making via an increased
reward sensitivity. Thus, while this study suggests that reward
and punisher experience determines judgement bias in rats, fur-
ther studies with a larger sample size will be required before more
solid conclusions can be drawn.
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6.1 Introduction
Investigating the relationship between affect and cognition typically involves conduct-
ing an affect manipulation prior to testing on a behavioural task, such as the judge-
ment bias task. However, the task itself, or indeed the contrast between the affect
manipulation and the task, might alter the subject’s affective state and complicate
interpretation of results. This could potentially explain some of the null or negative
results from judgement bias studies (e.g. Briefer and McElligott, 2013; Burman et al.,
2011; Doyle et al., 2010), including the finding that rats are more risk-seeking following
experience of punishers compared to rewards (Chapter 5). Hence, there is a need for a
better understanding of how within-test experience might influence decision-making,
and also for methods of inducing negative or positive affective states during the test
session.
Affect is proposed to reflect an individual’s experience of rewards and punish-
ers (Eldar et al., 2016; Mendl et al., 2010; Nettle, 2008). This is supported by the
findings of Chapters 3 and 4 which demonstrated that the average earning rate influ-
enced subjectively reported affective valence in humans, although other studies have
suggested that the difference between an actual outcome and the expected outcome
determines subjective affective valence (Rutledge et al., 2014). Additionally, using
computational modelling as described in Chapters 3 and 4, we found that decision-
making depended on how predictable recent outcomes had been, and that the extent
to which predictability modulated decision-making was associated with affective va-
lence. Examining the influence of within-test reward and punisher experience might
therefore be a useful means of elucidating the relationship between reward and pun-
isher experience and cognition. Moreover, parameters extracted from judgement bias
data using a task using computational modelling could provide a useful and more
reliable measure of affective valence.
In this study, we adapted the automated judgement bias task for rats described
by Jones et al. (2018) to allow within-test variation of reward magnitude. Specifically,
following the human judgement bias task described in Chapter 4, we varied the re-
ward (also apple juice in this study) magnitude according to a noisy sine wave. The
choice data from this task was analysed according to our novel model of judgement
bias (Chapters 3 and 4) to assess the influence of reward and punisher experience
on the putative processes underlying decision-making, namely reward and punisher
sensitivity and prior beliefs about the reward and punisher. We hypothesised that
rats would be more likely to make the risky response when the potential juice reward






Subjects were 20 male Lister Hooded rats (Charles River, Margate, UK), aged c.9
weeks of age when training commenced. Rats were housed in pairs in cages measur-
ing 560x340x190mm under a 12-hour reversed light-dark cycle (lights on 1900-0700).
Cages contained sawdust substrate, shredded paper bedding as well as a number of
enrichment items including a cardboard nest box, a plastic tube attached to the cage
lid, a cardboard tube, and an aspen block. Food (LabDiet) and water were available
ad libitum and rats were not food or water restricted prior to training or testing. All
rats were checked regularly for any health issues, and the work was conducted un-
der University of Bristol Investigation Number UB/16/004 following approval by the
Bristol University Animal Welfare and Ethics Review Body. All rats were rehomed
as pets on completion of the study.
6.2.2 Apparatus (see Fig. 6.1)
Training and testing were conducted in a shuttle box (508×254×305mm) placed in
a sound isolation chamber. The box was divided in half by a metal panel and only
one half (254×254×305mm) was used throughout the entire study. A custom-made
trough (Faculty of Engineering, University of Bristol) was located centrally on the end
wall. An opening (32×40×35mm) which was 35mm above the floor allowed access to
the trough from the shuttle box. Syringe pumps controlled the delivery of apple juice
(Morrisons, West Yorkshire, UK; Apple Juice from Concentrate) to these troughs.
A stainless steel tube was inserted through a hole in the side wall of the trough
and was connected to a pump-controlled syringe via PVC tubing. All hardware was
manufactured by Coulbourn Instruments (Allentown, PA, USA), and operated by
their Graphic State (v4) software.
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Figure 6.1: The shuttle box within a sound isolation chamber used
for the judgement bias task; there is a syringe pump connected to the
trough on the end wall via PVC tubing.
6.2.3 Training
Following Jones et al. (2018), rats were trained to ‘stay’ in a trough following pre-
sentation of a tone (either 2Khz or 8khz) to obtain a food reward, and to leave the
trough (‘go’) following presentation of the alternate tone (either 2Khz or 8khz) to
avoid a punisher. Hence, there is a safe response (‘go’) and a risky response (‘stay’).
In human versions of this task, subjects are informed of the potential reward and pun-
isher magnitude prior to testing. To parallel this in the rat task, the amplitude of the
tone varied according to the magnitude of the potential reward; higher amplitudes
signalled a greater reward magnitude. Use of a liquid reward allowed fine-grained
variation in reward magnitude (i.e. volume delivered) and we opted to use apple
juice as the reward as we considered that sucrose solution would be too viscous and
would create difficulties in cleaning the equipment. We verified that rats found apple
juice rewarding and assessed the quantities they would consume in a pilot study. Due
to equipment constraints, in particular that we could not vary the strength (psi) of
air-puff on a trial-by-trial basis, the magnitude of the air-puff could not be varied
within-testing but instead was fixed at 40psi. However, the amplitude of the negative
tone was varied so that amplitude did not provide information about the potential
outcome.
Rats were first habituated to the training shuttle boxes. This involved two 15
minutes sessions on consecutive days in which rats were placed in the shuttle box
with no trough, on the first day each rat was accompanied by their cagemate and on
the second day they were placed in the shuttle box on their own. Rats then completed
one training session of 30-minute duration every weekday until they met the criterion
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to progress to testing. Rats first underwent positive training in which they learnt
to associate the positive tone with apple juice, the volume of which depended on
the amplitude of tone (0.02 ml for the low amplitude tones and 0.1ml for the high
amplitude tones), and to stay in the trough for increasing durations to receive this
apple juice. In this phase, the high amplitude positive tone was presented on 33% of
trough visits, the positive low amplitude tone was presented 33% of trough visits, and
on the remaining 33% of visits no tone was presented (null tone). The order of these
trials was randomised.
Rats were first trained to keep their snout in the trough for 20ms (Stage=p1) to
receive the apple juice. If the rat visited the trough at least 40 times, stayed in the
trough for the required time on 62.5% of trials in which the positive tone was presented,
and completed at least two sessions, the required stay duration between trough entry
and juice delivery was increased to 0.75s (Stage=p2). If the same criteria were met in
this stage, the duration was increased to 1.5s (Stage=p3). An individual progressed
to final stage of positive training according to the same criteria. In comparison to
previous studies using this methodology, rats were required to keep their snout in
the trough for 2s to receive apple juice during the final stage of positive training
(Stage=p4). The purpose of this stage was to ensure that rats would wait for 2s to
obtain the low volumes of juice. Rats progressed to discrimination training following
the same criterion as before; 62.5% accuracy for each tone and at least 40 trials
completed in a session, although were only required to complete one session of this
stage.
Discrimination training involved training rats to ‘stay’ in response to the positive
tones to obtain apple juice and to ‘go’ in response to the negative tones to avoid an
air-puff. The positive and negative tone was counterbalanced across individuals. In
the first stage of discrimination training (Stage=d1), the positive tone was presented
on 50% of trials (25% high and low), negative tones on 25% of trials (12.5% high and
low), and null tones on 25% of trials. The order of tone presentation was randomised.
To progress to the next stage of discrimination training (Stage=d2), an individual
was required to visit the trough at least 60 times within a session, make the correct
response on 62.5% of visits for both the negative and positive tones, and have com-
pleted at least two sessions at this stage of training. In the second and final stage of
discrimination training, the positive and negative tone were presented on 46% of trials
each (23% high and low amplitude) and null tone on 8% of trials. If rats met the same
criteria described above, they progressed to judgement bias testing. If any individual
performed poorly (<50% accuracy) for four consecutive days, they returned to the
previous stage of training.
However, few rats learnt to discriminate between the positive and negative tone,
which was particularly apparent for the low amplitude tones. Hence, from the fourth
week of training onwards, rats were only trained on the high amplitude tones. Despite
this, we continued to have difficulties training rats and so reduced the strength of the
air-puff to 20psi for poorly performing rats.
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6.2.4 Testing
During the test session, in addition to the reference tones used in testing, rats were
also presented with four different probe tones (2.639kHz, 3.482kHz, 4.595kHz, and
6.063kHz). The order of the tone presentation was randomised but identical for all
rats. Tones which were perceptually closest to the positive reference tone were re-
warded if the ‘stay’ response was made and tones which were perceptually closest to
the negative tone were punished if the ‘stay’ response was made, nothing was received
following a ‘go’ response. The volume of apple juice delivered for correct stay re-
sponses was pre-determined according to a noisy sine wave with mean=0.118ml and
standard deviation=0.027ml, between a minimum volume of 0.067ml and maximum
volume of 0.150ml (Fig. 6.2). There were 90 trials and each tone was presented 15
times each. If a rat did not complete sufficient trials within a test session (<50%
trials completed), they returned to training for at least two consecutive days before



















Figure 6.2: Offered volume of apple juice on each trial of the judge-
ment bias task
6.2.5 Model-dependent analysis
The model-dependent analysis assessed the key hypothesis of this study; to investigate
the cognitive processes underlying judgement bias, and how these relate to reward
and punisher experience. In particular, we modelled judgement bias choice data as
a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP), as described in Chapters
3 and 4. Briefly, the model considers each rat to occupy a belief state that depends
on the objective time and observations of the stimulus up to that time. Each belief
state has a value that is defined by the likely transitions from that state given the
current state, the potential reward and punisher, and state-dependent probability of
the reward and punisher. The state value determines the probability that an individual
will make either response upon reaching the state according to a softmax function. We
can then compute the probability that a rat makes the ‘go’ response by considering
both the probability that they transition to any state given the presented stimulus
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and the probability of making the ‘go’ response in those states. In contrast to human
participants who know the potential value of the reward and punisher, rats must
learn the value of the potential reward according to experience. We consider that
rats update their expected value of the reward (learnt reward; an average reward
rate) following each delivered reward according to the Rescorla-Wagner learning rule
(Rescorla et al., 1972) with learning rate (α). The prediction error (wPEn−1) and
average earning rate (R̄n−1) also depend on previous outcomes as previously described
in Chapter 3; the prediction error is the difference between the outcome and the model-
determined stimulus-dependent predicted outcome (which fit the data better than
when modelled using the prediction formed prior to stimulus onset, ∆AIC=56.726).
The average earning rate (R̄n−1) is updated following each outcome according to the
Rescorla-Wagner learning rule, and in contrast to the learnt reward also includes both
punishing and null outcomes. In the model, biases in decision-making arise through
an altered reward sensitivity, loss sensitivity, or the prior belief that the trial will be
rewarded. The model assumes that R̄n−1, wPEn−1, wPE2n−1, and On−1 influence CR,

















































In addition to these parameters, the following parameter were also assessed for
their contribution to the model fit: σ which accounts for the rats’ ability to dis-
criminate between the tones, a lapse rate (λ) which accounts for stimulus indepen-
dent errors, a joint learning rate for the average earning rate and average reward
rate (α), and a forgetting factor for the weighted prediction error (γ). We took a
stepwise approach to model fitting, and compared the goodness of fit of the models
according to their AIC values. Model-fitting was carried out using the computa-
tional facilities of the Advanced Computing Research Centre, University of Bristol -
http://www.bris.ac.uk/acrc/, as described in Chapter 3.
6.2.6 Statistical analysis
Data were analysed using generalised linear mixed models (GLMMs) using the R (R
Core Team, 2017) packages lme4 (Bates et al., 2015) and nlme (Pinheiro et al., 2018).
All GLMMs included a random effect of subject.
Data from training sessions were analysed to assess progression and the factors
influencing progression. We modelled the number of trials completed in each test
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session from the stage of training (i.e. p1, p2, p3, p4, d1, and d2). Additionally,
accuracy in the positive phase of training (i.e. p1:p4) was modelled from training
stage and tone amplitude, accuracy in the first stage of discrimination training (d1,
prior to removal of the low amplitude tones) from tone frequency and tone amplitude,
and accuracy across discrimination training (i.e. d1 and d2) from stage and tone
frequency. To make post-hoc comparisons of factor levels that were significant, we
used Tukey’s Honest Significant Difference (HSD) test using the R package multcomp
(Hothorn et al., 2008). The statistical analysis of training data allowed us to assess
the rats performance during training, to allow a better understanding of how training
could be improved in future.
We also analysed both judgement bias (the binary decision to ‘stay’ or ‘go’) and
the self-determined inter-trial intervals (the time between the end of one trial and
initiation of the next trial). In the GLMM of judgement bias, fixed effects included
the learnt reward (derived from the model-dependent analysis), the number of trials
completed, and the stimulus presented. The GLMM of self-determined inter-trial
interval also included the number of trials completed and the learnt reward, and
also included R̄n−1, On−1, wPEn−1, and wPE2n−1 (derived from the model-dependent
analysis). To avoid issues of multicollinearity, On−1, wPEn−1, and wPE2n−1 were not
included in the same model but instead separate models including each variable were
compared according to their AIC value. The best fitting model included the squared
prediction error (∆AIC=5.158, comparing saturated model containing wPE2n−1 and
not wPE2n−1 or On−1 with the next best-fitting saturated model which contained On−1
but not wPEn−1 or wPE2n−1). The statistical analysis of judgement bias data allowed
us to assess the extent to which rats attended to the fluctuating reward, the extent
to which they discriminated between the tones, and the effect of number of trials
completed on judgement bias. The statistical analysis of self-determined inter-trial
intervals allowed us to assess whether there were time and reward volume dependent
changes in motivation to obtain juice.
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Training
Training of the rats during the positive phase was comparable to that described in
both Jones et al. (2018) and Chapter 5; rats completed the first stage of positive train-
ing (p1) in 2.350±0.150 sessions (mean± SE), the second stage (p2) in 2.250±0.315
sessions, the third stage (p3) in 2.000±0.000 sessions, and the final stage (p4) in
2.368±0.738 sessions. All 20 rats completed positive training. The number of train-
ing sessions required before rats (who did meet the progression criterion) reached
criterion in discrimination training was also comparable; rats progressed from the
first to second stage of discrimination in an average of 7.643±1.112 sessions and from
the second phase of discrimination to testing in 7.500±1.648 sessions. However, the
proportion of rats who failed to reach criterion was much greater that described in
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both Jones et al. (2018) and Chapter 5, with only 15 rats (75%) completing the first
stage of discrimination training (five did not progress due to both insufficient trials
and inaccuracy) and only six (30%) progressing to testing (five did not progress due
to insufficient trials only, three due to both insufficient trials and inaccuracy, and one
due to inaccuracy). Although six rats progressed to testing, only four completed a
sufficient number of trials for their data to be analysed.
Training stage was a significant predictor of accuracy in the positive training phase
(Fig. 6.3: LRT=103.812, p<0.001). More specifically, accuracy decreased significantly
across consecutive stages except between p3 and p4 (Table 6.1). Accuracy did not
differ significantly between the high and low amplitude tones (LRT=0.841, p=0.359),
and there was no significant interaction between training stage and tone amplitude
(LRT=3.633, p=0.304).
Table 6.1: z-values and p-values from the post-hoc contrast analy-
sis of the influence of training stage on accuracy during the positive
training phase
Contrast z-value p-value
p2 vs. p1 -3.232 0.007
p3 vs. p1 -10.211 <0.001
p4 vs. p1 -7.074 <0.001
p3 vs. p2 -5.588 <0.001
p4 vs. p2 -3.703 0.001
p4 vs. p3 1.233 0.603
In the first stage of discrimination training (only considering data prior to the
removal of the low amplitude tones) rats were both less accurate following presenta-
tion of the positive tones compared to the negative tones (Fig. 6.3: LRT=140.777,
p<0.001) and also following presentation of the low amplitude tones compared to the
high amplitude tones (Fig. 6.3: LRT=106.760, p<0.001). Furthermore, there was
a significant interaction between tone amplitude and tone frequency (LRT=18.821,
p<0.001). Post-hoc analysis revealed that rats had the greatest accuracy when the
high amplitude negative tone was presented, the lowest accuracy when the low ampli-
tude positive tone was presented, and there was no significant difference in accuracy
following presentations of the low amplitude negative tone and high amplitude positive
tone (Table 6.2).
Rats had a greater accuracy in the second stage of discrimination training com-
pared with the first stage (Fig. 6.3: LRT=49.011, p<0.001), and also following pre-
sentation of negative tones compared to positive tones (Fig. 6.3: LRT=190.103,
p<0.001). There was no significant interaction between stage and tone frequency
(LRT=1.889, p=0.169).
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Table 6.2: z-values and p-values from the post-hoc contrast analysis
of the interaction between amplitude and valence on accuracy during
the first stage of discrimination training
Contrast z-value p-value
Low -ve vs. high -ve -4.874 <0.001
High +ve vs. high -ve -8.593 <0.001
Low +ve vs. high -ve -17.969 <0.001
High +ve vs. low -ve -1.864 0.24
Low +ve vs. low -ve -11.077 <0.001









































































Figure 6.3: Mean proportion of accurate responses to presented stim-
uli split by tone and amplitude in each stage of training
The number of trials initiated varied significantly depending of the stage of training
(Fig. 6.4: LRT=113.021, p<0.001). This was driven by an increase in the number of
trials initiated in the final three stages of positive training, compared with the first








































































Figure 6.4: Mean number of accurate trials completed in each stage
of training
Table 6.3: z-values and p-values from the post-hoc analysis of the
influence of training stage on number of trials completed
Contrast z-value p-value
d2 - d1 -0.561 0.993
p1 - d1 0.543 0.994
p2 - d1 6.801 <0.001
p3 - d1 6.684 <0.001
p4 - d1 5.945 <0.001
p1 - d2 1.018 0.908
p2 - d2 7.021 <0.001
p3 - d2 6.862 <0.001
p4 - d2 6.209 <0.001
p2 - p1 6.32 <0.001
p3 - p1 6.079 <0.001
p4 - p1 5.476 <0.001
p3 - p2 -1.381 0.73
p4 - p2 -0.231 0.999
p4 - p3 1.016 0.909
6.3.2 Testing
The model-dependent analysis revealed that the best fit model included the following
parameters: σ, βCR0 , β
CR
R̄
(Table 6.4, Fig. 6.5). A variable joint learning rate for
143
Chapter 6. How does fluctuating reward magnitude influence rat judgement bias?
the average reward rate and average earning rate α was found to improve model fit
(∆AIC=55.011). The model derived probability of making a ‘stay’ response was found
to be a strongly significant predictor of the observed response when analysed using a
binomial GLMM with a random effect of subject (Fig. 6.6: LRT=186, p<0.001)
Table 6.4: ∆AIC values for computational models of judgement bias
choice data: comparing the AIC value for each model with the AIC
value of the best model
Model Parameters ∆AIC





σ, βCR0 , β
CR
wPE 9.486
σ, βCR0 , β
CR
wPE2 20.239




σ, βω0 , βωwPE2 171.623
σ, βω0 , βωwPE 172.568
σ, βω0 , βωOn−1 172.818
σ, βω0 176.081
σ, βω0 , βωR̄ 180.054













































Figure 6.5: The mean proportion of ‘stay’ responses from the model-
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Figure 6.6: The proportion of ‘stay’ responses for intervals of model-
derived probabilities of executing the ‘stay’ response
As the sample size (four rats) was insufficient to run statistical tests as in Chapters
3 and 4, we instead computed a 95% confidence interval for each parameter estimate
as follows:
Upper 95% limit = p+ 1.96
√
φ−1 (6.4)
Lower 95% limit = p− 1.96
√
φ−1 (6.5)
where φ−1 is the inverse hessian around parameter estimate (p) obtained from the
model fitting procedure.
Although all estimates of βCR0 were positive, indicative of a greater sensitivity to
the apple juice relative to the true volume of juice, this was not reliable for any of
the rats (Table 6.5). Similarly, although estimates of βCR were all greater than zero,
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indicative of a greater reward sensitivity when the average earning rate was higher,
this was reliable in only one of the four rats (Table 6.5). The mean (±SE) value of α
was 0.130±0.100.
Table 6.5: Parameter estimates of βCR0 and β
CR
R̄
for each rat with
the upper and lower 95% confidence intervals from the computational
model of judgement bias choice data
Parameter Rat Estimate Lower 95% CI Upper 95% CI
βCR0 1 1.2843 -5.269 7.837
2 0.9855 -2.279 4.250
3 1.6659 -291.132 294.463
4 0.4438 -0.041 0.929
βCR
R̄
1 0.4184 -4.058 4.894
2 0.0067 -2.310 2.323
3 0.0181 -30.066 30.102
4 4.1085 1.430 6.787
The stimulus was a significant predictor of judgement bias, indicating that rats
did learn to discriminate between the tone frequencies (LRT=131.452, p<0.001).
The learnt reward was also a significant predictor of judgement bias (Fig. 6.7:
LRT=14.687, p<0.001); rats were more risk-seeking when the learnt reward was


























Figure 6.7: Mean proportion of ‘stay’ responses for each presented
stimulus when the learnt reward was greater than and less than the
median value. Error bars represent one standard error
Rats were faster to initiate trials when the learnt reward was higher (LRT=4.364,
p=0.037) and when wPE2n−1 (squared weighted prediction error) was lower
(LRT=7.182, p=0.007). R̄n−1 (the average earning rate; LRT=0.075, p=0.785) and
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number of trials completed (LRT=1.708, p=0.191) did not significantly influence the
self-determined inter-trial interval.
6.4 Discussion
The aim of this study was to develop a variant of the automated judgement bias task
for rats in which reward availability varied across testing, allowing us to investigate
how within-test fluctuations in reward magnitude, assumed to influence affective state,
altered decision-making behaviour. To achieve this, we rewarded rats with apple juice
and varied the volume delivered for correct ‘stay’ responses according to a noisy sine
wave across judgement bias testing.
Unfortunately, few rats met the progression criteria for testing. Analysis of the
training data indicated that problems arose when the negative tone was introduced,
and that there were particular issues with the low amplitude and positive tones.
Overall, rats were better at making the ‘go’ response for the negative tone than the
‘stay’ response for the positive tone. This suggests that following the introduction of
the air-puff, the apple juice, in particular the very small volume delivered following
the low amplitude tone, may have been insufficiently rewarding such that rats were
unwilling to risk an air-puff to obtain it. This could perhaps be solved with food or
water restriction, or using an alternate liquid that may be more rewarding without
leading to satiation, for example sucrose solution could be a potential alternative
reward (if potential issues of equipment cleaning were solved).
Rats were also less accurate at the low amplitude tone for both the positive and
negative tones. This could indicate that it is more difficult for rats to determine the
frequency of the tone at low amplitudes, given the lower signal to noise ratio, leading to
uncertainty about whether a reward or punisher would be delivered and hence leaving
them unable to learn the correct response. However, although a high proportion of rats
were able to learn the discrimination following removal of the low amplitude tones,
few rats met the criterion to progress to testing. This might reflect that negative
tones were more frequently presented in the second stage of discrimination training,
resulting in an increased unwillingness to initiate trials.
However, the rats that progressed to testing demonstrated that they were attend-
ing to within-test reward experience and modulating their behaviour accordingly. Rats
were more likely to make the risky ‘stay’ response when they had learnt that juice
availability was higher. Thus, consistent with results from the human version of the
task and theoretical work (Bernoulli, 1954; Daston, 1980; Ore, 1960; Stearns, 2000;
Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953), the expected value of the trial is an important
determinant of the response made.
The model-dependent analysis suggested that judgement bias was modulated by
the average earning rate. However, although the parameter estimates were associated
with greater reward sensitivity and hence greater risk-seeking when the average earn-
ing rate was higher, this was only reliable for one of the four rats. Further research
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with a larger sample size should be conducted to assess the extent to which a high
average earning rate induces a relatively positive judgement bias in rats. Importantly,
in humans (see Chapter 3 and 4), a higher average earning rate was associated with
more positive affective valence. Although we cannot conclusively determine whether
rats subjectively experience positive or negative affective states, we can state that the
aspects of reward experience that modulate momentary subjective affective valence in
humans also inform decision-making in rats.
In accordance with the results of the human task using juice rewards (Chapter 4),
the extent of the judgement bias could be attributed to variation in reward sensitivity.
Although the model-estimated parameters reflected that rats valued the juice more
highly than expected given the true volume of the juice, which here is perhaps self-
selecting (i.e. only the rats that strongly valued the juice were sufficiently motivated
to learn the discrimination and complete trials, and so meet the progression criteria
for testing), this was not reliable in any of the four rats.
The results of the analysis of inter-trial interval data was also comparable to the
results of the human primary reward and punisher judgement bias study (Chapter 4).
Rats (and humans) were slower to initiate trials when recent outcomes had been less
predictable. This might reflect that individuals take time to consolidate new informa-
tion or to seek additional cues that may aid the reduction of future unpredictability.
The learnt reward, essentially an average reward rate which differs from the average
earning rate in that it only tracks rewards and not null or punishing outcomes, also
influenced the self-determined inter-trial interval. Rats were faster to initiate trials
when they had learnt that the magnitude of the available reward was greater, perhaps
allowing them to capitalise on highly rewarding periods of the test sessions (Beierholm
et al., 2013; Niv et al., 2007).
6.5 Conclusions (see Fig. 6.8)
Although it is clear that our novel variant of the judgement bias task could be used
to investigate the influence of reward experience on decision-making without the com-
plexities of manipulating experience prior to testing, there are methodological issues
that must be first addressed. Alternate liquid rewards should be sought which have a
greater incentive salience than apple juice. Yet, despite the problems during training,
the results from the rats who progressed to testing were promising. In particular, we
demonstrated that reward and punisher experience does modulate judgement bias and
vigour. It would therefore be worthwhile to attempt to remedy the methodological
issues and repeat this study.
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Figure 6.8: Diagrammatic summary of the results of Chapter 6: the
nodes represent variables relating to affect, decision-making (where
CL denotes loss/punisher sensitivity, CR denotes reward sensitivity, ω
denotes the prior belief about outcomes, and JB denotes judgement
bias), experience (where wPE denotes the weighted reward prediction
error, wPE2 denotes the squared weighted reward prediction error,
and R̄ denotes the average earning/reward rate), and vigour, the lines




Affective state and exploratory
behaviour in rats
Chapter summary: Negative affective states in humans (par-
ticularly depression) have been shown to alter exploratory be-
haviour. Here, we assess how exploration might relate to affect
in rats and whether a task which measures exploration could
provide a novel measure of affect that requires less training than
the judgement bias task. The task developed in this study re-
quired rats to choose between persevering with a depleting food
source or forgoing a food reward to move to a new food source.
Data were analysed using a computational model based on the
marginal value theorem which considered the optimality of ex-
ploration relative to exploitation, and using a model-agnostic
statistical analysis. We found that rats in a putative negative
affective state, induced by the removal of enrichment from the
homecage, stayed at the depleting food source for fewer consec-
utive trials (greater exploration) and completed fewer trials in
a test session. The computational analysis revealed that follow-
ing the removal of enrichment rats exhibited a reduced rate of
learning and increased stochasticity in decision-making. How-
ever, equipment failure reduced the sample size of this study to
six rats and so further studies will be required before conclusions
can be drawn about the suitability and reliability of this task as
a measure of affect in non-human animals.
7.1 Introduction
It is self-evident that successful foraging is vital to survival. However, food sources are
typically not replenished at the same rate at which they are consumed. This leaves
organisms with a predicament: to persist with a depleting resource or to expend energy
searching for a more abundant food source. The marginal value theorem (MVT)
describes a solution to this dilemma of whether to explore or exploit by stating that
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it is optimal to move to a new food source when the instantaneous payoff rate for
the resource drops below the average payoff rate in the environment (Charnov et al.,
1976). There is evidence that foraging behaviour in a wide range of species, including
screaming hairy armadillos (Chaetophractus vellerosus; Cassini et al., 1990), guinea
pigs (Cavia porcellus; Cassini et al., 1990), and starlings (Sturnus vulgaris; Vasquez
and Kacelnik, 2000), adheres to the MVT.
However, while in general animals might appear to behave optimally, there is vari-
ation in foraging behaviour between individuals of the same species (Nonacs, 2001).
One factor that has been proposed to underlie this variation around optimality in
humans is a person’s affective state through its impact on decision-making. The ex-
plore/exploit trade-off has most commonly been investigated using variants of the
n-armed bandit task in which individuals must choose between a fixed number of op-
tions with non-stationary reward values. For example, using this task Blanco et al.
(2013) found that humans with depressive symptoms were more exploratory than those
without depressive symptoms. However, Blanco et al. (2013) defined exploration as an
action which differed from that of an ideal actor, which contrasts with the exploration
we describe in this paper. We consider that exploration may be optimal or suboptimal
and simply reflects opting to move to new food source as opposed to continuing to
harvest the current food source. Exploration on the bandit task in humans has been
shown to increase concurrently with depressive anhedonia (Harlé et al., 2017). How-
ever, decreased exploration in the bandit task has also been associated with negative
affect. For example, stress, as measured by changes in cortisol levels following a stres-
sor and self-reported stress, has been correlated with reduced exploration in humans
(Lenow et al., 2017). Yet, with the exception of the explore/exploit task described
by Lenow et al. (2017), these n-armed bandit tasks are typically not conducted in a
foraging context which would be considered ecologically relevant or to which the MVT
would potentially apply. Specifically, consecutive harvests from same food source do
not necessarily deplete food availability at that source, which is perhaps unusual in
the natural world. Studying exploitation and exploration using tasks which are more
ecologically relevant may allow a better understanding the evolutionary significance
of affect-induced changes in exploitation and exploration (Scholl and Klein-Flügge,
2018).
Variation in learning and reward sensitivity have been proposed to underlie dif-
ferences in behaviour exhibited by clinically healthy humans and those with mood
disorders (Addicott et al., 2017; Huys et al., 2013; Scholl and Klein-Flügge, 2018).
It is well established that depression is associated with a reduced reward sensitivity
(Bylsma et al., 2008; Huys et al., 2013). Moreover, anhedonia is one of the diagnos-
tic criterion for depression (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Computational
modelling can provide insights into the cognitive processes underlying exploratory be-
haviour and allows the influence of learning and reward sensitivity on decision-making
to be disentangled. Most commonly, computational models of bandit task data have
assumed that exploration is undirected; exploration is random and results from noise
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in the decision-process such as the stochasticity generated by a softmax function. In
terms of exploratory behaviour, a reduced reward sensitivity may result in an individ-
ual making decisions that are more weakly determined by the value of the potential
outcomes. This would result in more stochastic decision-making (parameterised as
‘inverse temperature’ in a softmax function) and consequently greater exploration,
particularly in the context where exploitation is optimal (Addicott et al., 2017; Scholl
and Klein-Flügge, 2018). Human behavioural studies analysed using computational
modelling have found that estimates of parameter characterising reward sensitivity
(i.e. inverse temperature) correlate with depressive symptoms (Harlé et al., 2017;
Huys et al., 2013), although null results are sometimes observed (Chung et al., 2017;
Gradin et al., 2011).
It has also been hypothesised that depression impairs learning, and meta-analyses
have concluded that depression is associated with cognitive deficits (Bora et al., 2013;
Lee et al., 2012; McDermott and Ebmeier, 2009; Rock et al., 2014). Optimal foraging
behaviour relies on the accurate estimation of food availability both at a specific patch
and generally in environment which has to be learnt through prior experience. Hence,
exploratory behaviour might be influenced by the ability of an individual to learn
about the condition of their environment. The extent to which an individual learns
from recent rewards or punishers following experience is parameterised as a learning
rate. There is conflicting evidence from computational analyses as to whether or not
depression is associated with a reduced learning rate. While a number of studies have
identified a reduced learning rate in depressed humans (Chase et al., 2010; Dombrovski
et al., 2013), several have found no evidence for an affect-dependent learning rate
in humans (Dombrovski et al., 2010; Gradin et al., 2011; Huys et al., 2013). An
alternative hypothesis is that individuals experiencing negative affective states are
less able to modulate their learning rate in accordance with environmental volatility,
and there is evidence to suggest that anxious individuals are impaired in their ability
to do so (Browning et al., 2015).
The role of affect in altering explore-exploit decisions has received little attention
to date in non-human animals. Here we seek to investigate this to establish whether
there is evidence that affect manipulations alter decision processes in ways that show
parallels to findings in humans. An important additional outcome of this study will
be to establish whether decision-making in explore-exploit tasks can thus act as proxy
indicators of affect and hence be a useful measure of animal affect with a relatively
short training period.
To achieve this, we translated the human bandit task described by Constantino
and Daw (2015), in which rewards depleted with multiple visits to the same source,
to rats. Given the definition that negative affect is induced by the presence of pun-
ishers (anxiety-like states) or absence or removal of rewards (depression-like states;
Mendl et al., 2010; Rolls, 2013), enrichment items were temporarily removed from the
rats’ housing to induce a negative (specifically depressed) affective state. There is a
wealth of evidence to suggest that enrichment items are rewarding to rats (Brydges
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et al., 2011; Burman et al., 2008a; Patterson-Kane et al., 2001; Van der Harst et al.,
2003). The rats completed the bandit task before, after, and during this period of
unenrichment. Subsequently, we used computational modelling to characterise be-
haviour according to three parameters selected because of their relevance in human
studies: a learning rate; inverse temperature parameter; and an initial estimate of
the average reward rate. We hypothesised that the removal of enrichment would lead
to a depression-like state and blunting of reward sensitivity, and result in increased
exploration (i.e. a higher inverse temperature parameter); see Fig. 7.1. To further as-
sess this hypothesis, we assessed whether the number of trials completed and volume
of juice consumed during the bandit task, as a proxy of motivation to obtain food
rewards, differed between test sessions, with the prediction that fewer trials would be
completed and lower volumes of juice would be consumed in the unenriched period.
Given the conflicting evidence from previous research, we were agnostic as to whether























Figure 7.1: Diagrammatic summary of predictions: (A) High lev-
els of enrichment would induce a high arousal and positive valenced
affective state (excitement-like), while low levels of enrichment would
induce a low arousal and negatively valenced state (depression-like);
(B) a depression-like state would be associated with blunted reward
sensitivity and high exploration.
7.2 Methods
7.2.1 Subjects
Subjects were 20 male Lister Hooded rats (Charles River, Margate, UK), aged c.18
weeks when training commenced. However, only six rats completed testing as a result
of irreparable equipment failure and time constraints. The rats had taken part in one
behavioural study prior to this experiment. Rats were housed in pairs in cages measur-
ing 560x340x190mm under a 12-hour reversed light-dark cycle (lights on 1900-0700).
Cages contained sawdust substrate, shredded paper bedding as well as enrichment as
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described below. Food (LabDiet) and water were available ad libitum. All rats were
checked regularly for any health issues, and the work was conducted under University
of Bristol Investigation Number UB/16/004 following approval by the Bristol Uni-
versity Animal Welfare and Ethics Review Body. All rats were rehomed as pets on
completion of the study.
7.2.2 Apparatus (see Fig. 7.2)
Training and testing were conducted in a shuttle box (508x254x305mm) placed in
a sound isolation chamber. During the first two stages of training, the box was
divided in half by a metal panel and one half (254×254×305mm) was used for the
training sessions with the other half closed off. The dividing panel was removed
during the final training session and testing. A custom-made trough (Faculty of
Engineering, University of Bristol) was located centrally on each end wall. An opening
(32×40×35mm) which was 35mm above the floor allowed access to the trough from
the shuttle box. Syringe pumps controlled the delivery of apple juice to these troughs.
A stainless steel tube was inserted through a hole in the side wall of the trough and
was connected to the pump-controlled syringe via PVC tubing. All hardware was
manufactured by Coulbourn Instruments (Allentown, PA, USA), and operated by
their Graphic State (v4) software.
Figure 7.2: The shuttle box within a sound isolation chamber used
for the explore-exploit task; there are syringe pumps conducted to a
trough at either end of the box.
7.2.3 Training and testing
The first two training sessions were 15 minutes in duration and all remaining sessions
were 30 minutes in duration. Rats were not food or water restricted prior to training
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or testing. In all sessions, rats initiated trials by placing their snout into the trough
recess. There were three stages of training. The aim of the first stage was to train rats
to associate trough visits with apple juice. This stage comprised two training sessions,
each conducted in separate sides of the shuttle box, in which 0.1ml of apple juice was
delivered 20ms after the rat’s snout entered the trough. The aim of the second stage,
which comprised a minimum of two sessions and was also conducted in separate sides
of the shuttle box, was to train the rat to keep his snout in the trough for one second
to obtain 1ml of juice. To progress to the final training stage, rats had to complete at
least 60 trials and stay in the trough for 1s on significantly more trials than chance, as
determined by a binomial test, for two consecutive training sessions. The aim of the
final training stage was to introduce the rat to the bandit task, which would involve
visiting both troughs. Sessions in the final training stage had the same format as the
test sessions, and to progress to testing rats had to complete at least 20 trials with
at least 5 visits to each trough. Throughout the final training stage and during test
sessions both troughs were available. On the initial visit to each trough, and on visits
where the rat had previously been at the alternate trough, the volume of apple juice
delivered was drawn from a Gaussian distribution with a mean of 0.1ml and a standard
deviation of 0.005ml. The volume of juice delivered reduced on consecutive visits to
the same trough, with the juice reduction determined by a Gaussian distribution with
a mean of -0.01ml and a standard deviation of 0.005ml (excluding values greater than
0). If the rat did not stay in the trough for 1s then no apple juice was delivered but the
juice reward continued to deplete. Following the tenth consecutive visit to a trough,
the volume of juice delivered was determined by a Gaussian distribution with a mean
of 0ml and a standard deviation of 0.005ml which was bounded at zero. Therefore,
in the task rats had to make a choice to stay at the same trough with a depleting
juice supply (‘harvest’) or to forgo juice to move to the other trough (‘switch’). There
were three test sessions in total: the first test session was conducted the day following
the final training session, the second test session was conducted three days following
the removal of enrichment, enrichment items were returned immediately following the
second test session, and the third test session was conducted three days following the
return of the enrichment items. Rats had a practice test session on the day prior to
the unenriched and enrichment-return test session to refamiliarise them with the task.
7.2.4 Environmental manipulation
Unenriched housing has been associated with poor welfare and negative affect in rats
(Brydges et al., 2011; Burman et al., 2008a; Van der Harst et al., 2003), and rats show
a preference for enriched cages (Patterson-Kane et al., 2001). Hence, we manipulated
housing conditions to induce changes in affect. Rats were provided with enrichment
from their time of arrival at the University of Bristol. This comprised an aspen block,
a small cardboard tube, a plastic tube attached to the cage ceiling, and a cardboard
nest box (Fig. 7.3). With the exception of the cardboard tube, all enrichment was
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removed immediately following the first test session (Fig. 7.3), and the enrichment
was returned immediately following the unenriched test session.
(a) (b)
Figure 7.3: Examples of (A) enriched and; (B) unenriched housing
7.2.5 Statistical analysis
The key outcome variables were the decision to ‘harvest’ or ‘switch’ and the number
of trials completed in each session. A generalised linear mixed model (GLMM), using
the R (R Core Team, 2017) packages nlme (Pinheiro et al., 2018) and lme4 (Bates
et al., 2015), which included a random effect of session nested within individual, was
fitted to the binary decision to ‘harvest’ or ‘switch’ with housing type (enriched vs.
unenriched), number of test sessions completed, and volume of juice delivered on the
previous trial as predictor variables. A generalised linear mixed model with a Gaus-
sian error structure and random effect of individual was fitted to the number of trials
completed in each session. Housing type and number of test sessions completed (to
control for potential time or experience dependent effects on behaviour) were pre-
dictor variables in this model. To examine whether the treatment and number of
sessions completed influenced whether rats were willing to wait 1s for the apple juice,
a Gaussian GLMM was also fitted to the proportion of successful harvests in each test
sessions with housing type and number of sessions completed as predictor variables.
The model assumptions were verified and likelihood ratio tests (LRT) were used to as-
sess whether the difference in model deviance was significant when a predictor variable
was removed from the model.
7.2.6 Marginal value theorem model
Following Charnov et al. (1976) and Constantino and Daw (2015), we consider that it
is optimal for an individual to ‘switch’ when the expected reward from an additional
visit is less than the opportunity cost of the time spent harvesting the reward. This
rule for switching can be formalised as:
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π∗ =
switch, if εt+1 − hR̄t < 0harvest, otherwise (7.1)
where εt+1 is the expected reward, R̄t is the average reward rate at time t, and
h is the time taken to harvest the reward at the current trough (1s in this study).
The average reward rate incorporates the time taken to move between food sources;
this was demonstrated by Constantino and Daw (2015). More specifically, the aver-
age reward rate decreases as the time taken to move between food sources increases
(resulting from the increased time spent travelling instead of foraging).
Both εt+1 and R̄t can be defined using a Rescorla-Wagner learning rule (Rescorla
et al., 1972). Specifically, εt+1 reflects the outcome of the previous harvests r0:t and
updates according to learning rate α on consecutive successful visits to the same
trough:
εt+1 = εt + α(rt − εt) (7.2)
The value of εt+1 following a trough switch was the outcome of the harvest rt.
We verified the assumption that the expected reward was not updated following un-
successful harvests and also that rats learned the expected reward from experience
as opposed to updating based on the true depletion rate (i.e. depletion by mean=-
0.01ml) by fitting models using these alternate updating strategies and comparing
the model fit. The AIC value indicated a poorer fit in each case (fitting all models
including unsuccessful harvests: ∆AIC=77.489; fitting all models with update us-
ing true depletion rate: ∆AIC=369.056, in comparison to all models not including
unsuccessful harvests and no updating with the true depletion rate).
R̄t is given initial value R̄0 and updates following each harvest according to the
outcome of and the time since the last harvest τ :




We fitted an additional model in which the average reward rate and expected
reward update had different learning rates but this was found to provide a less par-
simonious model (∆AIC=1.574, comparing all models using separate learning rates
for the average reward rate and expected reward, to the same set of models using the
same learning rate for the average reward rate and expected reward update).
The probability that an individual continues to harvest at the same trough is






The softmax function is widely used in the field of reinforcement learning and
outputs an action probability given the action values and the inverse temperature
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parameter (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
Table 7.1: Glossary of MVT model parameters
Parameter Range Interpretation
α [0, 1]
Learning rate for the average reward rate and expected reward; higher
values reflect faster updating of the average reward rate and expected reward
following decision outcomes.
β [0,∞]
Inverse temperature parameter; higher values reflect that decisions are
less stochastic and more heavily based on the expected value of actions.
R0 [0,∞]
Initial value of the average reward rate; higher values reflect that the























Figure 7.4: Data generated using the MVT model to demonstrate
β-dependent variation in decision-making
We used a three-level hierarchical Bayesian random effects analysis for model fit-
ting which was previously described in Chapter 5. Briefly, this involved parameterising
distributions for the estimates of α, β, R̄0 from each test session for each individual,
and parameterising the estimates of these individual-level distributions as a higher-
level distribution across all subjects (as described in Chapter 5). The top-level pa-
rameters were estimated using an expectation-maximisation procedure (Guitart-Masip
et al., 2012; MacKay and Mac Kay, 2003).
The likelihood function and code for the EM procedure were written using Mat-
lab and each model took less than 10 minutes to fit (and hence did not required use
of the high-powered computing facility). The initial values for all parameters were a
number drawn at random between zero and one. Values for parameters constrained
159
Chapter 7. Affective state and exploratory behaviour in rats
between zero and ∞ were exponentiated within the likelihood function, likewise, val-
ues for parameters constrained between zero and one were transformed using a logistic
function within the likelihood function.
7.3 Results
All six rats completed training in five days. The rats completed an average of
28.250±6.868 (mean±SE) trials in the first training stage in which they kept their
snout in the trough for 20ms (i.e received juice) on 98.846±0.008% of trials, an av-
erage of 47.833±6.498 trials in the second training stage in which they in which they
kept their snout in the trough for 1s (i.e received juice) on 77.426±0.045% of trials,
and an average of 57.833±12.202 trials in which they kept their snout in the trough 1s
(i.e received juice) on 55.062±0.029% of trials during the final training session. This
decline in performance perhaps reflects the reduction in reward magnitude resulting
from repeated trough visits in the final test session.
Across test sessions, rats completed an average of 95.278±6.808 trials and in which
they kept their snout in the trough to successfully harvest the juice on 62.492±0.024%
of trials. Rats completed significantly fewer trials in the unenriched condition (Fig.
7.5: LRT=8.234, p=0.004) and the number of sessions completed was not a significant
predictor of number of trials completed in a session (LRT=2.337, p=0.126). However,
the volume of juice consumed did significantly depend on the number of sessions com-
pleted, with juice consumption increasing with the number of sessions (LRT=11.218,
p<0.001). Total juice consumption did not depend on housing type (LRT=0.005,
p=0.944). The proportion of successful harvests did not depend on housing type



















Figure 7.5: The mean number of trials completed in each test session.
Error bars represent one standard error
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Rats were more likely to ‘switch’ in the unenriched condition (Fig. 7.6:
LRT=5.482, p=0.019). The number of test sessions completed was not a significant
























Figure 7.6: The mean volume of juice harvested at a trough before
the decision to switch to the alternate trough in each test session.
Error bars represent one standard error
Housing type was a significant predictor of both α (learning rate; Fig. 7.7:
LRT=116.345, p<0.001) and β (inverse temperature; Fig. 7.8: LRT=4.886, p=0.027)
but not R0 (initial estimate of the average reward rate; LRT=0.123, p=0.726). The
parameter estimates of both α and β were lower when rats were housed in unenriched
cages. There was no significant effect of number of test sessions completed on α













Figure 7.7: The mean parameter estimates of α in each test session.
Error bars represent one standard error
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Figure 7.8: The mean parameter estimates of β in each test session.
Error bars represent one standard error
7.4 Discussion
The aims of this study were to use computational modelling to examine the specific
cognitive changes contributing to affect-induced shifts in exploration on the bandit
task and to assess whether bandit tasks could provide a measure of affective state
in rats. To this end, we developed a rat bandit task in which successive visits to
the same trough led to reduced rewards which was adapted from the human task
described by Constantino and Daw (2015). Data from this task were analysed using
a computational model based on the marginal value theorem.
Rats in putatively negative affective states resulting from less-enriched housing
conditions were more exploratory, which was attributed to a lower inverse temperature
parameter. Specifically, according to the model-based analysis their decision-making
was less dependent on the relative value of ‘harvesting’ compared with ‘switching’.
This is consistent with research from the field of computational psychiatry that has
identified lower estimates for the inverse temperature parameter in data obtained from
depressed humans (Harlé et al., 2017; Huys et al., 2013), which may reflect a blunted
reward sensitivity.
The affect manipulation also influenced learning; rats had lower learning rates
when in a putatively negative affective states. This concurs with the hypothesis that
depression is associated with impaired learning (Chase et al., 2010; Dombrovski et al.,
2013) and suggests that rats in depression-like states might also exhibit learning im-
pairments. However, it is important to note that it is unclear what an altered learning
rate might reflect in terms of cognition; although it could reflect differences in learn-
ing, it could alternatively reflect differences in the individual’s ability to encode or
recall reward experience, differences in perception of the magnitude or value of the
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experienced reward, or reflect differences in the individual’s estimate of environmen-
tal volatility given that volatility is a key determinant of learning rate (Browning
et al., 2015). Disentangling these possibilities will be important to better interpreting
the learning rate in studies of human depression and animal welfare. Overall, the
behaviour and cognition of rats from the less-enriched housing condition appears to
closely mirror that of depressed humans.
Rats also completed fewer trials in test sessions when their housing was unenriched,
which might be indicative of a reduced motivation to obtain rewards. This also needs
to be interpreted in the context of total volume of juice consumed which increased
across the test sessions. Taken together, it suggests that although the number of
trials decreased in the unenriched session, the absolute juice consumption did not
decrease, and so the greater exploratory behaviour resulted in more efficient foraging
(in terms of juice per harvest) relative to the test session prior to enrichment removal.
If we consider increased juice intake as a measure of optimality, this also suggests
that a reduced learning rate and inverse temperature parameter are not necessarily
associated with suboptimal decision-making. This contrasts with the hypothesis that
depression leads to suboptimal behaviour (Montague et al., 2012; Paulus and Angela,
2012). However, given that juice intake could be increased with faster shuttling and so
also a greater energy expenditure, interpretation of the results in terms of optimality
is complicated by a lack of measure of the energetic cost of harvesting and shuttling
between troughs. The increased juice consumption across test sessions might also
indicate that increased familiarity with the task improves performance.
Although the aim of this study was not to address different potential explo-
ration strategies it is important to briefly discuss directed and undirected exploration
(Carmel and Markovitch, 1990; Sutton, 1990; Thrun, 1992). The MVT and the ma-
jority of computational models used to analyse exploration and exploitation data in
the field of computational psychiatry have assumed that exploration is undirected;
the decision to explore or exploit depends on the utility of each option with some
stochasticity. However, in some contexts exploration can be used to reduce uncer-
tainty, and hence exploration may be valuable to better understand environmental
conditions. Directed exploration describes a strategy which accounts for the added
value of exploration. In future studies it may be worthwhile to assess whether rats
might also adopt a directed learning strategy and to examine whether affect might
influence the extent to which exploration is directed or undirected, and hence underlie
differences in exploratory behaviour between individuals in putatively negative and
positive affective states.
Although our results suggest that the bandit task is a promising measure of af-
fective state in rats, which requires little training, it is important to highlight a few
caveats. Firstly, the small sample size in this study may reduce the reliability of
the results (Button et al., 2013). Secondly, while there is strong evidence to suggest
that removal of enrichment should induce a relatively negative affective state, it is
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nonetheless an assumption. Finally, as the putative affective state induced by the ma-
nipulation most closely resembles a depression-like state, it is unclear how successful
the task would be in detecting anxiety-like states. Consequently, the task would ben-
efit from further investigation with larger sample sizes. Pharmacological validation of
the task would also be important to determine its value as a measure of affect.
From a welfare perspective, a crucial point is that the less enriched housing con-
dition in our study may be marginally more preferable than typical housing for lab-
oratory rats. In the less enriched housing condition, rats had more floor space than
current regulations require and rats were still provided with one form of enrichment
(UK Home Office, 2014). Our results, and indeed that of other researchers (Brydges
et al., 2011; Burman et al., 2008a; Van der Harst et al., 2003), might indicate that
changes in housing would enhance the welfare of laboratory rats, which would ulti-
mately improve the scientific value of experimental studies that use rats (Poole, 1997;
Prescott and Lidster, 2017; Sherwin, 2004).
7.5 Conclusions
The bandit task we have described may provide a useful measure of affective state
in rats which can be analysed through computational modelling. Rats in putatively
negative affective states were more exploratory and completed fewer trials in this ban-
dit task. Additionally, the computational analysis revealed that less-enriched hous-
ing conditions increased stochasticity in decision-making and reduced the individual’s
learning rate, indicative of a depression-like state. The task therefore warrants further




The judgement bias task has been widely used to assess affect, and hence welfare, in
a range of non-human animals. However, a solid understanding of how and why affect
alters judgement bias is still lacking. As outlined in the general introduction (Chapter
1), it has been hypothesised that affect might encode different aspects of reward and
punisher experience, such as predictability or how relatively or absolutely appetitive or
aversive an individual’s experience has been, to provide a context for decision-making,
hence allowing appropriate behavioural responses. Reward and punisher experience
could directly, or indirectly via affect, alter decision-making by influencing subjective
reward and punisher valuation or probability estimation. This hypothesis is sup-
ported by research in humans (see Chapter 1). To this end, the aim of this thesis
was to examine the relationship between affect, reward and punisher experience, and
the cognitive processes underlying decision-making, and also to look for parallels/dif-
ferences between humans and rats in order to identify cross-species (dis)continuity in
links between environmental conditions, affect, and decision-making. In this general
discussion we will assess the extent to which this aim was achieved, and our hypotheses
supported, as well as discussing the implications and limitations of our findings and
providing suggestions for future research. To avoid repetition, as results are discussed
in each experimental chapter, we will only provide an overview of the results in this
discussion where context is required.
8.1 Which aspects of reward and punisher experience in-
fluence decision-making?
Both humans and rats were more likely to risk a punisher to obtain a reward when
the expected value of the trial was greater (Chapters 3, 4, and 6). This suggests
that both humans and rats attend to the potential outcome of each option and use
this information to inform and optimise decision-making. Hence, this indicates that
individuals make decisions in accordance with theories of decision-making (see Chapter
1) and provides validation for the task as a measure of decision-making.
Humans were more risk-averse when recent outcomes had been less predictable/-
more surprising both when primary and secondary rewards and punishers were offered
or threatened. This could reflect a strategy to reduce uncertainty, although opting
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for the risk-averse response, whilst reducing outcome uncertainty, also reduces the
opportunity to learn and hence minimise future uncertainty (Chapters 3 and 4). In
contrast, the predictability of recent outcomes did not influence decision-making in
rats, but instead rats (although only one individual rat significantly) were more risk-
averse when outcomes had been absolutely less favourable (Chapter 6). This would
allow rats to make decisions in accordance with environmental conditions.
Consequently, we have identified disparities in the relationship between experience
and decision-making in both humans and rats. This inconsistency could be due to
differences in the focus of the individuals when completing the task; resolving uncer-
tainty may be the most important goal to humans, while maximising rewards and
minimising punishers may be more important to rats. Laboratory rats inhabit a pre-
dictable and controlled environment; they live in stable groups, experience negligible
fluctuations in ambient temperature and humidity, and husbandry and testing occur
at regular and predictable times. In contrast, humans regularly interact with different
people, experience fluctuating environmental conditions, and may have a varied daily
schedule. This may induce a greater drive in humans to reduce uncertainty (at least of
immediate outcomes) compared with laboratory rats. Additionally, the rewards and
punishers used may be more salient to rats than to humans. The sucrose pellet may
be especially rewarding to rats who have a diet consisting only of standard labora-
tory chow, particularly given that wild rats are opportunistic and omnivorous feeders
(Schein and Orgain, 1953). Moreover, as a prey species, the potential punisher may be
considered life-threatening to rats. Indeed, in our experiment, equipment failure that
resulted in an air-puff not stopping resulted in a rat displaying tonic immobility in-
dicative of perceived imminent death and hence an extreme fear-like state1. This may
promote decision-making that is informed by the absolute favourability of rewarding
and punishing experiences. On the other hand, there may be far more appealing foods
to humans, who experience a range of food daily, than apple juice, and the monetary
gains from the task were minimal, especially using the UK minimum wage (currently
£6.15 for those aged 18-20; £7.70 for those aged 21-24; and £8.21 for those aged
over 24) as a reference point. Additionally, the humans were made aware that the
experiment received ethical approval and that the experiment posed no risk to their
life.
Furthermore, humans completed the task with a conspecific present i.e. under
observation by the experimenter. Thus, there may be social factors influencing hu-
man decision-making. For example, humans may want to perform well to satisfy the
experimenter. Consequently, the increased predictability of recent outcomes during
testing, taken as evidence of good comprehension of the task, might inspire greater
confidence and less cautious decision-making in humans.
The prediction error most relevant to decision-making also differed between hu-
mans and rats. While the results of the computational analysis suggested that for
1This rat was immediately withdrawn from the experiment and observed until he had made a full
recovery. It should also be noted here that some rats do habituate to, and subsequently show no
avoidance of, air-puffs
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humans it was the difference between the outcome and prediction about the outcome
prior to stimulus onset that was most relevant, the difference between the outcome
and prediction about the outcome following stimulus onset was most relevant to rats.
This difference potentially stems from an important methodological difference; hu-
mans were shown the potential outcomes prior to stimulus presentation whereas the
specific potential outcome on each trial was unknown to rats, and their pre-stimulus
onset prediction would have been based on experience. It may be that the greater de-
gree of certainty about the potential reward/loss magnitude or simply being forced to
consider the potential outcomes prior to stimulus presentation made the pre-stimulus
prediction more pertinent to humans compared to rats.
Both humans, where primary as opposed to secondary rewards and punishers were
used (Chapter 4), and rats when within-test experience was manipulated (Chapter 6)
initiated trials with greater alacrity when recent outcomes had been more predictable.
We interpreted this to reflect a means to process and learn from unexpected outcomes,
or to search for novel cues to provide information about changing environmental con-
ditions. Hence, there is evidence that rats encode information about predictability,
even if predictability does not modulate their decision-making.
However, predictability did not exert the same effect on vigour in humans when
secondary rewards were used (Chapter 3), or on vigour in rats where reward and
punisher experience was manipulated prior to testing (Chapter 5). Instead, humans
in the monetary task were slower to initiate trials following outcomes that were bet-
ter than expected (consistent with slowing following decreased predictability), but
faster following outcomes that were worse than expected (inconsistent with slowing
following decreased predictability). We suggested that this may reflect differences be-
tween punishers and losses; losses can be recouped but punishers cannot be undone,
hence leading participants to increase vigour following unexpectedly poor monetary
outcomes so as to more rapidly regain attempts to increase earnings in line with ex-
pectation. In rats, when pre-test reward and punisher experience was manipulated,
variability in trial initiation latency could be attributed to the outcome of the previ-
ous trial. This could reflect that the within-test reward magnitude was static so that
predictability of recent outcomes is less relevant to shifts in environmental conditions.
The average reward or average earning rate influenced vigour in both rats (Chap-
ter 6) and humans (Chapters 3 and 4). In particular, individuals were faster to initiate
trials when they had learnt that the environment was more favourable. This is consis-
tent with both theoretical and empirical studies investigating the relationship between
reward experience and vigour (Beierholm et al., 2013; Griffiths and Beierholm, 2017;
Niv et al., 2007), and is thought to optimise the trade-off between energetic expendi-
ture and reward intake given the environmental conditions.
Therefore, a key finding of this thesis is that reward and punisher experience
modulates decision-making in the judgement bias task and vigour in rats and hu-
mans. While there are some similarities in the specific aspects of reward and punisher
experience which influence behaviour in rats and humans, there are also differences
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which require further examination.
8.2 Which cognitive processes underlie the relation-
ship between reward and punisher experience and
decision-making?
In the human monetary rewards and losses study, participants overall had a reduced
sensitivity to losses relative to the true monetary value of the loss (Chapter 3), whereas
humans in the primary reward and punisher task (Chapter 4) and rats (Chapter 6)
showed an increased sensitivity to rewards relative to the true volume of apple juice
offered/received. One possible explanation for this is that the losses might not be
perceived as true losses in a monetary task given that it is not possible for humans
to finish the task with less money than they had prior to testing, and participants
were aware that the experimenter cannot take money from them. On the other hand,
in the primary reward and punisher task, participants were asked to abstain from
drinking (other than water) and eating in the hour prior to testing, which through
hunger may have inflated the subjective value of the apple juice. Although rats were
not food-deprived for any period of time during experimentation, the judgement bias
training and test sessions were the rats’ sole opportunity to consume food other than
laboratory chow and hence may have been highly rewarding.
It is also important to note that only the reward magnitude fluctuated across test-
ing in the human primary reward and punisher task, while there was both a fluctuating
reward and fluctuating loss condition in the human secondary reward and punisher
task. Although, this could potentially underlie the differences in the cognitive pro-
cesses underlying judgement bias between studies, in the monetary task participants
were less sensitive to loss in the fluctuating reward condition in comparison to the
fluctuating loss condition which suggested that the finding would still be observed if
only a fluctuating reward condition had been used.
Variation in the prior probability of reward also governed judgement bias in the
human primary reward task. Participants overall had a greater expectation that the
trial would be punished than rewarded. This could reflect that participants had pre-
conceptions about what the task would involve, leading them to believe that delivery
of salty tea would be more probable than delivery of apple juice. Given that an in-
creased subjective probability of punishers has been associated with negative affect,
this finding could also reflect that overall the humans in the primary reward task
were experiencing a relatively negative affective state compared with participants in
the monetary task. This negative affect could arise from apprehension about the ex-
periment, for example concerns about an embarrassing reaction to the salty tea (e.g.
coughing, dribbling) or because the ambient room temperature was noticeably cool as
only a portable heater was available to heat the experimental room (with the study
conducted in Winter in a non-heated building). Room temperature has been shown
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to influence affective state in humans (Bell and Baron, 1977) and chickens (Deakin
et al., 2016). Although ideally this explanation would be examined by comparing the
results of the affect grid between the primary and secondary reward and punisher
tasks, this was unfortunately not possible as testing in each study was conducted us-
ing a different monitor with different number of pixels and so the co-ordinates are not
comparable and the absolute location within the grid might also not be comparable
due to differences in the speed at which each position within the grid could be reached.
The computational analysis revealed that the subjective valuation of rewards or
punishers was influenced by reward and punisher experience, which contributed to
within-subject variation in judgement bias in both rats, where the absolute favoura-
bility of experience influenced reward valuation (Chapter 6), and humans where the
predictability of recent outcomes influenced loss sensitivity (Chapters 3) or reward
sensitivity (Chapter 4). This was further supported by a concurrent measure of moti-
vation to obtain rewards described in Chapter 5; rats that experienced pre-test sucrose
valued punishers more highly than rewards and made fewer presses to obtain sucrose
in the progressive ratio lever pressing task compared to rats that experienced pre-test
air-puffs. This finding firstly indicates that judgement bias, which is largely consid-
ered to reflect affect-induced changes in probability estimation (Bateson et al., 2011;
Mendl et al., 2010; Nettle and Bateson, 2012) could also, or instead, arise from varia-
tion in the subjective valuation of rewards and punishers. Moreover, as highlighted in
Chapter 1, the influence that affect may exert on the subjective valuation of rewards
and punishers is unclear. Thus, a negative or positive judgement bias might not nec-
essarily be indicative of the relative valence of an affective state. It is possible that a
relatively negative judgement bias could reflect a reduced valuation of rewards or in-
creased valuation of punishers resulting from a relatively positive affective state, while
it is also possible that a relatively positive judgement bias could reflect an increased
valuation of rewards or decreased valuation of punishers resulting from a relatively
negative affective state. Indeed, this could explain the findings of Chapter 3 where
delivery of sucrose to rats, assumed to induce a relatively positive affective state rela-
tive to delivery of punishers, induced a negative judgement bias, and also provide an
explanation for other opposite findings in the literature (e.g. Briefer and McElligott,
2013), as well as the high levels of heterogeneity across judgement bias tasks revealed
by the meta-analysis (Chapter 2).
However, in the human primary reward and punisher study (Chapter 3), reward
and punisher experience (specifically the predictability of recent outcomes) also influ-
enced the participants’ prior expectation that the trial would be rewarded or punished.
Thus, reward and punisher experience does not solely modulate reward or punisher
valuation. Therefore, the question remains why both subjective reward and punisher
valuation and probability estimation were modulated by experience in the human pri-
mary reward and punisher study but not in other judgement bias studies described
in this thesis. A possible explanation is that there was greater power to detect this
effect in the human primary reward and punisher study; the sample size in the rat
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task was unfortunately very small due to problems with training, and given that the
immediate rewards are potentially more engaging to humans than promised monetary
rewards, the effect size may have been comparatively large.
8.3 The relationship between reward and punisher expe-
rience and decision-making and affect
The meta-analysis (Chapter 2) generally supported the hypothesised relationship be-
tween affect and judgement bias, suggesting that relatively negative affect is associated
with a negative judgement bias, and that a relatively positive affect is associated with
a positive judgement bias, across a range of species. However, there was wide hetero-
geneity in the extent to which the pharmacological manipulations altered judgement
bias which suggested that while some studies had small effect sizes or altered judge-
ment bias in the opposite direction to expected other studies had large effect sizes.
Thus, while in general judgement bias may provide a measure of affect, caution must
be taken to interpret judgement bias data.
With regards to reward and punisher experience, although recent unpredictability
in outcomes was found to influence judgement bias in humans, it did not influence
subjectively reported affective valence. However recent unpredictability in outcomes
did influence affective arousal; greater arousal was reported when outcomes were less
predictable. Conversely, the absolute favourability of experience determined affective
valence in humans, with more positive affect reported when experience had been more
absolutely favourable, without influencing judgement bias. This highlights that the
aspects of reward and punisher experience which influence affect do not necessarily
directly alter judgement bias, while the aspects of reward and punisher experience
which influence judgement bias do not necessarily directly alter affect. Consequently,
it appears that reward and punisher experience are not necessarily encoded by affect
to influence decision-making. This finding also indicates that judgement bias may be
related to affective arousal which is less relevant to animal welfare.
However, affect indirectly influenced decision-making by modulating the extent to
which unpredictability informed judgement bias. More specifically, in both Chapters
3 and 4, which detail studies using humans, reports of more negative affective valence
were associated with unpredictability exerting a weaker influence on the subjective
valuation of the rewards or losses. This could reflect that negative affect is associated
with blunting of prediction error signalling (Delgado et al., 2011; Kumar et al., 2008;
Steele et al., 2004), or could reflect an effort to maintain a positively valenced affec-
tive state (through increased risk-aversion) in periods of uncertainty. Additionally, in
the human primary reward and punisher task (Chapter 4), participants that reported
more negative affective valence exhibited an attenuated belief that the trial would be
rewarded in periods of greater unpredictability. This could indicate that the effects of
affective valence on decision-making are greatest when the environment is perceived
as unpredictable. Consequently, affect might not only determine judgement bias (as
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and affect
demonstrated in Chapter 2) but also determine within-subject variability in judge-
ment bias, and there may be interactions between environmental conditions and the
influence of affect on judgement bias, such that the influence of affect on judgement
bias might only be observed when recent rewarding and punishing outcomes have been
less predictable.
In contrast to previous research (i.e. Rutledge et al., 2014), the relative favourabil-
ity of the environment (prediction error) did not influence affective valence. Instead,
the most recent outcome provided a better account of within-subject variation in
affect, with humans reporting more positive affective valence when the most recent
outcome was more favourable (Chapters 3 and 4). Likewise, humans reported more
positive affective valence when the expected value of the most recent trial was greater,
as well as greater arousal when the magnitude of the expected value was greater. This
provides support for Roll’s (2013) definition of emotion as states elicited by rewards
and punishers.
While the experimental chapters in this thesis support elements of current theories
of affect, they do not wholly support any particular theory. Firstly, we did not find
that more predictable environments were associated with more positively valenced
affect, as suggested by both Huys and Dayan (2009) and Clark et al. (2018). How-
ever, we did find that affective valence modulated the extent and direction in which
unpredictability modulated decision-making. The finding that participants in more
negatively valenced affective states exhibit decision-making that is less dependent on
the predictability of recent outcomes could be considered indicative of a less flexible
decision-making strategy. This would not be contrary to the hypothesis that affect
determines the strength of the belief that the world is predictable, where a strong
belief (high precision around prior beliefs) that the world is unpredictable, theorised
to be associated with depression (Clark et al., 2018), would lead to weaker reliance
on environmental information. Notably, Browning et al. (2015) found that humans
were unable to adjust their learning rate in accordance with environmental condi-
tions, and it has also been demonstrated that negative affect induces a shift towards
model-free (which is less flexible that model-based) decision-making (Blanco et al.,
2013; Huys et al., 2012; Radenbach et al., 2015). Thus, in combination these find-
ings are consistent with an association between affect and behavioural flexibility. It
would be worthwhile in future studies to more directly assess the hypothesis that neg-
ative affect is associated with model-free decision-making strategies, for example using
tasks designed for rats (e.g. Hasz and Redish, 2018) and humans (e.g. Daw et al.,
2011b) that in combination with computational modelling, allow use of model-based
and model-free decision-making to be disentangled, alongside an affect manipulation.
Contrary to the hypothesis that affect reflects the relative favourability of en-
vironmental conditions (Eldar et al., 2016), we did not find that affect reflects the
difference between observed and expected outcomes (prediction error). However, the
finding that the absolute favourability (average earning rate) influenced human af-
fect is consistent with the hypothesis that affective valence reflects an individual’s
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cumulative experience of rewards and punishers (Mendl et al., 2010). Although, in
contrast to the hypothesis of Mendl et al. (2010), the average earning rate did not
influence human decision-making, and so there is no evidence to suggest that affect
functions to provide information about the absolute favourability of the environment
to inform human decision-making. However, the average earning rate influenced rat
judgement bias suggesting that the average earning rate may function to inform rat
decision-making within the judgement bias task.
In both rats and humans, the absolute favourability of the environment modulated
vigour, suggesting that affect (as a measure of environmental favourability) could
function to determine the vigour with which actions are executed. Moreover, serotonin
and dopamine have been proposed to underlie both vigour and affect, hence providing
a potential neurobiological explanation for this finding (Berridge and Robinson, 1998;
Boureau and Dayan, 2011; Niv et al., 2007; Owens and Nemeroff, 1994). However,
we would expect vigour and arousal to be closely related. Thus, this finding raises
the question of why the absolute favourability of the environment determines affective
valence but not affective arousal in human studies using the affect grid, given that it
also determines vigour. It could suggest that participants have difficulty separating
valence and arousal when reporting affect using the affect grid, although expected
value dependent shifts in affective arousal were successfully detected using the affect
grid.
To summarise, affective valence in humans might function to modulate the extent
to which information about unpredictability, obtained from reward and punisher expe-
rience, modulates decision-making. Adopting a less flexible decision-making strategy
could reduce energy expenditure by decreasing cognitive load. The absolute favoura-
bility of previous outcomes modulates the vigour with which actions are executed in
both rats and humans, and it also determines decision-making in rats. In humans,
the absolute favourability of previous outcomes also determined affective valence and
so it is plausible that the effect of absolute environmental favourability on vigour (in
both humans and rats) and decision-making (in rats) operates via affective valence.
Further studies with mediation analyses which assess the extent to which one vari-
able influences another variable directly, or indirectly via a mediating variable would
be necessary to confirm this. Modulating vigour and decision-making in accordance
with the absolute levels of rewards and punishers in the environment would allow
reduced energy expenditure and more cautious decision-making in less favourable en-
vironments, and increased energy expenditure and less cautious decision-making in
more favourable environment. Hence, overall our research suggests that affect may
function to mediate energy expenditure, allowing energy to be conserved in poorer
environments. It would be worthwhile to directly test this hypothesis by taking di-
rect measures of energy expenditure such as oxygen consumption (e.g. Jequier et al.,
1987).
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8.4 Implications for judgement bias as a measure of wel-
fare
Our findings have clear implications for judgement bias as a measure of welfare.
Firstly, although overall judgement bias appears to measure affective valence (as per
the meta-analysis, Chapter 2), the high level heterogeneity identified in addition to
the finding that judgement bias may reflect reward and punisher valuation (Chapters
3 - 6) signifies that caution is necessary when interpreting the results of judgement
bias. It is not necessarily true that a null effect is indicative of no affective change,
while a relatively positive or negative judgement bias does not necessarily correspond
to a relatively positive or negative affective state.
When interpreting the results of judgement bias studies it is important to consider
the impact of affect manipulation on reward and punisher valuation, and the direction
of this effect. Additionally, consideration should be given to within-test reward and
punisher experience. It is evident from our studies, albeit with more drastic changes in
within-test experience than standard judgement bias tests as a result of the fluctuating
reward magnitude, that the ongoing rewards and punisher experience within the test
session can influence decision-making. Importantly, affective valence might indirectly
influence judgement bias by modulating the extent to which reward and punisher expe-
rience informs decision-making, leading to shifts in experience-dependent variability,
as opposed to absolute shifts, in judgement bias.
Computational modelling provides a means for these potential issues to be ad-
dressed. In this thesis we provided a novel model for investigating judgement bias,
which permitted insights into the relationship between reward and punisher expe-
rience, affect, and decision-making that could not be achieved through a statistical
analysis alone. In particular, it allowed us to assess precisely which aspects of reward
and punisher experience altered decision-making and affect and elucidated the mech-
anisms by which reward and punisher experience altered decision-making. Additional
behavioural tests, such the progressive ratio task, also provided a method to directly
assess the influence of the affect manipulation on reward valuation. A checklist of
potential factors, other than an altered reward/punisher probability estimates, such
as reward/punisher valuation or variation in within-test responses to rewards and
punishers, that may influence judgement bias and which should be considered in the
interpretation of results, or addressed using computational modelling or additional
behaviour tests, may be useful to researchers conducting judgement bias tests.
In this thesis, we also describe a novel task which could provide an alternative
measure of affective valence that requires a much shorter training period and use of
a simpler computational model for data analysis. The task examines the point at
which a rat opts to forgo a diminishing reward in order to receive a larger reward by
providing two spatially distinct food sources which deplete following consecutive visits
and restore following a visit to the alternate food source. Using this task, we found
that rats in putatively negative affective states, resulting from following removal of
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environmental enrichment from their homecage, would more readily forgo a reward,
which was identified using both a statistical and computational analysis. In particular,
this appeared to reflect greater stochasticity in decision-making, which could result
from a reduced subjective value of the reward. Further research will be needed to
validate this task and assess the extent to which it provides a measure of anxiety-like
states as well as depression-like states.
8.5 Limitations and outstanding questions
One major limitation of this thesis is that comparing laboratory rats and humans,
even when both complete near-identical tasks, is perhaps akin to comparing apples
and oranges. As previously mentioned, laboratory rats are a very homogeneous pop-
ulation with standardised life experiences in controlled environments, who receive a
substantial period of training, and (almost) no choice in whether they participate2. In
contrast, humans have varied life experiences, a short period of training, and consent
to participation. Moreover, in this thesis all rat experiments were conducted with
male rats, whereas a majority (83.3%) of humans were female due to the unequal
ratio of female to male staff and students at Bristol Veterinary School. Thus, while
differences in results between rat and human studies could relate to species differences,
it could also relate to other factors including environment, sex differences, training
duration, or a self-selecting bias whereby personality traits such as extroversion or
inquisitiveness determine whether a human decides to participant.
There is also an issue of generalisability; we cannot say whether the results from
these studies generalise to all humans (given that all human participants lived in the
UK with some connection to Bristol Vet School) or all rats (given that all rats were
obtained from the same breeding facility). This is particularly relevant to the rat
studies which had a very small sample size as a result of the rats failure to learn the
task and equipment failure. Indeed, the results of the study in which the majority
of rats failed to learn the task (Chapter 6) may simply reflect some characteristic of
the rats associated with their ability to perform the task (e.g. rapid learners/good
discrimination skills/highly food motivated). In future experiments, it would be in-
teresting to run a judgement bias study with a more heterogeneous population of rats
that include both males and females such as wild rats or even pet rats. Recently,
Ellis et al. (2019) described a study in which pet rats participated in a behavioural
experiment demonstrating that this would be feasible.
Additionally, although we attempted to design judgement bias tasks that were as
similar as possible for both rats and humans, there were differences that should be
resolved in future studies. The first, as previously mentioned, is that humans were
shown the magnitude of the potential reward and loss prior to stimulus onset whereas
rats were not made aware of the magnitude of the potential outcome. Although we
2Note that rats have been known to nap during training or testing and hence in these cases choose
not to participate.
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attempted to inform rats of the magnitude of the outcome by varying the amplitude
of the tone and there was some evidence that rats did learn to discriminate between
tone amplitude, performance at the low amplitude tones was very poor and we failed
to train rats on this variant of the task.
The stimuli also differed between the studies; visual stimuli were used for human
experiments and auditory stimuli were used for rat experiments. These stimuli were
based both on constraints imposed by the testing equipment and also consideration of
each species’ perceptual systems. Rats are a nocturnal prey species, which is reflected
in their visual system; approximately 99% of the photoreceptors in the rat retina are
rods (responsible for vision in low light but colour insensitive; LaVail, 1976), compared
with approximately 95% in humans (Curcio et al., 1990), and the position of their eyes
on the side of their head allows a wide visual and overhead vision at the expense of
depth perception (Wallace et al., 2013). However, rats have highly sensitive hearing
and olfaction which is important for communication and predator detection (Blan-
chard et al., 2003; Doty, 1986; Knutson et al., 2002), and somatosensation (through
their whiskers) which is essential for navigation, orientation, and balance (Arabzadeh
et al., 2005; Mitchinson et al., 2007); the sensitivity of these senses in rats exceeds
that of human senses (Guić-Robles et al., 1989; Kelly and Masterton, 1977; Rajan
et al., 2006). The neural differences between humans and rats also make comparing
decision-making between these species challenging. For example, the cerebral cortex
of a rat is approximately a thousand times smaller than that of humans (Uylings and
van Eden, 1991). Additionally, the distribution of monoamine transporters (e.g sero-
tonin and norepinephrine) also differs between humans and rats (Smith and Porrino,
2008).
It is also important to highlight the short-term nature of the manipulations of re-
ward and punisher experience described in this thesis, with the exception of the study
described in Chapter 7 in which housing conditions were manipulated. The results re-
lating to reward and punisher experience may reflect a transient affective response as
opposed to longer-term mood. To better understand the long-term impact of reward
and punisher experience on affect and decision-making it will be necessary to run a
longitudinal study and monitor the impact of variable reward and punisher experi-
ence. In humans, this could be achieved through use of a smartphone-based platform
through which participants regularly report on rewarding and punishing experiences
and complete a short judgement bias task. Computational psychiatry research has
already been conducted using a smartphone app for data collection with good success
and large sample sizes (Rutledge et al., 2017). In rats, development of an automated
judgement bias task which can be conducted within the homecage would be invaluable
to permit regular judgement bias testing. Furthermore, research should be undertaken
to investigate how decision-making on the judgement bias task might be altered in
both human and a range of non-human animals experiencing affective disorders, for
example asking whether long-term absolutely unfavourable environments might con-
tribute to depression or anxiety, or asking how depression or anxiety might modulate
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the relationship between unpredictability and decision-making on the judgement bias
task. Indeed, the influence of prior beliefs on decision-making, and the relationship
between these prior beliefs, affect, and reward and punisher experience, may become
more apparent following studies which include participants experiencing affective dis-
orders.
A key finding of this thesis is that variation in reward and punisher valuation
partly underlies variation in judgement bias. A better understanding of the influ-
ence of affect on reward and punisher valuation, and particularly the direction of this
effect, would aid the interpretation of judgement bias data and formulation of hy-
potheses for judgement bias testing. Hence, it would be worthwhile to examine how
reward and punisher experience, both more and less favourable and both short and
long term, influence reward and punisher valuation, using several measures of reward
and punisher valuation in combination with computational modelling. It would also
be interesting to examine the effect that reward and punisher controllability exerts
on decision-making behaviour and how this interacts with predictability, given that
controllability has been proposed to influence the affective impact of rewards and pun-
ishers (Bassett and Buchanan-Smith, 2007). For example, learnt helplessness, which
is associated with a depression-like state, demonstrates that individuals will not try
to escape a punisher in new contexts if they have previously learnt that punishers
cannot be controlled (Seligman, 1972).
With regards to the computational model, it is important to bear in mind that
a good model fit does not provide unequivocal evidence of the cognitive mechanisms
underlying behaviour; alternate mechanisms that have not been modelled might in-
stead account for behaviour. The putative decision-making processes characterised by
our computational model were selected based on empirical and theoretical research;
a wealth of research suggested that affect influences both reward and punisher prob-
ability estimation and valuation, and that affect should be influenced by reward and
punisher experience, including predictability and absolute favourability (see Chapter
1). Although the computational model provided an overall good fit, model perfor-
mance was noticeably poorer at the positive reference stimulus; humans participants
exhibited greater accuracy than the model predicted. Thus, it is clear that our model
does not fully account for human behaviour. Alongside the findings of the meta-
analysis (Chapter 2) in which pharmacological manipulations were found to exert the
weakest influence at the positive reference cue, this might suggest that responses to
certain rewards (but not certain punishers) are impervious to the effects of previous
experience and/or affect. In future, computational modelling could be used to fur-
ther explore this result and to find a parameter that improves the model fit at the
positive reference stimulus, with no detrimental effect at other stimulus levels. An
important next step to assess our novel POMDP model will be to investigate how
the current model parameters relate to neurobiological processes. Endogenous fluc-
tuations in dopaminergic activity in the midbrain have been shown to correspond
to within-subject variability in risky decision-making (Chew et al., 2019); hence we
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might expect our results to correspond to the mean or standard deviation of these
fluctuations within an individual participant.
As part of this thesis, only potential biases in decision-making have been inves-
tigated as there is clear evidence that affect can influence the different components
of decision-making which can be easily investigated through behavioural tasks and
computational modelling. However, an alternate or additional explanation is that
biases in decision-making occur at the sensory level (Mendl et al., 2009). More specif-
ically, the ambiguous stimuli could be perceived as either rewarding (i.e. ‘seeing the
world through rose-tinted glasses’) or punishing, rather than perceived as ambiguous
where the decision about the best course of action is determined by affect. There is
some evidence to suggest that affect can alter perception. For example, anxiety is
associated with a greater likelihood of perceiving an ambiguous facial expression as
indicating a negative emotion (Blanchette et al., 2007). Although the extent to which
affect may alter perception in a top-down manner has been debated and considered
unlikely by some researchers (e.g. Firestone and Scholl, 2016), this warrants further
investigation. Additionally, we have not examined the possibility that ambiguity aver-
sion (Ellsberg, 1961) i.e. an aversion towards ambiguous outcomes and preference for
known outcomes, might underlie our results. However, the meta-analysis revealed
that judgement biases occur at non-ambiguous tones, suggesting that ambiguity aver-
sion is unlikely to be the sole process underlying the relationship between affect and
judgement bias.
8.6 Conclusions (see Fig. 8.1)
Through computational modelling, in particular use of a novel computational model,
we have made progress in understanding the relationship between reward and punisher
experience, affect, and decision-making. Although we have demonstrated, through a
meta-analysis, that in general, putatively negative affect may result in a relatively
negative judgement bias and vice versa, the relationship between affect and decision-
making is complex. In particular, the aspects of reward and punisher experience
which alter affect do not necessarily alter decision-making in humans, and affect may
influence the extent to which decision-making is modulated by reward and punisher
experience. Variation in judgement bias may not solely reflect changes in probability
estimation but also reward or punisher valuation.
A key finding of this thesis is that reward and punisher experience influences
(human) affect, (human and rat) vigour, and determines (human and rat) decision-
making. More specifically, we have found that both rats and humans encode in-
formation about recent predictability and the absolute favourability of the environ-
ment to inform their behaviour. In humans, we also found that affect influenced
decision-making by modulating the extent to which decision-making depended on the
predictability of reward and punisher experience. Although the function of affect re-
mains unclear, our results are most consistent with affect providing a measure of the
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extent to which energy should be conserved to optimise the balance between reward
acquisition, punisher avoidance, and energy expenditure given the environmental con-
ditions.
In future studies, it would be worthwhile to further examine the hypotheses that
a) negative affect is associated with less flexible model-free decision-making and b) re-
duced energy expenditure. This could be addressed by conducting experiments which
allow model-free and model-based decision-making to be disentangled through com-
putational modelling (e.g. Hasz and Redish, 2018, for rats; and Daw et al., 2011b,
for humans) throughout which reward and/or punisher magnitude is systematically
varied and human affect is measured as we have described in this thesis, and concur-
rent measures of energy expenditure (e.g. oxygen consumption, Jequier et al., 1987)
are taken. Additionally, repeating the studies described in this thesis with a more
heterogeneous population of rats and humans, as well as humans experiencing affec-
tive disorders, especially if conducted longitudinally, would provide further valuable
insights into the adaptive function of affect across species. In particular, we might
anticipate that predictability may be a more prominent factor in the decision-making
process of rats who inhabit less predictable environments, and that the relationship
between affect, environmental conditions, and probability estimation will be more ap-
parent where there are greater differences in putative affective state between human
(or rat) participants.
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Figure 8.1: Diagrammatic summary of thesis results relating to the
relationship between specific aspects of reward and punisher experi-
ence, affect, decision-making, and vigour: the nodes represent variables
relating to affect, decision-making (where CL denotes loss/punisher
sensitivity, CR denotes reward sensitivity, ω denotes the prior belief
about outcomes, and JB denotes judgement bias), experience (where
wPE denotes the weighted reward prediction error, wPE2 denotes the
squared weighted reward prediction error, and R̄ denotes the average
earning/reward rate), and vigour. The colour of the lines represents





A.1 Main database search
A.1.1 Scopus
The following search was conducted using Scopus:
( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( ( "Cognitive bias*" OR "judgement bias*" OR "judgement
bias*" OR "Cognitive affective bias*" ) AND ( "pessimis*" OR "optimis*" OR "va-
lence" OR "mood*" OR "emotion*" OR "affective state*" OR "emotional state*" OR
"ambig*" ) AND ( "animal*" OR "animal welfare" ) ) AND ( PUBYEAR > 2016 ) )
OR ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( ( "Cognitive bias*" OR "judgement bias*" OR "judgement
bias*" OR "Cognitive affective bias*" ) AND drug* ) )
A.1.2 Web of Science
The following search was conducted using Web of Science:
(TS=( ( "Cognitive bias*" OR "judgement bias*" OR "judgement bias*" OR
"Cognitive affective bias*" ) AND ( "pessimis*" OR "optimis*" OR "valence" OR
"mood*" OR "emotion*" OR "affective state*" OR "emotional state*" OR "ambig*"
) AND ( "animal*" OR "animal welfare" ) ) AND ( PY=(2017-2019) ) ) OR ( TS=(
( "Cognitive bias*" OR "judgement bias*" OR "judgement bias*" OR "Cognitive
affective bias*" ) AND drug* ) ) Indexes: SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, A&HCI, CPCI-S,
CPCI-SSH, BKCI-S, BKCI-SSH, ESCI, CCR-EXPANDED, IC.
A.2 Subject database searches
The following databases were searched via the University of New South Wales:
A.2.1 Psychology databases
All APA Psychology databases via the Ovid platform including PsycINFO, PsycAR-
TICLES, PsycBOOKS, PsycEXTRA and PsycTESTS using the following search:
(("Cognitive bias*" or "judgement bias*" or "judgement bias*" or "Cognitive af-
fective bias*") and ("pessimis*" or "optimis*" or "valence" or "mood*" or "emotion*"
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or "affective state*" or "emotional state*" or "ambig*") and ("animal*" or "animal
welfare")).mp. [mp=ti, ab, td, hw, tc, id, ot, tm, mh, tx, ct]
A.2.2 Biomedical and pharmaceutical databases
The EMBASE database using the following search:
(("Cognitive bias*" or "judgement bias*" or "judgement bias*" or "Cognitive
affective bias*") and ("pessimis*" or "optimis*" or "valence" or "mood*" or "emo-
tion*" or "affective state*" or "emotional state*" or "ambig*") and ("animal*" or
"animal welfare")).mp. [mp=title, abstract, heading word, drug trade name, original
title, device manufacturer, drug manufacturer, device trade name, keyword, floating
subheading word, candidate term word]
The Medline database using the following search:
(("Cognitive bias*" or "judgement bias*" or "judgement bias*" or "Cognitive
affective bias*") and ("pessimis*" or "optimis*" or "valence" or "mood*" or "emo-
tion*" or "affective state*" or "emotional state*" or "ambig*") and ("animal*" or
"animal welfare")).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word,
subject heading word, floating sub-heading word, keyword heading word, organism
supplementary concept word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease sup-
plementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]
A.3 Grey literature
The ProQuest Dissertation and Thesis database using the following searches:
noft(affect*) AND noft(bias*) AND noft(pharmacol*)
noft(affective) AND noft(bias*) AND noft(animal*) 20 records found
Google dataset using the following search:
( "Cognitive bias*" OR "judgement bias*" OR "judgement bias*" OR "Cognitive
affective bias*" )
The Dimensions database using the following search:
affect* AND bias AND pharmacol* AND (animal OR welfare*)
A.4 Snowballing
The following review articles were used for snowballing using Scopus:
Crump, A., Arnott, G., and Bethell, E. (2018). Affect-driven attention biases as
animal welfare indicators: review and methods. Animals, 8(8), 136.
Clegg, I. (2018). Cognitive bias in zoo animals: An optimistic outlook for welfare
assessment. Animals, 8(7), 104.
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Hales, C. A., Stuart, S. A., Anderson, M. H., and Robinson, E. S. (2014). Mod-
elling cognitive affective biases in major depressive disorder using rodents. British





To assess whether the model-fitting procedure could recover the true parameter values,
we first generated sets of data using a range of parameter values for each parameter
and fitted the model to these data. To determine whether the model could reliably
detect individual differences, we examined the extent to which the true and recovered
parameters were correlated using Pearson’s correlation coefficient. Additionally, to
determine the accuracy of parameter recovery, we examined the extent to which the
mean of the true parameters differed from the mean of the recovered parameters
using a t-test. Across all parameters (with the exception of γwPE for which there was
a marginally non-significant correlation) there was a significant correlation (Fig. B.1,
Table B.1) and no significant difference (Table B.1) between the true and recovered
parameter values.
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Table B.1: Results of the statistical analyses of the true and recov-













αR̄ 0.705 <0.001 -3.790 -4.007 -0.901 0.369
B 0.920 <0.001 0.697 0.681 -0.125 0.901
βCL0 0.979 <0.001 0.440 0.462 0.135 0.892
βCL
R̄
0.988 <0.001 0.113 0.095 -0.271 0.786
βCLO 0.910 <0.001 0.020 0.021 0.279 0.780
βCLwPE 0.937 <0.001 0.066 0.042 -0.800 0.425
βCL
wPE2 0.927 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.284 0.777
βCR0 0.983 <0.001 0.483 0.471 -0.073 0.942
βCR
R̄
0.943 <0.001 -0.100 -0.106 -0.177 0.859
βCRO 0.874 <0.001 0.022 0.021 -0.159 0.874
βCRwPE 0.926 <0.001 0.016 0.016 0.035 0.972
βCR
wPE2 0.867 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.318 0.751
βω0 0.988 <0.001 -0.072 -0.088 -0.084 0.933
βω
R̄
0.989 <0.001 -0.044 -0.052 -0.114 0.909
βωO 0.849 <0.001 0.023 0.022 -0.317 0.752
βωwPE 0.735 <0.001 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.985
βω
wPE2 0.846 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.172 0.863
γwPE 0.178 0.079 -0.645 -0.383 0.462 0.645
ζ 0.507 <0.001 2.462 2.335 -0.448 0.655
λ 0.739 <0.001 -4.242 -4.326 -0.481 0.631
σ 0.956 <0.001 -0.730 -0.724 0.070 0.944
φ 0.594 <0.001 -0.718 -0.540 0.981 0.328
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Figure B.1: Scatterplot of true and recovered parameter values for
each parameter in POMDP model of judgement bias.
We then assessed the ability of the model-fitting procedure to recover the true
parameter values from the best-fitting models from Chapters 3,4, and 6 when these
parameters were fitted simultaneously. The parameter values used to generate data
were within the range of parameters recovered from the observed data (i.e. drawn
from a normal distribution with the mean and standard deviation of the recovered
parameters). Each set of generated data had the same number of datapoints as the
collected data (i.e. 180 for the studies with human subjects, and 90 for the rat study).
We also assessed the extent to which there were correlations between the parameters
recovered from the generated data, to observe the extent to which there were trade-offs
between parameters.
There was a moderate correlation between the recovered parameter values of βCL0




wPE2 (Fig. B.2). Despite this, there was a significant
correlation (Fig. B.3, Table B.2) and no significant difference (Table B.2) between
the true and recovered parameter values. Hence, the parameters values obtained from
the best-fitting model are considered to be reliable estimates of the true parameter
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values.















































Figure B.2: Correlation matrix of recovered parameter values of σ,
λ, βCL0 , β
CL
wPE2 . The size of the circle indicates the magnitude of the
correlation, the colour indicates both the magnitude and direction,
and the number within the circle is the correlation coefficient.
Table B.2: Results of the statistical analyses of the true and recov-
ered parameter values for parameters in the final model of data from













βCL0 0.985 <0.001 -0.413 -0.448 -0.425 0.671
βCL
wPE2n
0.811 <0.001 0.002 0.003 0.022 0.982
λ 0.956 <0.001 -0.985 -1.007 -0.159 0.874
σ 0.524 <0.001 -0.559 -0.532 0.166 0.869
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Figure B.3: Scatterplot of true and recovered parameter values for
each parameter in the best-fitting model of data from the human mon-
etary judgement bias task










wPE2 , and σ and β
ω
wPE2 (Fig. B.4). Additionally, there was a
moderate correlation between βω0 and λ, β
CR





Although there was a significant correlation between all true and recovered parame-
ters (Fig. B.5, Table B.3), indicating that individual differences in these parameters
were identifiable, there was a significant difference between the mean of the true and
recovered values of βω0 (overestimate of true value), β
CR
0 (underestimate of true value),
and λ (underestimate of true value), see Table B.3. The estimates of these parameters
and therefore not reliable. This could potentially be addressed in future studies using
a greater number of trials or greater variation in the reward magnitude. However,
this shortcoming does not alter the results qualitatively; if we consider that βω0 is an
overestimate and βCR0 our results would not change qualitatively, and no statistical
tests were conducted on the value of λ.
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Figure B.4: Correlation matrix of recovered parameter values of σ,




wPE2 . The size of the circle indicates the magni-
tude of the correlation, the colour indicates both the magnitude and
direction, and the number within the circle is the correlation coeffi-
cient.
Table B.3: Results of the statistical analyses of the true and recov-
ered parameter values for parameters in the final model of data from













βω0 0.413 <0.001 -1.476 -2.135 -3.039 0.003
βω
wPE2 0.321 <0.001 -0.051 -0.050 0.008 0.994
βCR0 0.315 <0.001 1.513 2.294 3.804 0.000
βCR
wPE2 0.484 <0.001 -0.162 -0.135 0.424 0.672
λ 0.327 <0.001 -12.591 -10.531 2.336 0.020
σ 0.771 <0.001 -1.552 -1.559 -0.161 0.872
190







−1.2 −0.8 −0.4 0.0 −20 −10 −1.8 −1.6 −1.4 −1.2 −1.0







































Figure B.5: Scatterplot of true and recovered parameter values for
each parameter in the best-fitting model of data from the human pri-
mary reward and punisher judgement bias task
There was a strong correlation between βCR
R̄
and αR̄, and a moderate correlation
between σ and all other parameters (i.e. βCR0 , β
CR
R̄
, and αR̄), see Fig. B.6. Recovery
of αR̄ was poor (Fig. B.7, Table B.4); the true and recovered parameters were not
correlated, although there was no significant difference between the true and recov-
ered means. Hence, inferences about variation across rats cannot be made using this
parameter. The model fitting procedure underestimated the value of σ and tended to
underestimate the value of βCR0 , although as above, this would not change the results
qualitatively (Fig. B.7, Table B.4).
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, and σ. The size of the circle indicates the magnitude of the
correlation, the colour indicates both the magnitude and direction,
and the number within the circle is the correlation coefficient.
Table B.4: Results of the statistical analyses of the true and recov-














αR̄ -0.037 0.864 -2.723 -3.256 -1.215 0.231
βCR0 0.720 <0.001 0.886 1.258 1.815 0.078
βCR
R̄
0.455 0.025 0.368 0.182 -0.176 0.862
σ 0.604 0.002 -1.455 -0.986 3.176 0.003
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Figure B.7: Scatterplot of true and recovered parameter values for
each parameter in the best-fitting model of data from the rat judge-
ment bias task
It is important to note that data generated from values outside the range of values
used here may not be recoverable. Indeed, the behavioural signature of extremely




0 ) would be near identical
(i.e. a high proportion of ‘stay’ or ‘go’ responses across all ambiguous stimuli) and
hence the model would unlikely be able to recover these values. Likewise, the model
assumes generalisation of the stimuli (i.e. the summarised judgement bias data should
follow an approximately sigmoidal shape when plotted), and consequently the model
would struggle to capture behaviour in which generalisation was not observed. More
specifically, although σ and λ govern the shape of the psychometric curve, there are
no values at which these parameters could capture a non-monotonic curve (e.g. 100%
accuracy at the most ambiguous cues; but 0% accuracy at the moderately ambiguous
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